

**SECURITY INCLUSION OF THE FR YUGOSLAVIA
IN EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
– Conference Papers –**

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Editors:
Miroslav Hadžić
Philipp Fluri

Belgrade • 2003

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Foreword

In order to develop into a fully democratic community, FR Yugoslavia must become a stable country in terms of security. To achieve this goal, the FRY government should first eliminate all internal causes of its citizens' insecurity. This implies that it should, at the same time, also eliminate and/or reduce all potential external threats to the country's security. Yugoslavia cannot do this on its own but only through cooperation with other countries – its neighbors as well as those from its broader surroundings, all the more so as the Euro-Atlantic Community has become the key security factor in the Western Balkans during the wars following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and also because of the expansion of NATO and EU. Therefore, the task that the new FRY authorities are facing is to define the country's international and security status in a different way. In so doing, they should first take a clear political stance towards the ongoing processes of security cooperation and integration within Southeastern Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Community. The first challenge in this process will be to determine the country's position on the Partnership for Peace program.

Having had to cope for ten years with undeclared wars fought in their vicinity, the citizens of FRY have remained unfamiliar with the contemporary theory and practice of civil, social and state security. To make things worse, the local intellectual elite also had no access to the latest developments in this field. This lack of knowledge, generated by the former regime's repression and the legacy of Communism, made ideological manipulations with the geopolitical position of FRY easier to carry out. It resulted in biased views and ideological disqualification of economic, political and security integrations in the Euro-Atlantic space. The final occasion that gave rise to local manipulations of this kind was the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against FRY.

In spite of this, by ousting Milošević on October 5, 2000, the citizens opted for democratic and market-oriented reforms in Serbia, i.e. in FRY. By this act, they also supported the new government's strategic orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic Community. However, if FRY is to join this community, the majority of its citizens must be willing to order their society according to modern democratic standards – and that is just one of the requirements that have to be met. As for a permanent consensus of the citizens, it can only be reached on the basis of elementary interests, whether these interests be related to economy, politics, security, the social sector or culture. To this should also be added the awareness that FRY cannot further these interests

outside the Euro-Atlantic structures, to which it naturally belongs. If the citizens, through the mediation of policy makers, are to arrive at a list of mutual interests and then give their approval of it, they should first understand why FRY should become fully integrated with the Euro-Atlantic Community. Therefore, the citizens should have access to reliable information and expert analyses that would convince them that FRY can only return to Europe if it fully integrates with the Euro-Atlantic Community – in terms of economy, politics and security.

Wishing to meet these needs, the Center for Civil-Military Relations, a non-governmental organization from Belgrade, organized an international conference entitled "PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY INCLUSION OF THE FR YUGOSLAVIA IN EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY." The conference, held in Belgrade on September 21–22, 2001, was opened by the FRY Federal Foreign Affairs Minister Goran Svilanović. The organization of the conference and the publication of a collection of papers presented at it were supported by the NATO Office of Information and Press from Brussels and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

In addition to FRY officials, the participants included numerous domestic and foreign experts. What is more, this was the first time that a delegation of the NATO Headquarters from Brussels participated at a conference of this kind in FRY. The delegation was headed by Mr. Robert Serry, Director of Crisis Management and Operations, NATO HQ, Brussels. On this occasion, the first unofficial contacts between the representatives of FRY authorities and NATO were made. In addition to this, on the second working day of the conference the participants visited the Military Academy of the Yugoslav Army, where they were presented with the curricula of high military educational institutions in FRY.

II

The main topics discussed at the conference were:

- analysis of the security dimension and achievements of the Euro-Atlantic Community's ongoing integration;
- examination of the degree of achieved economic, political and security integration within the Euro-Atlantic Community;
- theoretical and political controversies related to the unification and/or pluralization of the Euro-Atlantic Community's security system;
- examination of interrelatedness of security systems of the Southeastern European states and the Euro-Atlantic Community;
- integrative role and security capacities of NATO and the Partnership for Peace program;
- listing key features of FRY's new security position;

- FRY's capacities for reform and integration; preliminary estimate of the Yugoslav Army's capability to join the Partnership for Peace program;
- estimation of the prospects for FRY's joining the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Thanks to the participants, the conference had a number of positive effects, including the following:

- it facilitated an exchange of views between local and foreign experts from the relevant fields;
- it encouraged the transfer to FRY of contemporary theoretical thought related to the concept and practice of mutual security;
- it enabled foreign experts to present their views on the progress and achievements of the security integration within the Euro-Atlantic Community directly to the professional and general public in FRY;
- it provided domestic experts with an opportunity to present publicly their views on the achievements and limits of the security integration within the Euro-Atlantic Community;
- it encouraged a reassessment of the effects of the Euro-Atlantic Community's role in the crisis and wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
- through the media, it provided the local public with information about the development of security integration within the Euro-Atlantic Community and the role of NATO and Partnership for Peace in the process;
- it presented to the domestic public the fundamental interdependence of Southeastern Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Community in terms of security;
- it helped domestic experts and the public to learn the fundamental security aspect of FRY's full – i.e. economic and political – integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community;
- it presented to local experts and the public the key procedures and standards that FRY would have to meet in order to join the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community.

III

The collection of texts which we hereby present to the public includes authorized transcripts of conference discussions and the papers presented by the conference participants. The fourth section of the present volume also brings the papers from the international seminar entitled “FR YUGOSLAVIA AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE – EXPECTATIONS AND PROSPECTS”, held in Belgrade on January 16–18, 2002, organized by the Institute for European Studies from Belgrade

under the supervision of Jovan Teokarević. There were two reasons to include these texts in our collection. Firstly, FRY's relation to the Partnership for Peace program was the central theme of both conferences. Secondly, both conferences have been held thanks to the support of the same donors – the NATO Office of Information and Press from Brussels and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

According to the themes and issues they address, the papers and transcripts of discussions are grouped into four sections. The first section includes the papers that, taken together, describe the international and local political climate in which FRY's prospects for joining the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community are being examined. A comparative reading of articles by Dušan Lazić and Robert Serry provide the reader with an insight into the official views of FRY and NATO concerning the prospects for their future cooperation. This gives the readers an opportunity to compare and contrast these views. In the text that follows, Philipp Fluri examines the experience of the neutral Switzerland and its motives for joining the Partnership for Peace program, explaining why in his opinion FRY should also begin the process of integration with the Euro-Atlantic Community as soon as possible. The results of an opinion poll conducted by Milorad Timotić show the reader what the citizens of Serbia think about this issue. Finally, a text by Vladimir Rukavishnikov informs the reader about the Russian views on NATO's European policy. This is all the more intriguing as the “Russian factor” has so frequently been referred to on the Serbian political scene – both in a sober and a manipulative fashion.

What links together the texts from the second section of the present volume is their focus on contemporary security theory and practice. The section opens with an essay by Michael Pugh, in which he problematizes, in general terms, the relation between the civil society and the security sector, examining the role and status of the civil society in relation to the new concept of security. Marc Houben, on the other hand, focuses on the stages that the reform of armed forces usually goes through in developed Euro-Atlantic societies and the impediments that sometimes arise in this process. Vojin Dimitrijević examines, in the context of international peace, the interdependence of internal prosperity and external security in the countries that managed to break away from their Communist past, while Radoslav Stojanović analyzes the influence of the specificities of the Balkan region on European security.

The third section of our collection features papers examining FRY/Serbia's internal prospects for joining the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community. By analyzing the key elements of the transition strategy adopted by the new Serbian government (the Democratic Opposition of Serbia), Vladimir Goati implicitly explains why DOS is currently reserved towards FRY's speedy admission to the Partnership for Peace program. Miroslav Hadžić uses his short account of the domi-

nant political and ideological discourse in Serbia as an opportunity to elaborate on the possible ways in which FRY could benefit by getting integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Community's security system. In the essay that follows, Mile Stojković presents his findings concerning FRY military and defense system's capacities for integration. Finally, Zlatan Jeremić writes about the changes that have already been made and those that still lay ahead if the Yugoslav Army is to join the Partnership for Peace program.

The fourth section brings together five essays of authors from five different countries: Jovan Teokarević looks at FRY's attitude to the Partnership for Peace program. Ivan Ivanov sums up the Bulgarian experience with the program, Zsolt Rabai gives an account of what Hungary had to do to become a member of NATO, while Ljube Dukoski writes about the attitude of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Partnership for Peace program. The section and the whole collection end with Stefan Merisanu's analysis of the goals, structure and area of responsibilities of the Partnership for Peace program.

Belgrade, May 5, 2003

Editors

PART ONE

Dušan Lazić*

The Cooperation Between FRY and NATO

In order to examine the issue of the cooperation between FRY and NATO as accurately and thoroughly as possible, let us begin by going back in time and looking into the context of international relations in recent years.

Over a long period of time, formal, institutionalized forms of cooperation between FRY and NATO did not exist. This, however, does not mean that there were no contacts, and even certain forms of cooperation.

During the Cold War and the division of the world into two blocs, particularly visible in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) showed considerable interest for the territory of Yugoslavia. Back then, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a buffer state between NATO, i.e. the West, and the Warsaw Pact, i.e. the East. After the collapse of the Berlin wall and as the integration processes in Europe, including the continent's new security structures, started building up, NATO's interest in Yugoslavia changed.

NATO Changes Its Role

Abandoning the role it had during the Cold War, NATO now worked out new forms of inclusion and distributed its troops in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Alliance forces were assigned complex peacekeeping and security missions aimed at maintaining stability in the region. In different forms and with different mandates, NATO forces ensured their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo – i.e. Yugoslavia – and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is safe to say that at this moment NATO is the key security organization in Southeastern Europe.

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Another important prerequisite for the cooperation between FRY and NATO is the expansion of the Alliance and a new situation in our country's immediate environment. This process began when Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined NATO. The former members of the Eastern Bloc (Bulgaria, Romania) and all the former Yugoslav republics are clearly committed to become integral parts of the Euro-Atlantic structures as soon as possible. Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, as well as Albania, have been included in the Partnership for Peace Program for years. Just recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina also applied.

In fundamentally different international and internal conditions, FRY now intends to establish and develop cooperation with NATO, in an attempt to join the current trends in Europe and the region.

The Cooperation: Ups and Downs

FRY's cooperation with NATO in the past decade reflected the attitudes of the former regime, which, as proved in practice, were in collision with the country's vital interests. Hostile and groundless views were often publicly expressed against NATO, on the one hand, while its missions elsewhere were tacitly supported, as a result of international pressure and the necessity to accept certain international obligations. With the signing of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreements (1995) and the accompanying documents, NATO's cooperation with FRY, as one of the sponsors of the Agreement, was formalized for the first time.

With the eruption of the Kosovo crisis, the relations with the Alliance went downhill, reaching their lowest point as NATO launched the bombing campaign against FRY. The political and psychological consequences of these events can still be felt in FRY-NATO relations, and can only be left behind gradually.

After the demise of the old regime, the democratic changes in Yugoslavia created conditions for a fresh start in the cooperation with NATO. Initiatives were taken and possibilities considered for Yugoslavia, one of the region's two remaining non-members – to join the Partnership, as an important element of international security.

The cooperation with NATO gave the most visible results in resolving the crisis in Southern Serbia. The implementation of the crisis-management program of the governments of Serbia and FRY for the municipalities of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja, endorsed by the international community, resulted in mutual trust and partnership, which have already bore fruit. The so-called Ground Security Zone, set up after the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement, was done away with, as was the buffer zone keeping apart the Yugoslav Army and KFOR (NATO-led multinational forces). The no-fly zone over Kos-

ovo was recently shrunk from 25 km to 10 km. The position of hostility was therefore abandoned. New relations in the region and the constructive policy now pursued by FRY and Serbia, have brought about positive changes. The direct involvement of Yugoslav and Serbian officials, above all Serbian vice-premier Nebojsa Covic, and the teamwork of the Yugoslav forces and NATO on the ground, resulted in good cooperation and mutual trust. All this put an end to the terrorist attacks of the Albanian extremists, pushing them away from the territory of Southern Serbia.

A special form of cooperation was established in the area of solving the problems in Kosovo, based on the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement and in compliance with the Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council. A Joint Commission of the Army of Yugoslavia and KFOR for the implementation of the Agreement was formed with the aim to secure a complete implementation of the above-mentioned documents. In addition, further contacts and cooperation among the representatives of our country and UNMIK took place.

Yugoslavia's and NATO's common interests led to a further improvement of their relations. In this context, let us mention the federal government's decision of August 23, 2001 allowing KFOR countries to transport troops, weapons and military equipment to and from Kosovo, in compliance with Yugoslav laws and regulations, and under the provisions of the Dayton-Paris Agreements and the UN Resolution 1244. Thus, Yugoslavia has manifested its readiness to cooperate with the international peace forces in its territory and surrounding areas. In this context, an agreement defining the status of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo is a next urgent step.

Also, let us underline the importance of a regular dialogue that the Yugoslav authorities managed to establish with NATO leaders, in particular the Secretary General Lord Robertson. FRY's Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic and Covic visited the NATO Headquarters on several occasions in 2001 to discuss a number of crucial topics. Minister Svilanovic, upon the invitation of NATO Secretary General, participated in the conference of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council in Budapest, in late May. This was the first time a FRY state official addressed this forum, drawing together the representatives of NATO states and all the participating states of the Partnership for Peace.

What is the Next Step?

All this said, a logical question presents itself: what next? Years of our country's international and self-imposed isolation, in addition to all other consequences of the previous regime's policy, made it impossible for FRY to join sooner the modern global and European trends and play an active and constructive role in the international relations. Therefore, it is imperative to make up for all the opportunities missed during the nineties and deal with all the negative consequences.

The issue of FRY's accession to the Partnership for Peace comes quite naturally. Many reasons speak in favor of it. At its last meeting, the Supreme Defense Council postponed this decision until after an agreement had been reached on the future status of the Yugoslav federation.

The cooperation between FRY and NATO is thriving. It is quite specific in more ways than one. As a country well aware of its needs and potentials vis-à-vis the global, as well as European and regional trends, Yugoslavia will build its relations with NATO bearing in mind its long-term interests and priorities, as defined by our new foreign policy.

Of course, this implies further democratic changes and reforms in our country, as well as full observance of our international obligations.

Robert Serry*

NATO's Role in the Balkans

Overall Policy Objectives in the Balkans

- Objectives in the Balkans must be seen through optic of overall objective of the Alliance, which is creation of long-term stability throughout Euro-Atlantic area, based on commonality of values and strategic interests.

- Specific objective in the Balkans, where NATO heavily engaged in Crisis-Response Operations, is the establishment of sustainable peace, opening the way to Euro-Atlantic integration. In the near term, this involves efforts to contain crises or, when possible, prevent them.

- Recently agreed Task Force Fox aside, other 2 NATO-led operations in the Balkans (KFOR and SFOR) focus their efforts on an end-state, rather than an end-date. Generally speaking, the primary goal of both missions is to ensure a safe and secure environment, in which agencies responsible for civilian implementation can do their work, helping all citizens to rebuild their lives. Specific, targeted support is also given in instances where it is essential for achieving wider civilian-implementation objectives, such as: support for bringing PIFWCs to justice; support for elections; public security; and the safe return of DPRES.

- A key aspect to helping build domestic stability and successful transition in the Balkans is promotion of defence reform, including the monitoring of defence budgets in each country. This is pursued through a range of activities and other programs, including PfP.

- Key element of success for NATO-led missions is conducting them impartially, without favor or prejudice to any party, and in full accordance with all applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

- Another key element of success is to draw widely on knowledge and perspectives from interested nations throughout the IC. Over 30

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nations participate in SFOR and KFOR, including Russia, which continues to be an invaluable strategic partner. Extremely close cooperation and coordination with key IOs is also a top priority, including the UN, OSCE and EU.

- To achieve these goals and objectives, NATO relies on two main categories of tools: short-term tools, which include immediate activities for crisis prevention or management, and longer-term tools.

- Longer-term tools include engagement through the EAPC/PfP, the MAP process, SEEI, and support through the Stability Pact, including SEECAP.

- Now that I have spoken about NATO's overall objectives in the Balkans and the manner in which we are pursuing them, let me mention some specific aspects of each mission.

SFOR

- SFOR's current size is about 19,000 troops from 19 NATO and 15 non-NATO nations, including Russia.

- SFOR continues to maintain a secure and safe environment, ensuring the conditions for progress towards full military and civil implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, which is its primary mission.

- SFOR also provides strong, closely coordinated support to the other key IOs, including the OHR, ICTY, UNMIBH/IPTF, OSCE and the UNHCR, which is in charge of the returns of DPRES.

- SFOR will continue to support progress in the areas of minority returns; enhanced co-operation between the entity armed forces; further detention of persons indicted for war crimes; the fight against illegal secret services, corruption, and organised crime; and the implementation of judicial and police reform. SFOR will also continue to support the High Representative's efforts to counter the challenges posed by separatist activities and nationalist violence.

KFOR

- In accordance with UNSCR 1244, KFOR, a robust peacekeeping force of nearly 50,000 troops was deployed on 12 June, 1999 to restore and consolidate peace in Kosovo. NATO is firmly committed to UNSCR 1244 and to a peaceful, united, multiethnic and democratic Kosovo, and ready to cooperate with Belgrade to this end.

- Today, KFOR has about 42,000 personnel deployed in Kosovo, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, in Albania, and in

¹ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Greece, including troops from 16 Partner countries, including Russia, and four non-NATO Partner nations.

- KFOR has five main areas of responsibility under UNSCR 1244:

1. *Deterrence.* Deterring renewed hostilities in Kosovo and reacting to any threat against KFOR troops.

2. *Provision of a safe and secure environment* in which all people of Kosovo can live freely and UNMIK, IOs and NGOs can work in safety. Key aspect of creating this environment is encouraging return of refugees and displaced persons from all communities. Other main effort is helping UN Police and the KPS to ensure public safety and order throughout Kosovo. In pursuit of this task, KFOR conducts between 500 and 750 patrols, operates over 40 temporary or static checkpoints and guards over 150 patrimonial sites on a 24-hour basis, every day. On any given day, two out of three KFOR soldiers are out, conducting security operations, with a particular focus on minority protection. In Pristina, for instance, British soldiers are living with and guarding individual Serb families. KFOR soldiers regularly escort Serb and Roma children to schools. Other soldiers protect the civil and religious infrastructure and some minority groups.

3. *Demilitarise and transform the Kosovo Liberation Army.* Following the end of hostilities, a major concern was preventing former fighters from drifting towards organized crime or extremist groups. To do this, the KPC was created as a civilian public-service organization, working for the benefit of all citizens of Kosovo. Besides receiving various types of disaster-relief training, the KPC will also become responsible for EOD clearance operations. On the whole, this has been very successful, with the KPC having performed thousands of hours of work rebuilding critical infrastructure, as well as other civil-service projects. But there is still work to be done. The KPC remains 98% mono-ethnic, and we are still waiting for the first Kosovar-Serb members, modalities for which are currently under discussion. Despite occasional acts of non-compliance by individual KPC members, the process remains under strict control, and KFOR and UNMIK remain committed to the strictest enforcement of the KPC Code of Conduct, including by taking actions such as the recent dismissal of high ranking KPC personnel.

4. *Support to international humanitarian effort.* KFOR has provided wide-ranging support to all facets of infrastructure repair.

5. *Support to the international civil presence within Kosovo – UNMIK.* KFOR maintains a good and close working relationship with UNMIK and each of the Pillars, Police and Justice (UN); Civil Administration (UNMIK itself); Institution Building (OSCE) and Reconstruction (EU).

- The general elections on November 17 will constitute a very important milestone for the future of Kosovo, allowing all people to take ownership of their future. NATO, as well as the wider International Community, is looking forward to the fullest Kosovo-Serb participation in those elections. Recent declarations of support from Belgrade for the registration process have been particularly helpful in this regard.

Operation "Amber Fox"

- Since the beginning of KFOR, over 2,000 troops from KFOR REAR, mostly performing logistics functions.
- When crisis began in March, NATO created NCCC to liaise, coordinate and share information with FYROM authorities, so that FYROM government and KFOR could act in a mutually reinforcing way. Became directly involved in political and negotiating process, represented *in situ* by civilian NATO Ambassador, Personal Rep.
- On 22 August, NATO deployed Operation Essential Harvest, with full support of FYROM government. Role of TFH: immediate collection of voluntarily surrendered arms and ammunition from the so-called NLA.
- The political reforms NATO is supporting, contained in the Framework Agreement, should better prepare the country for further integration into the European mainstream.
- Following the successful conclusion of Operation Essential Harvest on 26 September, NATO has agreed the deployment of Operation Amber Fox, for an initial period of three months, which will provide emergency support to the civilian EU and OSCE monitors, if required.
- Now that I have given some details of NATO-led activities in the Balkans, let me turn to the issue of NATO-FRY relations.

NATO-FRY Relations

- Since the landmark democratic changes in Belgrade, relations between the FRY and NATO steadily developing. Changes opened new opportunities for cooperation on issues of common interest, as well as enhanced regional cooperation which contributes to peace and stability in South East Europe, NATO ultimate aim as I have said.
- Intensified contacts have been key in this development, such as: Minister Svilanovic's attendance of the EAPC Ministerial in Budapest in May 2001; Deputy Prime Minister Covic and Svilanovic's addresses to NAC throughout the course of this year; FRY participation in the Ad Hoc Committee on DU; FRY contribution to the South East Europe Common Assessment Paper (SEECAP), a regionally-led activ-

ity within NATO's South East Europe Initiative.

- Peaceful settlement of crisis in Southern Serbia is a key building block for NATO-FRY cooperation. Return of FRY/Serbian Forces into the GSZ in the framework of the Covic peace plan was a success. Allies attach utmost importance to the continuing implementation of the CBMs in Southern Serbia.

- NATO remains fully committed to UNSCR 1244 and peaceful, united, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo. Ready to cooperate with Belgrade to this end. Support cooperation on the ground between UNMIK/KFOR/FRY. Looking forward to full Kosovo-Serb participation in Kosovo-wide elections on November 17.

- Looking ahead in NATO-FRY relations: NATO is ready to consider further cooperation with FRY. Important issues to consider: continuing cooperation with ICTY, VJ restructuring and reform, continued restructuring of relations between FRY and RS Army in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accords.

Conclusion

- NATO remains fully committed to peace and stability in the Balkans and thus in the wider Euro-Atlantic area. Look forward to continuing development of NATO-FRY cooperation.

Philipp Fluri*

Why the Federal Republic Yugoslavia Ought to Apply for Joining the Partnership for Peace

Switzerland, like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), is a neutral country and, like FRY, it intends to remain neutral. Nevertheless, it has decided to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme. The very reasons why Switzerland became an active member of PfP and why, in spite of its strong commitment to neutrality, the Partnership enjoys popularity, seem to offer a good starting point for FRY to consider joining the Partnership as well.

Switzerland is a neutral country which does not intend to join NATO. Neutrality, however, does not offer protection from the many trans-border dangers and risks now threatening the democratic market economy. It is therefore not surprising that the Swiss government's report on security policy is entitled *Security through Cooperation* (Annex I). It provides a conceptual framework for a major and far-reaching reform and re-orientation of the country's security sector¹. After a lot of consideration, the Swiss government has come to the conclusion that security today can only be created and maintained through a joint international effort. Such cooperation, however, does not entail renouncing the principle of neutrality².

* PhD, Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

¹ The new strategy of Swiss security policy is geared towards cooperation. Within Switzerland, emphasis is put on the best possible coordination of our own civilian and military instruments through comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. Internationally, cooperation with friendly states and international security organizations will be expanded, as well as the Swiss commitment to enhance peace.

² The law on neutrality leaves considerable freedom for manoeuvre to the neutral state. In the current political-military environment, neutrality must be interpreted in an active way that expresses a spirit of solidarity. Neutrality does not prevent Switzerland from having an active commitment to enhance peace or from cooperation in military training. However, the law of neutrality prohibits

Successful cooperation presupposes a sufficient degree of interoperability. Switzerland has thus enthusiastically embraced the *Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP)*. With its long tradition of neutrality, it lacks practical experience in international staff work and many other practical, human resources-related aspects of interoperability. Together with, and complementary to PARP and OCC, TEEP is key to such adjustment of mindset.

The NATO Secretary General's Report on TEEP of November 30, 1999, defines the objectives of this initiative as follows:

(TEEP) aims at increasing the ability of training and education efforts to meet current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational Partnership, focussing specifically on the achievement of interoperability. It also seeks to promote greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.

What does this mean concretely?

- Joint European defence efforts will be leading to an increased demand in training. This growing training demand can only be met through increased international cooperation.
- Available resources will remain scarce. All TEEP programmes – the Training Centres, the PfP Consortium, and Simnet – are therefore aiming at enhancing the efficiency of the use of our scarce resources.
- TEEP is an important tool for making better use of the resources *in the spirit of* programmes of the PfP nations. Given the scarcity of resources mentioned above, it is imperative to tap this potential and to better coordinate it with the existing PfP programmes and initiatives.
- Such an approach will permit Partner nations to play a more substantial and politically visible role, thus encouraging them to increase their contributions, and eventually providing the Partnership with tools of interest not only to the Partners, but also to NATO.
- TEEP is complementary to the existing NATO training opportunities and institutions. It is a force multiplier that allows more people, and a broader community, to be reached more efficiently, more effectively, and more rapidly.

TEEP aims not only at the military, but also at the civilian security policy community. It is, thus, an important tool for strengthening civil-military cooperation, the emergence of a Euro-

military support of any warring party. For this reason, even in peacetime, a neutral state cannot make any commitment to give military assistance in the event of war. Therefore, membership in NATO is not compatible with neutrality.

Atlantic community of values, and of a trans-Atlantic crisis management capability.

By joining the Partnership and by having access to TEEP, the demands for improved military training, deepened civil-military cooperation and a better use of modern information technology can be satisfied. TEEP has motivated Switzerland to define its own strengths and make its own expertise available to the interested parties:

- *TEEP clearly contributes to meet the increased demand for an improved military training:*

The usefulness of the PfP Training Centres is obvious. More of these centres, particularly of a regional nature, are required. The Baltic Defence College, to whose activities Switzerland contributes financially, in kind and with personnel, could serve here as a model. Similarly, the value of the "Simulation Network" initiative needs no further comment. Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) and modern information technologies (IT) will in the years to come evolve into the key tools of military training. The scope ranges here from improved English language training all the way to individualized and highly specialized distance-learning systems to better prepare individual officers and civil servants for virtually every type of military and security policy assignment. The *PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes* has come up with a whole series of tools, designed to complement and broaden the existing training offers.

- Secondly, TEEP is an indispensable tool for responding to the need for increased civil-military, cooperation.

The Swiss PfP Training Centre, the *Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, is a joint venture of Switzerland and another 15 Partner nations. It offers security policy courses, varying in duration from three to nine months, for officers, diplomats and civil servants from all over the EAPC area. Each year, some 75 participants attend these courses. In this way, the Centre contributes to the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security policy community.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) documents good practices in civil-military relations and makes the lessons learned available to our partners in Eastern Europe.

- Thirdly, TEEP will be a genuine motor for change with respect to the need to make better use of modern IT.

The future potential of ADL for training is evident. In this area, the Consortium will – with dedicated working groups on IT and ADL, respectively – be at the cutting edge. The US and Switzerland have concluded a bilateral MoU to support the Consortium with quite substantial means. The need for extensive use of simu-

lation technologies is no less evident. Sweden has taken the lead here, together with the US. Finally, Switzerland, as an IT-led Partner nation, will put its *International Relations and Security Network*" (ISN) at the disposal of Partners and TEEP³.

Why then does FRY ought to join the Partnership for Peace?

Quite a few good reasons should have become obvious straight away from what was said above:

- The Partnership creates security through cooperation, which for the time being makes it unique in Europe.
- It is adapted to the new risks and threats to European security that emerged after the Cold War.
- It is politically accommodating in that it does not force governments to renounce their policy of neutrality.

Other advantages are less evident, though by no means negligible:

The membership in PFP has certainly breathed oxygen into the Swiss defence thinking: an armed force, intellectually isolated from both the outside world and combat action for more than a hundred years, has been exposed to 'interoperability' training and exercises on different levels. Different levels in the control-and-command structures have started to think in terms of *security through cooperation*. The trickle-down effect has had its impact on the general culture as well. The overall contribution of PFP membership to Swiss security-sector reform is still to be assessed. No doubt it will be *considerable*.

³ The ISN is a comprehensive IT network initiative. It offers a Links Library which guides users intelligently to over 2,500 web sites in international security. It also offers one of the world's most advanced Limited Area Search service that leads users not to web sites, but straight to answers and individual documents. In addition, the ISN provides the user with a highly professional conference calendar, a current affairs news service, and a dedicated educational modules homepage. Through a network of cooperation agreements it sets international standards and norms.

Milorad Timotić*

Attitude of Serbian Public Opinion towards Partnership for Peace and NATO¹

Introductory Remarks

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is one of the programmes which was warmly welcomed by all the former Socialist countries in Europe and central Asia. The membership in PfP is widely perceived as the first step towards the integration into the existing Euro-Atlantic defence system. The membership in this programme has always been preceded by the decision made by the ruling political forces in the country. However, the political elites would not have been able to do it without a certain level of public support in their respective countries and prior public and propaganda campaigns aimed at bolstering the public support for such political decisions. In FR Yugoslavia, the idea of joining PfP was put on the public agenda only last year, and that mostly within the expert circles. The Serbian public has not been sufficiently informed about it and has often been exposed to inaccurate reports and misinformation, while the citizens have had no opportunity to voice their views on the issue.

In view of the facts presented above, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) compiled a questionnaire about relevant defence and security issues in FRY, which was subsequently presented to the Serbian citizens so that they could state their views on PfP and Euro-Atlantic defence and military integrations.

Based on the project and questionnaires developed at the CCMR, the Centre for Political Research and Public Opinion of the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences conducted a survey on its standard, repre-

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¹ This article was written in September 2001.

sentative sample comprising 1,680 citizens of Serbia, March 3-10, 2001. The survey was conducted in 105 randomly selected local communities in the territory of Serbia excluding Kosovo.

A stratified three-tier quota sample was used in the survey. In the first stage, the proportions of the specific region were defined. For instance, the subsample for Vojvodina comprised the areas of Backa, Banat and Srem. In the second phase of the survey procedure, the municipalities were randomly selected, while the probability of their being selected was dependent on the size of their respective populations. The third stage included local communities selected by way of the same principles, but this time applied to areas within the previously included municipalities, also on the basis of cumulative frequencies. The quota criteria were stratum (urban and other settlements), gender, age and education of those surveyed with the starting point being the results of the 1991 census corrected on the basis of demographic projections.

The sample was fairly representative of the adult population of Serbia with respect to gender (50% male and 50% female), age group (21% below 30 years of age, 19% aged 30-39, 18% aged 40-49, 17% aged 50-59 and 25% over 60), share of urban population (57%), nationality (Serbs 81%, Hungarians 7%, Yugoslavs 3%, Muslims 2%, Roma 2%, Croats 1%, Montenegrins 1%, others 4%) and education (41% of those who did or did not finish elementary school, 45% with completed four-year secondary or technical schools, 14% with higher education).

The possibility of error for dichotomous variables is 3% for this type of sample.

The questionnaire included, amongst others, the questions referring to the country's security and defence, the role of the army in the political system, the future shape and structure of the Yugoslav Army and its attitude towards the defence system integrations in the region and Europe, the state of human rights in the Yugoslav Army, etc. The views on issues concerning the internal mechanisms and life within the Yugoslav Army and the respect of human rights in the army were provided by the subsample comprising of the respondents who had served the army or had been commanding army officers. This subsample comprised 698 respondents, which should be enough to draw reliable conclusions.

The results of the poll have enabled us to draw conclusions regarding certain aspects of the defence and the military about which the public so far had no opportunity to voice its views. This is due to several reasons, including extraordinary circumstances in the country for the past ten years as well as the special privileged position which the army traditionally enjoyed in our society. However, times have changed which is why such attitudes must also change, i.e., the public

should have the opportunity to make its views known about as many issues concerning security and defence as possible, including the army, which is precisely in charge of the country's defence and security.

1. The Greatest Dangers to the Security of FRY

In order to be able to form any opinion about the further transformation of the Yugoslav Army, it is necessary to have at least a vague notion about the position of the country in the international community and potential threats to its security. The question in Table 1 below serves to test this.

Table 1

Which are, in your view, the greatest dangers to the security of FRY?	Number	Percentage
1. world war	141	9.0
2. larger-scale European war	175	11.7
3. possibility of a renewed armed aggression by NATO	402	26.6
4. armed conflict with a neighbouring state	121	8.3
5. disputes with the current Montenegrin authorities	319	22.2
6. unresolved Kosovo problem	1305	84.0
7. emergence and activities of the so-called OVK (UCK) in Southern Serbia	1097	73.7
8. possible conflicts and instability in ethnically mixed areas	456	33.4
9. international crime (trafficking of people, drugs and capital)	335	24.5
10. other	19	1.9
11. no answer	81	5.2
total	4,451	300.5

The results in Table 1 suggest that the Serbian public perceives internal political problems and uncertainty as the main threats to the country's security. According to 84% of those surveyed, the major threat to the security of FRY is the unresolved status of Kosovo. The second problem is the emergence and activities of the Albanian separatists in Southern Serbia (73.7%), which was headline news at the time this survey was being conducted (early March 2001). The third problem, according to 33.4% of those polled, was the possibility of conflicts breaking out and instability in ethnically mixed areas. Only one tenth of the respondents opted for world war or larger-scale Euro-

pean war as a source of serious threats to the security of FRY. The respondents are less likely to believe in the possibility of an armed conflict with some of the neighbouring states.

2. How to Further Develop the Yugoslav Army?

As regards the public view of what is the biggest threat to the country's security and the need for an adequate transformation of the Yugoslav Army, the respondents have been asked the question below in Table 2.

Table 2

Given the new political circumstances in our country, how should the Yugoslav Army, in your view, develop in the future? Should ...	Number	Percentage
1. the Yugoslav Army maintain its present force and size, and modernise according to the current possibilities and resources of the society?	497	29.8
2. the army personnel be reduced and the military modernised in keeping with the possibilities and resources of the society?	950	57.0
3. separate republican armies be established under joint command?	24	1.4
4. the Yugoslav Army be abolished as the need for it has ceased to exist?	27	1.6
5. other	18	1.1
6. do not know	152	9.1
Total	1,668	100.0

The Serbian public is aware of all the limitations which this country is confronted with and is by and large realistic about the perspectives of the military and the country's defence. The absolute majority of those surveyed (57%) are in favour of the reduction of army personnel and its modernisation in line with the economic resources and possibilities of the society.

Respondents' Replies with Respect to Age Structure

Table 2a

Given the new political circumstances in our country, how should the Yugoslav Army, in your view, develop in the future? Should...	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 -	average
1. the Yugoslav Army maintain its present force and size, and modernise the military according to the current possibilities and resources of the society?	24.4	22.9	27.3	33.3	38.9	29.7
2. the army personnel be reduced and the military modernised in keeping with the possibilities and resources of the society?	62.5	64.9	64.0	59.4	42.5	57.1
3. separate republican armies be established under joint command?	2.0	1.6	2.4	1.4	0.2	1.4
4. the Yugoslav Army be abolished as the need for it has ceased to exist?	3.6	1.6	0.7	0.4	1.4	1.6
5. other	1.1	1.9	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.1
6. do not know	6.4	7.2	5.1	8.7	15.9	9.1

The results in Table 2a clearly show that the age of those polled has influenced their replies. 24.4% of the youngest respondents (18-29) believe that the army should maintain its present force and size as well as 38.9% of the oldest respondents (over 60). And conversely, 62.5% of the youngest respondents think that the army personnel should be reduced and the military modernised, while 42.5% of the oldest respondents share their view. The differences are logical and may be easily explained, which is why they should be taken into account when assessing the future position of FR Yugoslavia in terms of security.

3. Should the Length of the Compulsory Military Service be Reduced?

Lately, the possibility to reduce the length of the compulsory military service has been widely debated in public, while some non-governmental organisations have also been conducting public campaigns to achieve this goal. Hence, it makes sense to determine the opinion of the public on this issue.

Table 3

Should, in your view, the length of the compulsory military service in FRY be immediately reduced?	Number	Percentage
1. Yes	1013	61.7
2. No	414	25.2
3. Do not know	216	13.1
Total	1643	100.0

As expected, the majority of those surveyed (61.7%) are in favour of the reduction of the length of the compulsory military service. The age structure has also influenced the results: 71.3% of the youngest and 52.5% of the oldest respondents opted for the reduction of the length of the compulsory military service, with a conspicuously regular decreasing trend as the respondents' age increases.

4. Opinion About the Professional Army

Universal conscription in most European countries has been replaced by voluntary enlistment and the introduction of the professional army forces. The following table shows whether the public believes that the conditions are now right in this country for the introduction of the professional army.

Serbian public is also realistic with respect to the possible introduction of the professional army. The majority of those surveyed (42.5%) felt that the compulsory military service should be maintained while enlisting professional soldiers only for certain specialised duties.

Table 4

Some European countries have abolished the compulsory military service and introduced professional armies. What should, in your view, Yugoslavia do in this respect? Should it ...	Number	Percentage
1. keep the compulsory military service because it is a part of our tradition?	342	20.5
2. retain the conscript system and enlist professional (paid) soldiers for certain specialised duties after their having served the compulsory military service?	709	42.5
3. abolish the compulsory military service and replace it entirely with voluntary enlistment and the professional (paid) army?	466	27.9
4. other	10	0.6
5. do not know	142	8.5
Total	1669	100.0

The age structure considerably influences the replies to this question. While only 9.2% of the youngest respondents are in favour of keeping the compulsory military service in place, 33.9% of the respondents aged 60 and over share this view. A similar trend, but of course, in the opposite direction, is noticeable in relation to the results for question number 2 (48% of the younger and 36.5% of the older respondents). The survey results for the question number 3 (the abolishment of the compulsory military service) are quite interesting and indicative. The percentage of those surveyed in favour of the abolishment of the compulsory military service is steadily decreasing from 36.6% in the youngest age group to 13.9% among the oldest participants in the survey.

Hence, the young people are considerably more in favour of the abolishment of the compulsory military service than the elderly. Prevalent European trend to abolish the conscription system and introduce professional armies will probably have more supporters in the future in this country as well.

5. Is FRY Capable of Sustaining a Professional Army?

Of course, the previous question would make no sense unless there were no adequate economic resources in place to finance the professionalisation of the army.

Table 5

Do you think that now or in near future the citizens and the economy of FRY could financially sustain a professional army?	Number	Percentage
1. Yes	382	23.0
2. No	826	49.8
3. Do not know	452	27.2
Total	1660	100.0

Realistically assessing the existing economic resources and possibilities of the society, the majority of those polled (49.8%) thought that the citizens and the country's economy would not be able to sustain a professional army in the near future.

The age structure had no particular bearing on the replies of the respondents. It is conspicuous, however, that a slightly larger percentage of younger participants in the survey (26.9%) felt that the citizens and the country's economy would be able to finance a professional army in comparison to older respondents (17.4%). Most probably, younger respondents projected their anxieties and wishes that the length of military service be reduced or that the compulsory military service be abolished altogether.

6. Should Our Defence Policy Change?

After negative experiences in the confrontation with the international community and failed attempts to solve modern political and national problems by way of military force, it makes sense to ask the citizens of Serbia whether something should be changed in our defence policy.

Table 6

Following the landslide victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, in the general elections, the position of FRY in Europe and the world has changed significantly. Do you think we should modify our defence policy accordingly?	Number	Percentage
1. Yes	856	51.4
2. No	355	21.3
3. Do not know	455	27.3
Total	1666	100.0

The results shown in Table 6 suggest that an absolute majority (51.4%) of the Serbian public believes that the country's defence policy should change.

The age structure considerably influences the respondents' answers to this question. The older the respondents, the more inclined they are to

favour *status quo* in this respect: 58.1% of those surveyed aged 30 and younger as well as 38.9% of the respondents aged 60 or older are in favour of effecting changes to the defence policy.

7. How to Change Defence Policy?

The respondents were asked to express their view on the direction in which these changes should be effected.

Table 7


Which of the following answers best reflects your view on the need to change our defence policy? Should...	Number	Percentage
1. the military and political alliance with Russia be strengthened and should we rely on its assistance in the defence of FRY?	47	5.5
2. we gradually integrate into wider European defence structures, above all, "Partnership for Peace"?	643	74.9
3. we prepare ourselves for the membership in NATO?	106	12.4
4. other	8	0.9
5. do not know	54	6.3
Total	858	100.0

The majority of those polled (74.9%), who agreed that the defence policy should be modified, also felt that these changes should unfold as part of the gradual integration into European defence structures, above all, the Partnership for Peace programme. The percentage of those polled who thought that we should be preparing for the membership in NATO (12.4%) should not be disregarded. Considerably fewer respondents were in favour of other options.

The age structure in this case has slightly less influence on the distribution of the respondents' answers in comparison to the previous question: 3.8% of the youngest and 12.9% of the oldest are in favour of strengthening the alliance with Russia. 76% of the youngest and 63.2% of the oldest respondents approved of the European integration and the membership in the Partnership for Peace programme. The members of the age group 40-49 most often subscribe to this option (85.7%). The age groups 18-29 (14.9%) and 30-39 (16%) the most often opt for the preparations to join NATO.

In a survey of the identical sample of the Serbian population conducted in early June 2001, the citizens were asked a similar question. Due to a different wording of the question, slightly different answers were obtained, but, on the whole, these were largely "Eurocentric" replies.

Chart 1: Attitude towards possible membership in military alliances (%)



Among the options concerning the planning of the country's defence policy, on the whole, the prevailing view of the public is that the country should join the European defence alliances – Pfp and even NATO (43%).

One fifth of those polled is unable to select any of the options offered.

It may well be said that the public opinion is divided in this respect. This time, there are small but indicative differences in comparison to the answers of the respondents to a similar question in the survey conducted last autumn. While the attitude of the public towards the integration into the European military structures remained unchanged, a slightly larger percentage of the respondents (one fourth) felt that the country should maintain its independent position. Also, a slightly larger number of those polled were in favour of an alliance with Russia (8%)².

The common denominator of both public opinion polls is the fact that, despite years of anti-Western propaganda and the NATO air strikes, the majority of citizens believe that the solution to the problem of the country's security should be sought in some sort of integration into the European security structures.

² Excerpt from *Political Profile of Civil Discontent*, Serbian public opinion, summer 2001, CPA/CPS, page 25.

8. Closing Remarks

The survey of the Serbian public opinion as part of the investigative project entitled Protection of Human Rights in the Army and the Police of FR Yugoslavia – Serbia proved to be fully justified. The results of the public opinion polls which are reflected in the views of the public on this issue complemented the research of the legal and social aspects pertaining to the exercising of basic human rights in the army and the police, published as part of individual studies included in this collection of works.

Regarding the issues of the country's defence and security and viable development of the armed forces, the public voiced by and large its support for the following positions and policies:

- According to the views of the public, potential threats to the security of Yugoslavia may be ranked as follows: (1) unresolved status of Kosovo, (2) unstable situation in Southern Serbia (Bujanovac, Presevo) and (3) potential conflicts and instability in ethnically mixed communities. The external threats to the security of the country are, in view of the general public, considerably less serious than the internal ones.
- The Yugoslav Army should be reduced in numbers and modernised in accordance with the existing resources and possibilities of the society and in context of a realistic assessment of both external and internal threats to national security.
- The length of the compulsory military service should be reduced, but the conscript system should remain in place with the enlistment of professional soldiers for specialised duties in the army since the citizens and the current state of the country's economy cannot afford as yet the transformation of the Yugoslav Army into fully professional armed forces.
- It is necessary to make certain changes to the country's defence policy, which has been convincingly corroborated by the tragic experiences in the past years.
- The defence policy should undergo changes aimed at gradual integration into regional and European security structures, starting with the Partnership for Peace programme.

In the future democratic development of the political system in Yugoslavia, the public will undoubtedly play an important role in the shaping of the policies and their subsequent implementation. The strategy and military doctrine for the defence of the country are integral parts of its general political strategy which, in fact, they derive from, so the role of the public in drafting both the strategy and doctrine should not be disregarded. The public will be motivated to lend support and implement the kind of military strat-

egy and doctrine which, at least in general terms, correspond to the public perceptions of state and national objectives, but the welfare of individuals as well. Therefore, in the course of the imminent transformation of the Yugoslav Army, one should bear in mind these views, perceptions and convictions of the citizens with respect to the guidelines and directions for the society's defence system development. The entire process of defining the defence strategy and military doctrine, the reduction and modernisation of the armed forces and the provision of the proper legal framework for its positioning within the political system should result in establishing a democratic civil control over the army and the police in Yugoslavia. Democratic political parties, social institutions and organisations, and, above all, every individual as a member of an active public, vested with specific obligations and rights in the field of defence policy, take keen interest in this process. Democratic development of the society will be increasingly opening up the sphere of influence for every individual as well as the emerging structures of the civil society, the field for redefining and implementing the defence system and the space for members of the armed forces to exercise their human rights.

Vladimir Rukavishnikov*

Russian Perception of NATO European Policy

Introduction

The tragic events in the USA, which began to dominate our discussion, made me change the subject of my paper. The question of combining the efforts of the international community to counter new threats and challenges of the 21st century is particularly acute today. It is with this in mind that we in Russia consider questions relating to strategic stability, the settlement of conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans, the enlargement of NATO eastward, as well as the whole set of security, disarmament and arms-reduction issues.

Let me start by commenting very briefly on the historic and geopolitical significance of the tragic events that occurred in the United States on 11 September this year. In our view, the American and worldwide reaction to the terrorist attacks on the United States has global significance – it is central to a gradual building of a secure international system in which the United States and the entire Euro-Atlantic alliance want to play central roles, as does the Russian Federation.

However, the design of the 21st-century global security system is still not clear. There are various views on this topic in my country. Some are related to the present Russian NATO policy and the American policy in Europe. Others have to do with deep-seated phobias inherited from the past.

My assessment of Russia's approach to NATO's European policy does not reflect the official line. It is nevertheless based on knowledge of the past and present doctrines and circumstances. The description of the public opinion on NATO is based on the results of opinion polls and content analysis of messages conveyed to the public by the na-

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tional electronic and print media. The review of political platforms of the Russian parliamentary parties and debates in the State Duma was used in this analysis as well.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we shall consider the impact of NATO's operation against Yugoslavia on Russia's perception of the Alliance. The Russian view on the issue of NATO's enlargement eastward is dealt with in the second chapter. The third chapter is dedicated to the reaction of the Russian society and political elite on the tragic events in the USA.

The Impact of the Kosovo War on the Russian Perception of NATO

The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia had a profound effect on the Russian perception of NATO. In fact, the attack on Yugoslavia has taught Russians just what the US and NATO can do and, even more importantly, what they cannot and do not want to do.

In the eyes of the Russians, the attack on Yugoslavia was aimed to prove that NATO is the decisive force in the post-Cold War Europe and to re-enforce the US leading position in that organization. The Russian press emphasized that the aggression against Yugoslavia was primarily an American war (Madeline Albright's, according to some), which once more proved Western Europe incapable of handling the lasting Balkan crisis without Uncle Sam's assistance.

By attacking Yugoslavia, the US was determined to show that Russia was not capable to prevent or stop NATO's aggression against a sovereign state and, on top of that, a fellow Slavic nation. Whatever the strategic importance of Southeastern Europe for NATO is, the symbolic significance of that anti-Russian message cannot be overestimated. In 1999 it also became clear, at least for the Russian public, that the publicly declared goal to transform NATO from a military alliance into an instrument of political-military cooperation between the West and the East through PfP and the Russia-NATO Founding Act, had been discredited.

Russia was forced to accept the *de facto* occupation of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by the US-led coalition troops. The Kremlin felt humiliated, although the Russian peacekeeping contingent was later included in KFOR, the international forces policing the province.

Better than any other post-Soviet event, the Kosovo war exposed the true position of the Russian Federation in the new world order. "Wherever they look, the Russians can see that history is being made, but not by them", said British experts. We have to admit that this is partly true. Yugoslavia is now looking for a way to enter EC and NATO. As Yugoslavia's economic integration into European institu-

tions progresses, its links with Russia will probably grow weaker, despite the historical, ethnic, linguistic and cultural closeness of these two nations, repeatedly insisted upon by Serbs during the war. This may and, perhaps, will result in Russia's declining influence in the Balkans, which will not go unopposed.

As for the impact of the Balkan crisis on the political discourse in Russia, there was and still is no doubt that NATO's "humanitarian intervention" in the region provided with fresh arguments those in Russia whose position on the US and NATO can be described as hostile and distrustful. Not surprisingly, they had argued that country's reorientation toward the West (both in terms of institutions and values) was a strategic mistake of the Yeltsin administration that now must be reversed by President Putin. Pro-Western circles, already exhausted by the August 1998 financial crisis, had lost their moral standing as a result of Kosovo.

As we know, NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia led to temporary suspension of Russia's cooperation with NATO. From Russia's perspective, NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia despite Russia's opposition confirmed that "equal partnership" was just a slogan, and the Founding Act and PJC mere gesture politics or even mistakes of the Russian diplomacy.

After a special meeting in Brussels on September 13, 2001, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council issued a statement saying that while NATO allies and Russia "have suffered from terrorist attacks against civilians, the horrific scale of the attacks of 11 September is without precedent in modern history". Therefore, "NATO and Russia call on the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism", the statement said. The Council, which many observers recently qualified as a "discussion group", said NATO and Russia would "intensify" their cooperation to fight the scourge of terrorism. The future will show if deeds will match words. In fact, it is a good opportunity to redefine Russia-NATO relations.

NATO Expansion Is Making Russia Nervous

In our view, it is unrealistic to expect that NATO's expansion, in the long run, would not affect Russia's cooperation with the Alliance. It is equally unrealistic to count on the possibility of a quick transformation of NATO, which would make the enlargement more acceptable for Russia in military and political terms, as well as psychological.

The issues of NATO enlargement and the PfP program have been discussed since the early nineties. Russians ask why NATO continues to expand, adding new members and looking for sophisticated new weapons. Defense officials are alarmed over the possibility of NATO forces being deployed too close to Russia's heartland. Such fears were

not entirely unfounded, since NATO's new military doctrine includes an expanded sphere of the Alliance's activity beyond its members' territory. On the eve of the inclusion of new members, among which at least one of three Baltic states and former Soviet republics, Russia's top army brass remains strongly opposed to the Alliance's enlargement, which it considers a direct threat to the country's security.

Let us remember here the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter, during his testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 9, 1997. He said: "NATO's enlargement is about America's role in Europe – whether America will remain a European power and whether a larger democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America; it is about Russia's relationship to Europe – whether NATO's enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding Central Europe [...] The progressive expansion of NATO can resolve the question of disproportionate Russian power in Europe [...] In brief, to me NATO expansion is not principally about the Russian threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable. That is why NATO's enlargement [...] is very much in America's long-term national interest"¹.

Let it be said that Russians also think that enlarging of NATO is linked with the American national interests. Through NATO, the USA wants to maintain its military presence in Europe and simultaneously defy any step-up of Russian role in the continent². Therefore the admission of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to the Alliance has been viewed in Russia not so much as the accession of these states to NATO as the formalization of their security ties to the USA.

In February 1999, at a Washington conference on NATO enlargement, Mr. Brzezinski supposed that the very idea of expanding the alliance depended on the aim of NATO. He said: "If NATO expansion was particularly driven by the desire to enhance Europe's geo-political security against Russia, then no further expansion is needed because NATO has gained geo-strategic depth. It has enhanced its security by adding a chain of countries that further increases the scope of West Europe's security. But if Europe's desire to be a zone of peace and democracy was a driving element of NATO expansion, thereby creating a wider Euro-Atlantic system, then for it

¹ Quoted from: <http://www.csis.org/hill/ts100997.html>.

² "Washington should be in the position to counter any expansion of Russian influence in the region", – such a view was expressed by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, S.H. "The Lonely Superpower". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, March/April 1999, p. 47).

to follow that further expansion is mandatory. Historically mandatory, geo-politically desirable”³.

Soon after that convention, the enlarged Alliance dropped bombs and occupied the province of Kosovo to “punish President Slobodan Milosevic”. The Alliance intervened to “protect the Albanians”, “prevent spillover of the conflict into the entire Balkan region”, and, finally, to “protect democracy”. This constituted a precedent. In Russia, some asked at that time if the United States and its allies intervened into internal affairs of Yugoslavia “to protect democracy” – even to the point of bombing Serbia – why shouldn’t they do the same in Latvia or Estonia, where the Russian minority still had limited civil rights? Why were these countries listed for membership in the Alliance?

The US administration and NATO officials often say NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe is necessary to encourage the region’s new democracies to stay on the path to free markets and integration with Western Europe. This is only partly true since, as Prof. Dan Reiter from Emory University demonstrated, “NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe. The empirical record during the Cold War is clear: inclusion in NATO did not promote democracy among its members. Furthermore, enlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999 and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting the decision on their request for membership”⁴.

In Russian view, the interest of the top political leadership of Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO has been to a large extent initiated and is still stimulated by the Western proponents of enlargement.⁵ These countries seek to join NATO due to the desire to speed up integration into the Western community, to “return to Europe”, if not through the main door, the EU, then at least through the “side door”, that is NATO. One has to admit that the leaderships in all these states continue to fret that Russia might once again seek to dominate the region; they see NATO membership as a guarantee against that possibility. The irrational feeling of Russo-phobia supports this.

Speaking in Poland on June 15, 2001, President Bush “called for an Atlantic Alliance that would stretch all the way to Russia’s border,

³ Quoted from: Frank T. Csongos. “NATO: Expansion – How Far, How Fast?” <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/02/F.RU.990212141514.html>.

⁴ Reiter, D., “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy?” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.4 (Spring 2001), pp. 41-67; cited from p. 42.

⁵ This is the position of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, see: <http://www.svop.ru/doklad/en1.htm>.

delving more emphatically and aggressively than any of his predecessors into a matter guaranteed to make Moscow nervous”.⁶ Referring to the steady expansion of the Alliance, which will be discussed in details next year at the NATO Summit in Prague, Mr. Bush said: “The question of ‘when’ may still be up for debate within NATO, but the question of ‘whether’ should not”. He added, “As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas”.

Those phrases of Mr. Bush referred to historic facts and disclosed his perception of the new world order. Some people questioned whether the US president likened post-Soviet Russia to Nazi Germany, referring to the Munich pact by which certain European countries were assigned to Germany’s sphere of influence. Others argued that the post-Second World War order was created at the Yalta conference and therefore Mr. Bush’s remark could be interpreted as a sign that Russia’s vision of the world order of the 21st century will not be taken into account by the US and NATO.

In fact, Russia’s objections did not prevent NATO from accepting new Eastern European members in the recent past. Keeping in mind that at the 2002 NATO Summit the Alliance may invite new members and that at least one of the Balkan states will be invited to join in, this question is likely to cause Russia even more pain.

“NATO, even as it grows, is no enemy of Russia”, said President Bush. “Russia is a part of Europe and, therefore, does not need a buffer zone of insecure states separating it from Europe.” But Russia, Mr. Bush seemed to say, could become a friendly partner in his world vision or might find itself alone. Thus, the US president has admitted that NATO’s further expansion leads to a new division of the continent that may result in an isolated Russia.

For Russians, NATO remains above all a military organization. But given the absence of any kind of threat to Western Europe, Russians have been asking what is the purpose and ultimate aim of NATO after the Cold War and where are the limits of its enlargement. For as much as NATO officials insist that the Alliance has always been purely defensive and is not aimed against anybody, Russians are not happy with this explanation.

The Russian public agrees that NATO and the US are trying to diminish Russia’s influence in its immediate neighborhood, in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and considers the PfP program as an instrument for obtaining this goal. According to a wide-

⁶ Frank Bruni, “President urges Expansion of NATO to Russia’s Border”. *The New York Times*, June 16, 2001

(<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/16/world/16PREX.html>)

spread view among the Russian political elite, the aim of the PFP program is to enlist newly independent post-Soviet countries in a “strategic partnership” with NATO based on the belief that the main threat to their independence comes from Moscow and that military cooperation with the US and NATO should provide the means for containing this threat. The Russian military experts often name the PFP framework as a waiting room for nations seeking membership in the Alliance and as a military-to-military tourist venture in the case of Russia.

Politicians across the spectrum, from communists to liberals, are convinced that NATO’s eastward expansion can only be targeted against Russia.⁷ In less than a decade, they saw Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic transformed from Russia’s far ramparts to the first line of an increasingly aggressive Alliance, as Moscow started seeing NATO after the war in Kosovo. Naturally, behind a relative consensus among the parliamentarians (and basic actors of foreign policy outside the State Duma), differences in opinion abound: from a sturdy and irrational hostility to NATO, prevailing among most of the nationalists and left-wingers, to a rational acceptance of contemporary geopolitical realities, shared by many members of democratic, center-right and right-wing options.

Let us also point out that, despite a lack of sympathy toward NATO’s policy, the leaders of parliamentary parties share a common opinion that Russia’s national interest would be better served through cooperative engagement with the main international institutions, including NATO, to meet the new challenges facing it. At the same time, they vote for the increase of the defense budget.

Although the Russian public has not given much thought to NATO’s plan to expand to the east towards Russia, the public concern about NATO enlargement increased steadily year after year (Figure 1). In August 2000, over one half of Russians (54%) agreed that “Russia has reason to fear NATO countries”, while 32% shared the opposite view⁸. It means that a feeling of mistrust toward NATO is still alive and widely spread in the Russian society.

⁷ It should also be noted that the liberal, democratic and pro-Western politicians who initially, in the mid-nineties, had a neutral or even positive stance on the new post-Cold War NATO strategy no longer advocate the same views in public after the 1999 NATO war against Yugoslavia, due to a dramatically changed “climate of opinion”. Moreover, most of them have disappeared from the present-day political scene in Russia.

⁸ Results of August 2001 survey conducted by the Russian Center for Public-Opinion Research (VCIOM) (N= 1574 respondents). *Monitoring Objestvennogo Mnenia (The Russian Public Opinion Monitor)*, Vol. 1, January-February 2001, p. 15 – 30. p. 26.

"It sounds very elegant, the idea of spreading democracy in Eastern Europe, but it actually means not allowing Russia and its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States to get political and economic cooperation underway with Europe," said a Russian expert categorically. He added that Russia should consider the enlargement as an affront that sharpens the dividing line between it and the rest of Europe. Too strong of an expression, perhaps.




Fig. 1.

Russia's paramount national interest is to preserve and develop good relations, if not strategic alliance, with leading Western countries and their coalitions. In this context the US-Russia and Russia-NATO co-operation in combating global terrorism may be a basis of transforming NATO into a common European security system with an indispensable inclusion of Russia. Russian policy towards the West and, in particular, Europe is not exclusively focused on the issue of NATO enlargement. This is just a part, although a key part, of a bigger story. However, if NATO does not undertake to postpone the decision to enlarge eastwards at least for several years, the entire politics of deepening co-operation is destined to become void, to say the least.

Reflections on the Terrorist Attack on the USA

In September 2001, the Americans discovered that the world, which hates America, had real teeth. Let me say a few words about the reaction of the Russian society and political elite to the terrorist attack on the US.

The tragic events of September 11 have divided the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, into several camps, and there were intense debates on whether or not Russia should participate in the prospective US retaliatory strikes. Consensus was reached not to

participate in military actions, but to provide intelligence and other assistance. A resolution was passed giving the president moral and political support, but not unfettered power to lead the nation to a new war. The division of the Duma came as a result of the parties' positions on the USA and NATO. Ideological differences also influenced the expressed positions.

The leadership of the Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS – Zoyus Prvich Sil), a pro-Western party, stands for close cooperation with the US and its allies. Boris Nemtsov, an SPS faction leader, believes that Russia now has a historic chance to reconcile with the West once an for all.

Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of Yabloko, moderate liberal democrats, insists that the Russian leadership should do everything it can to cooperate with the United States and work out a joint anti-terrorist action plan. Yavlinsky called upon the leadership to carefully discuss all terms and details of possible military operations with the Americans, and to insure that missile attacks against terrorists would not hurt civilians.

The Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov categorically objects to any such proposals. Russia “should not get implicated in that war” and reminded of the Soviet Union’s disastrous invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing 10-year war.

The LDPR’s leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy shares a similar, only a more radical view. He reacted angrily to the statement made by Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov in Washington in which he said that all the CIS states were to decide for themselves whether or not to give military assistance to the US, and that Russia would not put pressure on its CIS partners. “I would fire such a minister within 24 hours,” Zhirinovskiy fumed. He said Ivanov’s words amounted to capitulation on Russia’s part. “No American soldier should be allowed to set foot on CIS soil,” he said. “They would stay forever, as they have stayed in the Balkans”.

Zhirinovskiy called for Russia to side with the Islamic world: “The (United) States is waiting for Moscow’s response to the recent events in the USA. If Moscow stands up to defend the Muslim countries, we will win. Russia will once again become the world superpower and will become the other center of the world” (cited from: <http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2001/09/19/DumaRisesfor.shtml>).

Deputy leader of the LDPR faction Alexei Mitrofanov took this one step further by saying that instead of sympathizing with the Americans, Russia should extend necessary assistance to the Taliban’s Afghanistan, because this country is now facing a humanitarian disaster.

The leaders of the political center, as always, followed the official position of the Kremlin blaming international terrorism and calling for

a cautious approach in case of a military response. They appealed for increased cooperation between parliaments in the common fight against international terrorism.

Russia's support for the United States and the Alliance as a whole was based on what Moscow perceived as a common cause: the fight against Islamic radicalism. The Kremlin has portrayed the second war in Chechnya as a struggle against Islamic fanatics and has blamed the same forces for the instability on Russia's southern borders.

Politicians and commentators drew attention to the fact that in those days people in Moscow had been laying flowers not only at the US embassy, but also at the site where, two years earlier, terrorists blew up residential buildings, killing innocent people. Of course, this coincidence was accidental, but it is symbolic. Today, Kremlin's position on the issue of terrorism is the same as two years ago. However, some argued that two years ago the West did not respond to Russia's call to combine the efforts of the international community in the fight against terrorism, and the Western parliamentarians continued to criticize the Russian authorities for cruelties in Chechnya. They also emphasized the alleged links between Osama bin Laden and Chechen rebels. The Russian government has consistently asserted that the Islamic terrorism it has been seeking to stamp out has its roots in Afghanistan.

Let us now go back to the available poll results.⁹ Several days after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., Russians were asked the following open-end question: "PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU FELT WHEN YOU LEARNED ABOUT THE SEPT. 11 TRAGEDY."

The overwhelming majority (77%) said they felt pity and sympathy for the American people, as well as fear, horror, shock, indignation, anger, weakness, helplessness and inconsolableness. Fourteen percent of the polled were unable to answer this question. And 8% were indifferent or even glad ("All is quiet, there are no emotions"; "I don't care"; "The Americans have gotten on everyone"; "It was the revenge they deserved"; "I rejoiced at their putting pressure on them").

Respondents were asked the following question: "SOME PEOPLE WERE GLAD THAT THE UNITED STATES GOT THE PUNISHMENT IT DESERVED. DID YOU FEEL THIS WAY, AND IF SO, WAS THE FEELING STRONG OR WEAK?" Answering this question, 72% of Russians said they did not feel satisfaction. Seven

⁹ Results of a nation-wide poll conducted on September 15, 2001, on a sample of 1,500 respondents in urban and rural areas, by the Public Opinion Foundation. The results were released on September 20, 2001. Quoted from a webpress-release entitled "I cry because I feel so sorry for those people". Authored by A. Petrova.

percent described their satisfaction as strong, and 15% as weak. Most of those from the “satisfied” category are Zyuganov supporters (36%).

As is known, Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to express his condolences to the American people. About one-third of those surveyed said they didn’t watch his television address (30%), while almost all the rest (55%) said they liked it. Eight percent of the respondents had negative feelings about Putin’s address. Forty-one percent said that they were satisfied with “the just punishment” of the United States.

It seems that many people in Russia see these events as a consequence of the US government’s policy of double standards, because the US backed the Taliban movement during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and supported Albanian guerillas (KLA) in Kosovo.¹⁰ There is a saying that will probably sound right to many: some days you give the bear to eat, and some days the bear eats you.

Russians coupled their sympathy for the victims with expressions of concern over how the United States would retaliate. They doubted that the US would find the real culprits and that no more innocent people would die. Using politically correct language and expressing their sympathy for the innocent victims, Russian analysts emphasized the need to look deeper into the roots of events and the odium held up against the US for its imperial behavior and arrogant display of power and wealth. It is a reasonable point of view: to understand war, we need to look at its origins.

Conclusion

Has the world changed since September 11? It is difficult to give a straight answer, perhaps even impossible. I doubt it very much that the ordinary people in Russia are any more frightened or worried about their everyday lives now than they were three weeks ago.

The attitudes toward the US and NATO European policy cannot change overnight even under the pressure of recent dramatic events and declarations about cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. Many attitudes and phobias, as well as the existing policies, reflect the paranoia of the Cold War.

In the early nineties, there was a totally different atmosphere in Russia regarding the relations with the West as a whole, NATO and the US in particular. It was much more favorable than today. The debate on NATO enlargement was at the root of a steadily increasing

¹⁰ According to a web news report, several members of the leftist National-Bolshevik Party in the city of Saratov on the Volga river tried to distribute leaflets describing the attack on the US as a just revenge for the 1999 bombing of Belgrade; they were arrested by the local police. Source; [http:// www.lenta.ru](http://www.lenta.ru)

anti-NATO sentiment in the Russian society. It is fair to say that NATO expansion, together with NATO's war against Yugoslavia, helped sway the public opinion against the US and the Alliance.

Popular disenchantment has been correlated with the deteriorating official ties between Russia and the Alliance. As Russia watched its own international influence and defense capabilities decline, it witnessed NATO's increased activity in the hot spots of the Balkans, such as Macedonia, as well as Kosovo and Bosnia, with strong suspicion.

Recently, President Bush announced that he would go ahead with the development of a national missile defense system, or NMD, and withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. Bush's decision is seen in Moscow as an untimely and irresponsible step, which may lead to weakening strategic stability and security globally. We doubt that the Bush administration will change its plans to create a new missile defense system and withdraw from the 1977 ABM Treaty, even with terrorism as the most urgent threat facing the US.




Fig. 2

The US administration is aware of Russia's position on the START-ABM issues. Consultations and dialogue continue. However, only the future will show how constructive it is. Although the Russian president and military representatives said that they are not afraid of the US missile shield plan, tensions between the US and Russia regarding this issue are obvious. The US missile initiative together with the "war against terrorism" has compelled the Russian parliament to increase defense budget. And, unquestionably, the very idea of the revision of the ABM treaty has a negative impact on the public (Figure 2).

President Bush tends to present the US-led military anti-terrorist action as a revenge, but if he wants to win the global war against ter-

rorism, he, like his father in the Persian Gulf War, must build a coalition of nations that is prepared to act. And, as we know, the administration has already mobilized its traditional allies, NATO partners, which are bound by the Treaty to help the US defend itself when attacked, and which gave their assurances to do so. Mr. Bush has found allies among some Arab and Islamic governments, just as his father did in preparing to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Washington is right to try to enlist Russia, which faces serious terrorist threats itself.

At this point we see an emerging discrepancy between Russia and the United States and its allies, which, like in the case of Kosovo, are ready to act militarily without the UN approval. The Kremlin proceeds from the premise that the UN Security Council should be at the center of international efforts to battle terrorism.¹¹ For Russians the most important goal for the UN now is to coordinate the response to the new challenges to international peace and stability and work out measures to allow preventing such tragedies in the future.

Thus, despite the consensus in favor of uniting the world community's long-term efforts against terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks on the US, the dissimilarity between Russia and the US and NATO concerning the use of force, especially without the UN mandate, remains clear. This dissimilarity was perceptible during the 1999 Kosovo crisis as well.

Acknowledging policy differences with Washington, we must add that this time Russia will certainly have to be by the side of the US, and that, maybe for the first time after the intervention in Yugoslavia, Russian officials are talking about the spirit of community with the United States and the American people, presenting it as a natural thing. Not only has Russia expressed its most sincere condolences after the tragedy¹², which had befallen the residents of New York, Washington and the whole American people, but is also ready, as stated by President Vladimir Putin, to render certain assistance in the "war on terrorism." Russia proceeds from the assumption that the recent challenge of international terrorism has been thrown down not only to the Americans, but also to all of humanity. Therefore, from the Russian point of view, the response to this must be a joint one.

Russia's vital interest is to belong to the European (Euro-Atlantic) collective security system. It is determined to proceed towards cre-

¹¹ The UN Security Council has adopted a resolution harshly condemning these terrorist acts. During the UN General Assembly session in September 2001, a meeting at the level of foreign ministers of the Security Council member states is to be held. The questions of combating international terrorism will figure prominently at this meeting.

¹² Upon Putin's orders, a minute's silence was held on September 13 at 12:00 throughout the country as an expression of sympathy for the September 11 victims. National flags were flying at half-mast throughout the country.

ating a global system of security that could respond to new challenges to peace and stability.

Perhaps the US could make certain practical steps to reassure the Russian government and the Russian public that it has abandoned the strategy of confrontation. Mr. Bush is clearly supporting the inclusion of a Baltic state in NATO. The US could, perhaps, refrain from extending NATO membership to states in the territory of the former Soviet Union before 2005.

If this attack on the US by a large terrorist cell may trigger World War III, it's not too early to start thinking about the long-term geopolitical consequences of this new war. Just as world wars I and II produced new orders and divisions, so too might this one. What could it look like?

The answer to this question lies in the future. But it is clear that it is very difficult to change the relations between former rivals without trying to change the minds of the people on both sides.

PART TWO

Michael Pugh*

Civil Society and Security Sector

*“Security sector reform is too
serious a business to be left to
soldiers.”*

(With apologies to George
Clemenceau)

Introduction

In an idealised system of civil-military relations, the separation of powers, political pluralism and the engagement of civil society seem to be indispensable conditions for a non-politicised military, and a non-militarised society. As various researchers have argued, structures, rules and training policies may change the operations of armed forces, but one of the most difficult challenges is to change the mentality of the military, their political masters and of society at large.¹ This requires the ‘transformation’ of civil-military relations rather than simply ‘reform’ of structures.

Security sector reform in transitional societies has tended to focus on the following areas:

- reform of the uniformed security branches and the training of parliamentarians and civil servants;
- supporting the establishment of structures of proper civilian control over the military;

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¹ Wolfgang Manig, “Problems of Transformation of the Defence Establishments in Central and Eastern Europe”, in Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (Eds.), *European Security* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 25. This paper draws on continuing research with Neil Cooper, “Security-sector transformation in post-conflict societies”, for the Centre for Defence Studies, London.

- training members of the military in international humanitarian law and human rights;
- strengthening national parliamentary oversight of the security apparatus.

But these areas do not necessarily address the problem of military/social attitudes. In common with other former Socialist-governed states, Yugoslavia already has a high level of capacity for reform, and even for transformation.

Structural and Ideological Legacies

It is true that the Party's claim to exercise control did not mean that civilians were in charge of the military. The military were brought into the Party. In the chief political decision-making bodies relating to security, the military exerted control over themselves, because they had the monopoly of expertise, and civilian expertise was lacking.² Nevertheless, in terms of reform and transformation, Yugoslavia has certain advantages.

The principles of political control and Clausewitzian political subordination were assimilated by the military. Indeed, it is notable that even where the military in parts of Europe had excessive influence on security policy or were used for internal repression, there are fewer instances of rule by the military and praetorianism (intervention in politics) than in non-Communist or anti-Communist states (Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile in Latin America for example, in Turkey and Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and many places in Africa). The principle of Party control, though deviating from civilian control in daily practice, became part of the culture and ideology of civil-military relations that could be asserted in times of crisis (with exceptions such as Poland and, possibly, Romania). Military rule was widely considered to be illegitimate. Institutionalised civilian supremacy was based upon: consensus about where legitimate sovereignty lies; consensus about processes for making policy decisions including procedures for political succession; and a capacity in the civilian sector to defend its rights through legal means.³

But a culture of civilian supremacy does not necessarily ensure a successful transformation of attitudes. Civilian control can be exercised for narrow personal or party interests and the suppression of political opposition. In Croatia under President Franjo Tudjman, for instance, army staff and the officer class were expected to be members of Tudjman's Croat Democratic Union, or face dismissal.

² Manig, "Problems of Transformation", pp. 26-27.

³ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall, 1962), p. 226.

Nor does military professionalism guarantee transformation. According to Samuel Huntington, it may be possible to change attitudes by appealing to the concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘professionalism’ in order to keep the military out of politics.⁴ However, ‘professionalism’ can be interpreted as loyalty to some higher authority, such as ‘the nation’, rather than to political control. In many coup-prone states, nationalism and the need for strong central government have provided guilt-edged invitations for the military to intervene.⁵ Moreover, as Alice Hills has noted with respect to civil police, standards of professionalism are culturally dependent and often skill- and status-based, rather than linked to moral choices.⁶

A Security-Policy Community

A transformation in civil-military mentalities requires something else than structural reform, a culture of civilian supremacy and a reliance on professionalism. It also requires the creation of a security policy community that stretches beyond the military and politicians.

For framing a transformative approach to civil–military relations, it is therefore important to note a difference of emphasis between:

- civilian control and management, which is constitutionally established through law and formal decision-making processes, and
- civil-society engagement, which is largely a matter of political and social mobilisation.

These are not differences – because the mobilisation of civil society can also be formalised as constitutional reform. For example, since Slovenia became independent, tribunals that hear claims for conscientious-objector status have a statutory obligation to include NGO representatives, such as peace activists, on their panels.⁷

But the importance of civil society is in its role in creating an awareness of issues, debates and security-policy options. Yugoslavia has been engaged in this process, through CCMR, since 1995. One of its main objectives has been ‘to animate [the] professional and political interest of citizens, their associations, political parties, parliamen-

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Practice of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 74.

⁵ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, p. 210.

⁶ Alice Hills, “Security Sector Reform and Some Comparative Issues in the Police–Military Interface”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 2000, p. 4.

⁷ Discussions with Marjan Malesic, Social Science Faculty, University of Ljubljana, 7 October, 1998.

tary and state organs for a modern arrangement of civil–military relations’.

Support for Civil Society

However, the concept of civil society is imprecise and a difficult one to capture. It can be defined as an emancipatory political alternative to authoritarianism: “where progressive values and political practices can be articulated, counter-hegemonic institutions can be created”.⁸

Not all non-state associations are ‘progressive’, of course; some may be dedicated to racism and violence or, like the Mafia, may be illegal, or declared so. It is not the existence of civic associations that strengthens civil society, but their purpose and the extent of their freedom to operate.⁹ In the context of security-sector reform, civil groups can be singled out for support if they foster bottom-up democratic processes for building trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion and pluralism.

Engaging civil society may mean funding training, workshops and conferences and the provision of legal materials. It may also mean subsidising broadcasting or publications, such as special issues of journals that incorporate the views of non-uniformed commentators. It can also mean helping local NGOs to put forward their views on issues such as conscientious objection and freedom of information legislation, and the welfare of the military.

Examples can be found in overseas development policies. The UK’s development policy, for instance, even includes the idea that:

*The voices of the poor can be strengthened by supporting those parts of civil society that help poor people organise to influence decision makers.... Promoting effective and inclusive systems of government, including an accountable security sector, is an essential investment in the prevention of violent conflict.*¹⁰

Specific UK and other programmes in Africa have included:

⁸ J. Gershman and W. Bello, cited in Michael Edwards and David Hulme, *Non-Governmental Organisations – Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet* (London: Earthscan, 1995), p. 35. See also Robert Cox, “Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999, pp. 3–28.

⁹ Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), pp. 164–79.

¹⁰ UK Department for International Development, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor*, White Paper on International Development, Cm 5006 (London: The Stationery Office, December 1999), pp. 25, 27–28, paragraphs 58, 59, 71, 77.

- a Netherlands–Mali initiative that has involved civil-society organisations in the formulation of a code of conduct on the role of the security sector in society;
- UK funding for the provision of legal materials and training to NGOs and professional organisations to underpin reform of, and wider access to, justice systems in Rwanda;
- Finnish and Swedish support to NGO projects for education and policy-making access on a range of democracy and rights-based programmes in Africa, and
- Norwegian and British funding for seminars and training on democratisation for defence researchers in South Africa and Zimbabwe.¹¹

South-west Europe is generally far more modernised than Africa, but the level of civilian expertise or interest in defence and security policy may be extremely low.¹² Consequently, greater investment might be directed towards introducing processes that reduce the possibility of the militarisation of societies, and the alienation of the military from society. Of course, Yugoslavia has a more developed security-policy community than, for example, Albania. Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia investment could be used to gain the widest possible support for the definition of new military functions and security doctrines.¹³

Roles and Sources of Civil Society

Rights-based women's groups, experts in the media, researchers and professionals such as health workers can make important contributions to the formulation and implementation of policy.¹⁴ They might be engaged in discussions concerning rules on conscientious objection, recruitment policies and the welfare rights of military personnel.

For example, public-service workers and Red Cross/Crescent organisations might be involved in formulating rules governing the use

¹¹ Malcolm Chalmers, *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective*, Conflict Prevention Network for Saferworld, January 2000, pp. 11–12.

¹² See Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, "Between the Past and the Future: Civil–Military Relations in the Balkans", *Sudost-europa*, Vol. 48, No. 1–2, 1999, p. 36.

¹³ UK Department for International Development, *Poverty and the Security Sector*, p. 4.

¹⁴ Kåre Lode, "The Peace Process in Mali: Oiling the Works?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1997, pp. 409–24; Mari Solheim, "Microdisarmament in Mali: Single Success or Model for the Future?", unpublished MSc dissertation, University of Southampton, 1999.

of the military in civil disasters and emergency relief, such as the recent floods in Yugoslavia. Military aid to the civil authorities in non-political civil emergencies has considerable transformation potential. The widespread criticism of the Turkish military's performance following the earthquake of August 1999 demonstrates that failure to participate effectively in disaster relief can damage the reputation and credibility of military institutions.

Three organisational categories can be identified: veterans' organisations, educational groups and functional associations.

Veterans' organisations. These groups might be expected to take a keen interest in military affairs, but they vary widely in their goals and objectives. There is no inherent predisposition for them to adopt transformative approaches. Indeed, veterans' organisations are not necessarily interested in depoliticising the military, or in curbing any praetorian political aspirations the military might have. Some are simply military coups or paramilitary units in waiting. Others are committed to civilian primacy, but are highly partisan. However, others are driven more by the welfare needs and employment of former soldiers, and they can be highly critical of secrecy and intransigence in military establishments. Their potential should be explored.

Educational and intellectual groups. Within the academic/educational sector, courses and research programmes on issues ranging from military history to disaster response are a significant source of debate and contesting theories. Institutes studying military policy, strategy and defence are a recognised feature of many societies. They may be close to the prevailing military culture, overwhelmingly realistic in outlook and dependent on cultivating government politicians. But they will also often take a provocative line. NGOs engaged in campaigning and/or consultancy can present clear alternatives to existing military policy. An interesting and successful experiment in South Africa from the mid-nineties saw NGOs involved in the drafting of the country's White Paper on Peace Missions (1999).¹⁵

Functional associations and voluntary groups. Groups that have a direct or indirect role in forming public opinion on military issues include:

- trade unions and employers affected by changes in military expenditure and industrialisation;
- women's groups affected by the mobilisation and demobilisation of soldiers;
- church and welfare groups with interests in humanitarian, moral and philosophical aspects of security policy;

¹⁵ Rocky Williams, "South African Policy and Practice in Peace Missions", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 88.

- environmental groups interested in protecting or managing areas affected by military despoliation or training;
- media organisations and journalists' associations that have a commitment to investigative reporting, and
- rights-based groups, such as branches of Amnesty International, local citizens' forums and local Helsinki Citizens Assemblies.

Conclusion

Democratic associations of civil society can play a transformative role in changing existing mentalities. This need not be limited to budgetary and performance oversight, but could include development of structures and regulations. The role of civil society groups would also be to mediate and translate security issues between the wider society and the defence establishment. They can make military questions meaningful to society and echo social concerns to the defence establishment. Such a transfer of knowledge can also occur by other means: official statements, military press briefings, and the election of parliamentarians with an interest in security matters. But official statements are only the beginning of dialogue, press briefings can be easily manipulated and parliamentarians are elected only every few years and do not usually devote much time to defence issues (except, importantly, through standing committees).

Obviously, transformation cannot occur without a solid constitutional foundation, a system of accountability, some concept of freedom of information and a degree of consensus about what needs to be kept secret for strategic reasons, rather than maintaining military privilege and power. But there also needs to be a level of knowledge and understanding of security issues in society and a willingness in the military to accept social change and civil society influence. And it should be a genuine dialogue, in which issues are contested in a reasoned way, allowing for constructive criticism. Only then will it be possible to build a security policy community of mutual respect which becomes part of a transformation.¹⁶

¹⁶ James Gow and Carole Birch, *Security and Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, London Defence Studies No. 40 (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College: London, 1997), p. 10.

Marc Houben*

“Teaching the Bear to Dance”

Introduction

In 1989, the armed forces of the Netherlands consisted of 100,000 men, of whom 45,000 were conscripted. Large army units were deployed on the German plain facing a certain number of Communist motorised rifle regiments. The defence budget made up 2.6% of the gross domestic product. By the turn of the century, the Netherlands had reduced its defence budget by 20%, abolished conscription – *de facto*, but not formally – and decreased its manpower in the armed forces to 60,000 men and women. The new buzzwords were: flexibility, mobility and rapid reaction.

Typically Dutch? Not really. Most of the armed forces in the Western European countries have gone through or are going through a transformation process that is similar and has been initiated by the events in 1989 and later. Germany has almost halved its defence budget since 1989 and will shrink the manpower of its armed forces from 470,000 to about 282,000 (80,000 of them conscripts) in 2004, if the plans of Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping are completed in their entirety.

If one compares the changes and experiences that Western European (NATO and non-NATO) countries had and have to face, it is hardly surprising that they share many of the characteristics and experiences of the transformation process. Among the countries that have completed (most of) this transformation process are the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Denmark. Belgium and Norway are in the middle of the process. Germany has just begun.

The aim of this article is to make some generalisations about the changes that most of the armed forces in Western Europe were forced to make after 1989. The proposition put forward is that these changes can be clustered into three distinct groupings: 1) a fundamental shift in *orientation* or outlook; 2) the increased *mobilisation* of resources and

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a substantially decreased reaction time; and 3) the revision of defence budgets and the subsequent massive organisational *reshuffle*. These classes are always interrelated and sometimes partially overlapping.

Reorientation

Minister Sharping declared that nothing less than a ‘complete re-orientation’ of the Bundeswehr would be required to meet the needs for the next 10-15 years. ‘Orientation’ is generally used to convey a sense of direction. Walking in the mountains, one has to orient and reorient oneself regularly, that is, one has to find his or her way around the place. I use the word orientation in the sense of ‘outlook’ or view of the environment, but without losing the connotation of direction. Orientation, as I use it in this article, is about a person’s outlook on the world around him, his environment, self-image, and the way he perceives his role and responsibility within that world. The dominating direction is from the inside out.

I would like to argue that people and organisations are in many ways connected to their outside world or context. In the case of the armed forces, one can even say that a very obvious aspect of this connection is that the ‘self’ or identity of the armed forces is in many ways a *reflection* of its context or environment. An army is conceived as a reactive instrument, whose primary role is to defend and protect. Its means and methods are a direct function of its adversary and hostile environment. Thus, fundamental changes in the environment or context of the armed forces greatly determine the changes that need to take place *within* the armed forces, as well as the impact such changes may have on the identity or self-perception of the armed forces.

Based on a comparison of the experiences of a number of European countries, we find evidence that the orientation of the armed forces in Western Europe has shifted in three meaningful ways: 1) from an *enemy* orientation to a *crisis* orientation; 2) from a *territorial* orientation to an *expeditionary*-based orientation; and 3) from a *defensive* defence posture to an *active* security posture.

From Enemy to Crisis Orientation

The intimate connection between an army and its enemy becomes clear once the enemy is gone. Immediately after 1989, many in Europe said that the main reason for having an army no longer existed, that the defence budget had to be reduced and the ‘peace dividend’ cashed in. In most countries, the peace dividend was indeed cashed in, but that was not all. In many countries the armed forces plunged into a deep crisis. What happened and why?

The orientation of the armed forces prior to 1989 was determined mainly by the existence of a collective enemy. The image they had of their enemy was that of a real person, that is, a human being. The enemy had a face and a gun. In 1989, that enemy suddenly ceased to exist. An important – but often overlooked – effect of the disappearance of the enemy was that it not only radically changed the context of the armed forces, but it also had a fundamental impact on the identity and self-image of the armed forces. The armed forces had defined and identified themselves as being *against* another entity. They needed an enemy to assert their own identity. When their enemy literally ‘lost his face’, it had a severe impact on the identity and self-image of the armed forces in Western Europe. In essence, the crisis that most armed forces suffered from was existential in nature.

The image of the enemy has since been replaced by neutral-sounding ‘threats’ and ‘risks’. ‘We no longer face a bear in the woods, but many snakes in a swamp’, according to a senior US Department of Defense official. Risks are anonymous, abstract, faceless, almost a non-identity. A risk is an event or development that may affect your security situation negatively, and this can happen in a completely unpredictable or random way. When there is a threat, randomness is absent. Intention or willingness to hurt comes in its place.

How does this affect the role of the armed forces? You can insure yourself against risks and in many cases the armed forces are seen as a sort of insurance policy. But what if that insurance policy is no longer the right insurance policy?

From a Territorial to an Expeditionary Orientation

A territorial orientation is reflected in the assertion that the security of a state begins at home. That is, the security of a state must be defended at the borders and the country must be ready to perform that duty. This territorial orientation is reflected in home-guard type armed forces as are found in Norway and Denmark. A second example is the forward defences of NATO when, during the Cold War, the armed forces were prepared to stop Russian motorised rifle regiments on the German plain.

The crises that erupted in the Balkans in the nineties had a profound impact on international political and economic stability and, consequently, on the local scene of relatively distant third countries. Chaos theory and non-linearity made their way into strategic thinking and defence planning. The experiences of the nineties led to the firm belief in many European countries that, to ensure security at home, national security sometimes had to be defended thousands of miles away from home. Statements from Norwegian officials that Norwegian forces were defending Norwegian security in the Balkans or the

Middle East served to explain their full involvement in these trouble spots.

Countries with a strong traditional sense of 'homeland' subsequently organised strong home guards with tactical mobility but they did not possess the means for strategic lift. In Roman times, the heavy arms of a soldier were called *impedimenta*, obstacles to quick movement. The nineties showed that heavy, static weaponry had become the modern *impedimenta* to the new requirements of mobility and flexibility and long-range solutions which were reflected in a move away from heavy tank units to lighter, more mobile and flexible units. Examples of the weaponry and transport means to meet these new demands include: armored troop carriers (battlefield taxis), large transport aircraft and ships and armed helicopters.

From a *Defensive* Military Strategy to an *Active* Security Policy

The posture of the armed forces before 1989 was *defensive*, at the level of declarations, but in its strategies, doctrines and equipment as well. Most governments have declared that they now pursue an *active* security policy. This raises two questions: what is an active security policy and how is it different from a defensive security policy? Security strategies are traditionally classified into three distinct categories: defensive, offensive or deterrent. A defensive strategy is one of restraint and reaction and is concerned with solving a problem. An offensive strategy is an active strategy, aimed against a party and at creating a problem. An active security policy is one of engagement and (pro-)action and is about preventing a problem from escalating into a crisis.

Underpinning the concept of an active security policy is the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' security. The defence of a country's political sovereignty does not necessarily coincide with the defence of a country's territorial integrity. The defence of a specific country's security does not necessarily coincide with the defence of its home territory. The notion that the security of, for instance, Denmark and Norway can and must be safeguarded in the Balkans is also true. Indirect threats to security come through the backdoor: unintended and unexpected fall-out from a conflict, more refugees than a country can handle, destabilising environmental tensions, etc.

Although this may sound plausible in principle, the practical problems of convincing the constituency at home are huge. It is the responsibility of the politicians to try and answer the following questions: when to become involved in other peoples' war, how far can or should we go, and how much risk can we take. Finding the answers has become increasingly difficult. Active security may, on the one

hand, lead to political adventures and, on the other, to too much restraint so that a country may not be willing to bear its fair and just burden.

From an Instrument of *Confrontation* to an Instrument of *Integration*

The armed forces have developed from an instrument of confrontation into an instrument of integration. This special role of the armed forces is aimed at the involvement of new participants in European security and transatlantic cooperation. A strategy of cooperation, generally called “cooperative security”, is based on the belief that it is possible, at sub-regional level, to supplement and elaborate more fundamental security policy activities. The sub-objectives for cooperative security are: to contribute to a system of sovereign, stable and democratic states with equal rights; to contribute to the development of mutually supportive cooperative relations in which military relations are also characterised by cooperation and transparency, between potentially conflicting parties in particular; and to contribute to sub-regional patterns of cooperation which are linked to the outside world through a network of relations. Internationalising the armed forces may be considered a security-political gain in itself, in that it helps to keep at bay the risk of re-nationalisation of European security.

2. Mobilisation

As paradoxical as it may sound, the nuclear arms build-up permitted a demilitarization of society. Technology replaced human labour. Electronic war-making became a matter for technicians. The arms build-up consumed resources such as money, technology and knowledge, but it also permitted a demobilization, even a civilization, of society.

This quotation from Ulrich Beck (1998, p. 147) captures the antithesis of the move we have witnessed during the nineties: three distinct categories of mobilisation can be identified: 1) the mobilisation of *resources*; 2) the mobilisation of *time*; and 3) the mobilisation of *society and political will*.

2.1 Mobilisation of Resources

During the Cold War, the armed forces used the so-called mobilisation complexes, consisting of tanks, artillery, ammunition, planes, and other equipment, usually inappropriately stored and taken out at the first sign of tension. Conscripts were recalled, mobilised, provided with a gun, additional equipment and given refresher training. To mo-

bilise a mechanised brigade (including the soldiers) could take up to six weeks. During the nineties, the resources needed for action greatly exceeded the amount of material available.

Over the years, the resources mobilised for immediate action, that is the type and number of material and troops, have risen in both percentage and absolute numbers.

The debate on the *professionalisation* of the armed forces must be viewed in the context of mobilisation. A precondition for a quick and “no questions asked” reaction is the existence of a reliable and professional corps of soldiers. This, in fact, meant a change from conscripts to a professional army. The UK always had a professional army, the Netherlands abolished conscription in 1996, Belgium in 1997 and France in 1998. Norway and Denmark regard conscription as a fundamental pillar of their defence systems but enlist men after their conscription and grant them the status of professional soldiers. Germany paradoxically cannot abolish conscription because of the enormous numbers of conscientious objectors who fulfill their national obligations in all kinds of alternative service. The country is going to great pains to reform the entire system.

2.2 *Mobilisation of Time*

Apart from mobility and flexibility, speed was another critically important factor of success of the armed forces in the nineties. That decade saw the (overall) time for reaction greatly reduced. During the Cold War, an enemy build-up was expected to last at least several months, during which the West had enough time to summon a force of tens of thousands of conscripts, equip and retrain them. Today, we see that the bulk of the armed forces must be transformed into Rapid and Immediate Reaction Forces. This type of forces also existed in the Cold War. They were called Quick Reaction Forces, after the fighter squadrons where pilots actually sat in their planes ready for take-off in case of emergency. The change now taking place across the board is that the number of soldiers ready to be deployed at any time has increased enormously, in absolute and relative terms. These forces – Rapid and Immediate Reaction Forces – can react within 24 up to 72 hours all year round, and are ready and equipped to fly around the globe to assist in an emergency or react to an emerging crisis.

2.3 *Mobilisation of Political Will*

Since 1989, politicians have come to realise the difference between indirect and direct security. Direct security includes the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of a nation. Indirect security, in general, refers to international economic and political stability and the

functioning of international organizations, such as UN or OSCE. Conflict prevention requires not only a pro-active approach, an active policy and the capability to get personnel and resources on the ground in an early stage of a crisis, but more importantly, it requires the ability to mobilise enough political will for action, get resolutions passed and galvanize the Security Council.

Over the years, the political machinery of many political organisations has been stepped up, and adjustments made to allow flexibility in the arrangements concerning meeting schedules, reaction times, decision modes, etc. These days, it is a matter of hours before a first official statement, e.g. by the European Parliament, is given. This I will call the mobilisation of *political will* and the mobilisation of *society*.

Reorganisation

The organisational impact of these changes is a very direct and substantial adjustment to new circumstances and realities, manifested in a re-prioritisation of aims and the consolidation of the organisation of the armed forces. The reorganisation process of the armed forces, which is aimed at adapting the structures and organisation to the new environment, has three distinct characteristics: 1) the revision of the *defence budget*; 2) a shift from an *organic* to a *modular* organisation; and 3) the process of *standardisation*.

The Revision of the Defence Budget

The 'budget arithmetic' concerning defence budgets has not stopped. Defense Minister Scharping looks for 'a lasting balance between ends and means'. All European defence budgets have been revised since the end of the Cold War. Now shaping up, this revision has been a gradual process that was initiated after the public and politicians demanded the cashing in of the 'peace dividend' in the early nineties. Back then, this revision simply meant spending less on defence. In many European countries the peace dividend was cashed, and actual defence spending went down. On average, Western European countries spent 20% less in 1993 than they did in 1989 on defence and defence-related issues.

The level of defence spending must be in accordance with the new security context. An interesting question is whether each type of security context has its own 'spending index', its own typical percentage of GDP that countries should spend on defence. In other words, the 2.6% of GDP was related to and in balance with the threats of a collective enemy in a bipolar world. But what should this index be in a post-Cold War situation and, indeed, in the aftermath of September

11, full of uncertainty and insecurity? After deciding how much to spend, the next question is to assign the budget responsibilities to different ministries: which department should pay for conflict prevention, especially when it consists mainly of economic or financial measures? The Netherlands has created a budget line “Homogeneous Group International Cooperation”. It includes all expenses regarding international crisis-response actions, without a clear distinction between aid and conflict-prevention spending being drawn as yet.

Perhaps “budget calibration” is a good term. The budget must be calibrated to the new security context. But again: what is the right index figure? The method at hand is most probably a combination of trial and error, peer pressure and benchmarking.

A second observation with regard to the defence budget regards the way in which the money is allocated. Two keys are widely used when it comes to allocating the defence budget. The main spending categories within the defence budget are “personnel”, “investments and procurement” and “operations and exploitation”. The Cold-War spending ration was generally 1:2:1, countries that have abolished conscription saw it changing to 2:1:1. A second key that is in use in many countries is the division of resources between the services: army, navy and air force. In many countries this ratio used to be 2:1:1. Nowadays, we see that funds are directed to information and communication technology and logistics that enjoy a joint status. The ratio for allocating resources to the services has changed to 1:1:1.

From an Organic to a Modular Organisation

The idea of an *organic* organisation basically rests on a holistic approach to the organisation, which is considered as a whole. The elements are viewed as not being effective in isolation but must be seen in relation to each other and to the whole. To take an organic view of the organisation has been very typical of the armed forces. Artillery units, medical units, engineers and infantry were all part of the same organic whole. The new approach looks at the organization from a functional point of view. This is partly due to the fact that the UN peacekeeping operations have shown that certain elements of the whole were needed while some others were not. This functional approach is by no means a new concept for the armed forces. On the contrary, they were the first to recognise the clear advantages of functional grouping.

They realized that these functional groupings could be deployed independently. It is important to note that in a modular organisation it is not just the vertical relations that are important. The ability to estab-

lish horizontal, lateral connections is getting increasingly valuable. A smart combination of modules is the formula for success.

Modularisation means nothing more than fitting parts of the organisation into logical, functional units, or modules. Besides “function”, the word “effect” describes the module. Talking about a military organization, in many cases “function is effect”. Take artillery, for example, whose function is to provide firepower, whose effect is to neutralise or intimidate. Another example is transport units, whose function is to provide mobility. Metaphorically speaking, units are like Lego blocks: they do not change color and form, but can be arranged and rearranged to produce a variety of organisational designs required in different situations.

Moreover, these 'elementary segments' are self-sufficient units, thus deployable as modules. If large enough, they can be deployed independently. Otherwise, they must be incorporated into a larger multinational structure. For example, a module infantry battalion must be integrated into a brigade structure, which is the preferred operational formation.

The Process of Standardisation

“Standardisation” here means convergence of different measures, norms, etc. into one norm or measure which from then on becomes used by all as a standard. This process is as old as NATO. The best known military standardisation system is the ‘NATO military standard’. Nineteen countries have agreed to one standard to ensure technical connectivity, interoperability, etc. Over the years, the NATO standard proved to be one of the crucial preconditions for a successful military-technical integration of NATO. It means not only that ammunition and fuel are interchangeable, but the information and communication networks, too.

There are a number of military standards: the US standard, the NATO standard, the former Warsaw Pact standard and in the future, perhaps, the EU military standard. Which one will be adopted? Will the different military organizations accept a civilian standard? In any case: interoperability, cost effectiveness and simplified management and logistics were and still are the drivers of any standardisation program. The need for effectiveness and quick solutions (and political stubbornness) has, in the recent past, forced the western armies to converge on the civilian standard. The Internet is a good example of a communication means that has found a firm place in the military systems. Another example is the communication networks that were put up in the Balkans during various operations in the nineties. All of them were outsourced to civilian contractors. The downside of applying a military standard is that the equipment meeting military specifi-

cations tends to be extremely expensive and there is an increasing need to cooperate with other, non-military organisations. We see a strong tendency towards off-the-shelf procurement, which effectively means buying civilian systems.

Implications for the Inclusion of the FRY into the Euro-Atlantic Security Community

How does one teach a bear to dance? The title of this paper is intended to suggest a difficult and unnatural task. This is a way of describing the experience that many countries have had in transforming their armed forces from a regular (i.e. defensive) defence establishment into a rapid, mobile, flexible foreign-policy instrument, with a variety of roles and tasks. Early adaptors (UK, France) now possess a lean and efficient force, while other nations (Germany) are still struggling to make the necessary transformation.

What are the consequences and implications for FRY in this respect? Democratic control of the armed forces is a necessary precondition that has been stressed time and again and needs no further elaboration in this article. With regard to the above-described changes in reorientation, mobilisation and reorganisation, three key implications stand out.

First, the armed forces of the FRY must become *Alliance-ready*.

- This means that they must possess the elementary capabilities for an efficient and appropriate contribution to both collective defence and crisis management. The size, composition and equipment of crisis-reaction forces must meet international demands.
- The three services have to be equipped so as to be able to establish technological contact and hence interoperability with major allies and partners. Key capabilities must be identified.
- The command structure must be tightened and adapted to the requirements of joint multinational operations. A Joint Operations Command for future missions should be set up. Support and logistics must be concentrated in Joint Support Command, which must be treated as an independent organisational area, with own service chief.

Secondly, the personnel ceiling of the armed forces must be brought down to a sustainable, democratically acceptable number. Two issues need to be addressed here: “regularisation” of the armed and security forces, and conscription. Let us consider the latter first: the question of conscription must be answered in a *pragmatic, transparent* and *just* manner. Not all young men in FRY will be needed for military service. The question of who will have to serve must not be answered arbitrarily. There are historical, social and

economic reasons that speak against a professional army: social integration of the army and its members; civic responsibility; recruitment; costs – a professional army with competitive salaries, is costly; cultural restrictions, a citizen army is seen as a hedge against military interventionism. Conscription functions as a control mechanism. A military reason in favor of conscription is to retain the ability to double the strength of the armed forces in times of crisis (crisis stability), which is perceived by many (inside and outside the FRY) as an essential factor for military stability in Central Europe. I propose the opposite: to do away with conscription means to prevent or disable the capacity for a rapid build-up of armed forces in the region. This will and should be seen as a regional Confidence and Security-Building Measure. “Regularisation” of the armed forces and police means nothing less than abolishing all “grey-area” units, the paramilitary and para-police, operating outside the regular defence and police institutions.

Thirdly, a dynamic financial framework has to be created to allow the implementation of the reform measures. A balance between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ must be established. Investment as a share of defence spending must go up to between 25% and 30%, which should help to clear the investment jam and improve the necessary key capabilities in the short term.

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"Internal" Well-Being, International Peace and "External" Security in Postcommunist Part of Europe

Eric Hobsbawm's short 20th century came to an end in 1989 with the collapse of what had been called Communism. Now, after having entered the Gregorian and the Julian 21st century, it is quite pertinent to consider some of the experiences gained and problems that emerged in this margin of time between the real and the calendar end of the preceding era, that is, between 1989 and 2001.

The upheaval symbolised by the fall of the Berlin wall was welcomed in some quarters with almost millenarian hope. It was immediately perceived as a victory of the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Many also expected that transformations within national societies would find their way into the international system and would influence the manner in which global problems are approached and dealt with by international and transnational organisations. Apart from exaggerations about the end of history, there was widespread talk of the prospects of taming history by making it alternatively interesting, in the sense that the events preoccupying the attention of the inhabitants of the Earth would no longer be battles, violent clashes and revolutions, but developments in the domains of scientific discovery, arts, improvement in the quality of life, etc. The prevalent form of conflict would be – it was hoped – debates, not quarrels and fights.

If I am not terribly wrong, before 1989 there had been no great expectations of this kind. Hope existed mostly among the activists of non-governmental organisations, liberal intellectuals, human-rights lawyers and those politicians expressing the views or counting on the support of the former. However, theirs was not a prediction but a moral claim. Many analysts of international relations thought otherwise. Not only did they believe themselves to be more realistic, but they were preoccupied with other subjects, their focus was different.

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They were thinking in terms of states and saw avenues for improvement in changes of the behaviour of actors in the international system conducive to reduction of violence and better co-operation in strictly supranational fields, such as ecology and disarmament. Matters of international ethics – if there was such a thing – were restricted to international law and comity of nations. The ideals of democracy and human rights were left to political philosophers and other "internal" political scientists, to sociologists who, in principle, preferred to deal with societies within national borders – in other words, to persons bound on reforming their own countries. The link between national and international concerns existed, but it was very weak. In the eyes of international experts, the problems of morality, good life and governance, of the improvement of the human condition, were "internal affairs" in the classical sense of international law and concerned the outside world only inasmuch as they affected the foreign policies of the relevant states.

In this respect, the story of the preparation of the Helsinki Final Act and the negotiations at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe is worth recalling. It is still not clear whether the third humanitarian and human-rights basket, which later came to dominate the agenda of CSCE and its new incarnation, OSCE, was an intended outcome of the original efforts or an antidote to Soviet efforts to stabilise the strategic situation in Eastern Europe.

The break-up of the system dominated by the Soviet Union and the Communist parties in the Warsaw Pact was thus not expected in expert circles. To the despair of the anti-Communist dissidents, nobody dared predict it. And with good reasons. At the time of the gestation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act communism (in its "real-Socialist" version) looked alive and well universally and the West was perceived as being in moral, economic and strategic disarray. As a number of selected events will demonstrate, this was the time of the end of the Cold War, which resulted in some grandiose arrangements with Communists and in an increasing relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1970, the Soviet Union consolidated its grip on Czechoslovakia and West Germany normalised its relations with Poland by recognising the Oder-Neisse border. In 1971, China became represented at the United Nations by the Beijing government; the Soviet Union and India signed a treaty of friendship and mutual co-operation. In 1972, President Nixon visited China; the Soviet Union and both Germanies recognised one another. In 1973, the Western powers ceased to ignore the German Democratic Republic; the Federal Republic of Germany received Brezhnev, as did the United States and France; West Germany normalised relations with Czechoslovakia; after the Yom Kippur War, Arab oil-exporting countries declared oil embargo on the West. In

1974, Willy Brandt had to step down because of the presence of East German spies in his entourage and President Nixon was forced to resign over the Watergate scandal. At the Helsinki negotiations, Brezhnev, only the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, was accepted as the official state representative, a privilege that had been denied even to Stalin.

Indeed, who could have foretold, only fourteen years earlier, the dramatic events of 1989? Or was it at all possible to do so? Here again different perspectives re-emerge. It was really difficult to imagine that a nuclear power with the largest armed forces in the world and controlling a vast police apparatus would fundamentally change because of outside pressure and stubborn negotiating efforts of the Western diplomats. The only imaginable internal correction, from the exclusive viewpoint of those concentrating on the international system, was the gradual convergence of the internal systems – a trendy idea for quite a while. Those who thought that the Communist system would implode for internal reasons were few and their predictions were not taken very seriously.

In spite of the public euphoria, the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states held unpleasant surprises even for those whose optimism proved to be justified. The demise of “real Socialism” was by no means a happy end. The main reason was probably that the internal forces which eventually challenged the power of Socialist states – states beset by economic inefficiency, administrative incompetence, inflexible ideology and blind coercion – proved not to be the pioneers of liberalism, individual human rights and tolerance. They had nothing to do with the dissidents glorified by the West.

An important ingredient of the forces which emerged as the substitute for the previous authoritarian and totalitarian rule was linked to regression into the mythical stages preceding communist rule. With few exceptions, these stages had, in reality, been marked by authoritarianism, ethnonationalism, inter-ethnic conflict, discrimination based on race, religion or gender, a propensity to settle disputes violently, religious bigotry, even fascism and anti-Semitism. The former dissidents were forced to show their true colours – few of them proved to be true liberals, others admitted to having been inspired by nationalism, still others had to masquerade as nationalists in order to exert political influence. As a rule, at the first free elections, nationalists, many of them recycled communists, did better than genuine protagonists of the ideas of human rights and tolerance. The result, visible in the first constitutions and legislative acts, was the return to the nation-state in its elementary ethnic meaning and to tradition as a better inspiration than modernity, so much flawed by communist ideology. Politicians representing ethnic and religious majorities became aggressive and

intolerant – leaders of minorities quickly followed suit and eventually became their mirror images. Almost all post-communist countries experienced problems with the concept of nationality: it ceased to mean citizenship and became an ethnic link to the nation state. Pronouncedly multiethnic states proved to be particularly vulnerable. They came to be treated as a historical aberration. The bloody and continuing dissolution of Yugoslavia has by now become a paradigm of post-communist failure.

If there were no internal movements advocating what appeared to be international values, or if they were too weak, there was a new and unexpected role for international organisations and, for that matter, international relations scholars. Namely, it was soon realised that the course of events in the countries “liberated” from communism contradicted some kind of international morality, partly represented in written standards contained in international instruments, and partly in the liberal rhetoric of the Western political leaders. After all, Western opposition to communism was not, at least not verbally, inspired by the wish to restore the former primitive forms of capitalism, but rather by the desire to assist people subjected to communist rule to be able to enjoy the fruits of democracy, free market and individual freedom.

Thus the international community, as represented by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations, was compelled to assume an unexpected role. Instead of pressing governments to adopt more peaceful ways and, for that purpose, persuading them, indirectly, to modernise, the international community had to take sides in internal conflicts which often gradually turned into international ones. Given the insecure nature and stature of international ethics, the diplomacies of the more influential powers were tempted into regressing as far back as to the pre-1914 era, and selecting allies according to traditional economic or strategic interests, e.g. in order to enlarge their spheres of influence or prevent rivals from expanding theirs. The tendency to deal with strong rulers, whether democratically elected or not, has been obvious: it is difficult to imagine how foreign ministries could have acted otherwise. These rulers, in turn, being motivated by the supreme values of national survival, national interest, fear of extinction of their group, etc., have firmly believed that they were absolved of their obligations to respect treaties, honour solemn pledges and treat perceived enemies with respect.

Nevertheless, the commitment to liberal values has remained, due largely to the influence of non-state actors. As a rule, international non-governmental organisations are based in the West and funded by the citizens of affluent Western countries, so that their “ideology” has to meet the expectations of their donors and host countries. However, in the course of time, the advancement of liberal values encountered a growing resistance on the part of those who came to lead their nations

legitimately by at least having been elected in free elections. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good example: the outcome of the first elections there, in 1990, was a replica of the 1981 census. Moslems (now Bosniaks), Serbs and Croats were caught in the prisoner's dilemma of mistrusting others (or the leaders of the others). They eventually voted for their own national parties, having remained only with the ethnic choice, and not an opportunity to define themselves in terms of preferred political, social or economic programmes. Since then, there have been many elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its entities. They have become technically more refined, they have been closely observed by international organisations, but the results have remained stubbornly the same – the preponderance of nationalist parties.¹

The case of Bosnia brings us to the next phase, to another dilemma. It can be expressed as the difficult choice between upholding liberal values and preventing and managing international conflicts. The internal values of democracy and human rights clashed again with the international interests of security.

There emerged an unforeseen challenge to international organisations. The determination and resilience of the national leaders and their resistance to both cajoling and threat of force convinced the international community or, more precisely, representatives of international organisations and the major powers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia that concessions had to be made by abandoning the idea of a single multinational and multicultural state, by putting up with the results of ethnic cleansing and making deals with ultranationalist leaders and their mentors from other countries. All this was incorporated in the 1995 Dayton Agreement. After it was signed, there was hope that there would be no more conflicts in the area and that Bosnia-Herzegovina, divided into ethnically defined entities, would become governable. The High Representative, requested by the signatories of the Agreement and appointed by the United Nations, was originally there to supervise the civilian implementation of the Agreement. But, unavoidably, his “final authority to interpret”, contained in Annex 10 to the Agreement (Art. V), eventually resulted in the High Representative becoming the supreme protector, arbitrator and ruler of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should be noted that this development has been tacitly accepted by all parties, who realised that otherwise the state envisaged in Dayton would become ungovernable and their mutual relationships impossible.

This was, after Cambodia, the next step towards the United Nations assuming, together with other organisations, the task to govern a

¹ The encouraging exception was the relative majority of Bosniaks voting for the moderate Social-Democratic Party at the last elections in the Bosnian-Croat Federation.

failed post-communist state. In Kosovo, after 1999, direct international rule was formalised. Presently, Kosovo is governed by the United Nations, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO. As in East Timor, international organisations became the government of a territory with most attributes of a state.²

Now, acting as *de facto* sovereigns, those representatives of the international community, high or low, have to adopt a “philosophy” of their rule. If this is not a political programme, aimed at achieving something in the future, it is inevitably a set of values and principles on how to react to events and challenges. By necessity this philosophy has been that of Western liberalism, as defined in international treaties and declarations on human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights was designated by the Dayton Agreement as an integral part of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same principles are enshrined in the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, promulgated on 15 May, 2001 by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9). Its Preamble confirms that its authors were inspired by the UN Charter and an array of international human-rights documents, universal as well as European.

Will these efforts to impose liberal values be successful? For the time being the prospects are gloomy. The Croats and Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina still dream of joining Croatia and Yugoslavia, respectively, and continue to elect national leaders. Serbs in Kosovo have rejected the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, whereas the Kosovo Albanians have accepted it grudgingly, only as a further step toward an independent Kosovo that would, as in other homogenous areas of the disintegrating multinational states, hopefully bring ultimate bliss to its monochrome population. "The recognition of the collective rights of the ethnic nation will guarantee the protection and enjoyment of the rights of each individual member of the ethnic group, and not *vice versa*", has been a very loud slogan in many post-communist countries since 1989. As if to illustrate this, some Albanians of Macedonia, together with their radical ethnic fellow nationals from Kosovo, have resorted to violence against the state institutions of Macedonia (FYROM), hitherto believed to be a loyal member of the Council of Europe and having a government very receptive to friendly foreign advice. The motives of the insurgents remain unclear, but other partners in the political game rushed to supply them with acceptable, liberal ones. It is still not known whether the rebels in Macedonia really wanted better representation and language rights for the Albanian mi-

² Governing mandate and trusteeship territories under the League of Nations and United Nations systems was entrusted to individual states, members of the respective organisation, who acted as single administrative authorities.

nority or were motivated, as others in the area before them, by the desire to have an ethnically clean territory. Having again to choose between liberal values and international peace and stability, the representatives of NATO and other international organisations have pretended that the motivation of the insurgents was Western liberal, a proposition few people believe remembering hundreds of successive cease-fire agreements in Croatia and Bosnia violated almost immediately after they had been signed in the presence of international dignitaries.

Reactions to the developing situation in Macedonia have been a fresh manifestation of the general feeling of impotence in dealing with the parts of the world where the rules of the game, both in national and international politics, appear to be different from those believed to exist in the calmer areas of the West. This disposition is particularly acute when it comes to European states, expected somehow to behave better. Also, comparisons between the countries of the East and the members of the European Union are compulsory. The sense of frustration emanates from the failure to prevent and contain conflicts. Huge reconstruction and humanitarian-aid costs are the results of unwillingness to fund preventive efforts. Vacillation between Realpolitik and taking stands in favour of shared values has led to periods of cynical support to strongmen alternating with nervous punishments of their hapless subjects through international sanctions.

Have the international affairs experts contributed to such a state of affairs? Have they done so in their capacities of advisers, bureaucrats, teachers, commentators, journalists, authors and makers of various theories? Or is it that decision makers remain indifferent to their analyses and advice? I must return to the artificial separation of the study of national and international politics resulting in indifference towards matters "outside the field", indifference in its scholarly and moral meaning. Looking again at the subject matter of my preceding short description, I note that the stimuli to engage on this or that side, to idealise one party in the conflict or the other, to label whole nations as being inherently democratic or genetically programmed for authoritarian rule, on the one hand, or to escape into cynical equanimity and recognise only selfish strategic interests, on the other, have come both from the international and national levels. The role of the media, national as well as global, has been as important as that of diplomats and agents of international organisations. The international and national systems have interacted intensely. The motives of the actors involved, the goals they have followed, the systems of values underlying their actions, and their views of the world are indeed subjects worthy of close scrutiny, understanding, explanation and prescription by those who have chosen to contribute to the development of a better world and have an idea of what it should look like.

Rade Stojanović*

Particularities of the Balkans and European Security

The Balkans is called “powder keg” by the nations living in its territory. However, explosiveness is hardly a particularity of the Balkans. In the last 150 years (1800–1945), there were 16 wars and revolutions in Western Europe and two protracted conflicts lasting to our days – the Irish in UK and Basques in Spain. West Europe’s colonial wars in Africa, Asia and Latin America have not been taken into account here because they were not proper wars. The warring parties were absolutely unequal, and the colonial conquest was carried out by simple occupation of territories with the use of very small military forces.

During that same period in the Balkans there were eight uprisings and wars, as well as one protracted conflict lasting to this day – between Serbs and Albanians. However, Western Europe has not seen war for more than 50 years (excluding colonial). Instead, a high level of cooperation and integration has been achieved among the states that were enemies for the past 150 years. And in the late 20th-century Balkans, four wars raged for ten years in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Why did not wars stop in the Balkans fifty years ago? The reasons lie deep in the history of the Balkans. The history of Western Europe was equally bloody, but it has nevertheless been overcome. Balkan history specialists could use this as a model of taking from the past only what can be used for the purpose of present-day politics. They should examine what it is that Western Europe managed to free itself from that still persists in the Balkans. What is obvious from the behavior of the Balkan actors is that the feelings of hate, exclusivity, religious intolerance and chauvinistic political platforms are still very much alive.

This vision of reality could perhaps help to explain the bloody wars waged in Yugoslavia during the last decade of the 20th century. It is precisely due to such animosities that the warring parties were unable to find solutions to their conflicts, and the solutions had to be imposed by the leading powers and international organizations.

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It is true that the most horrible wars in the Balkans were not produced there (including both world wars). It proves that the great powers had a vested interest in being present in the Balkans. Today, this interest is not the same. The antagonism between East and West that existed in Europe for centuries has come to an end. Access to the Mediterranean is no longer among Russia's strategic objectives. Reaching Thessalonica and Baghdad... is no longer the objective of Germany and Austria. The road for cooperation between Europe's North and South is now open, after the East-West conflict has been confined to the past.

Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe can contribute to the security in the Balkans, all its peculiarities included. Both Russian and the US are members of this pact. The former is regionally connected to the Balkans, and the latter, is a global super-power with interests, influence and businesses all over the globe. The Balkans, as a European region, is of particular significance for the US as a geo-strategic divide between Europe's East and West.

The Balkans deserves a special treatment within the frame of security in Europe. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe takes this assumption as a starting point and devotes its activity to the specific preventive measures for the stabilization of the Balkans. This plan has three segments: stepping up the reforms of the political organization of Balkan states; necessary measures for the stabilization and development of the economy; measures for the preservation of peace and security.

I believe that the third segment deserves to be emphasized, although the first two fit into it. However, in overcoming the inherited enmities among the peoples of the Balkans, some direct security measures are necessary. It is necessary to include all the peoples of the Balkans into the European process of integration in order to avoid foreign – out-of-Europe – infiltrations of extremist movements. If all Balkan nations committed themselves to European integration, the opportunities for Islamic fundamentalism and its extremist organizations to act would be considerably reduced. The support to all nations must be equal in order to avoid developing a perception that some are being favored at the expense of others. In addition to the economic and political development of the Balkan nations, it is necessary to develop a sense and perception that Europe is a framework of security and peace for all of them.

During the Cold War, the Balkans was the link between the Northern and the Southern wing of the Western Bloc and played an important role in keeping the bipolar balance. With its pulling away from the Eastern Bloc in 1948, Yugoslavia became a zone of division between the number-one continental power – the USSR – and number-one naval power – the US – and the Western powers. Together with other non-aligned countries along the coastline of the Euro-Asian continental massif, she constituted a buffer zone between the conflicting blocs. The US switches its maritime power to the Pacific and the

Indian Ocean, building large naval bases with nuclear subs and other vessels.¹ The US Navy thereby directly threatened the industrial zone of the USSR in the Urals and the entire European part of the Soviet Union with missiles from the Indian Ocean.² From 1974, the USSR likewise began upgrading its own fleet, expanding its presence from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The crises in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East revealed the hotbeds of a potential global conflict between the two blocs.

The East-West continental route in Europe remains closed for peacetime communications, while the presence of substantial armed forces prevents the very thought of developing cooperative international relations in the interest of both sides.

The collapse of communism also brought about the collapse of the Eastern military-political bloc. Bipolarity suddenly came to an end. More important still was the disintegration of the Soviet empire as Europe's last empire. The empires of Austria-Hungary and Germany were destroyed after the World War 1. A revival of imperialism in Germany under Hitler had a monstrous form. The demise of Fascist Germany in World War 2 marked the end of imperialist rule in Western Europe. Faced with the imperialistic power of the Soviet Union, Germany sided with its traditional enemies, joined the Western bloc and began to cooperate with them in the fields of technology, culture and economy. The advancement of Germany and the whole of Western Europe showed that cooperation brought more benefits than imperialistic conquests. Eastern Europe existed only nominally. It was only part of a large empire burdened with threefold controversies of a system whose subjection to ideological-political objectives had led to a total disregard of such factors as progressive development, and its collapse was inevitable. The spectacularity and swiftness with which the USSR fell apart was extraordinary, but the British colonial empire had also disappeared quite suddenly, without any major armed conflicts and social disruptions. What are the changes that the disintegration of the USSR will bring in the geopolitical division of power in Europe and the world at large?

The Soviet Union had a dominant position in the European continent because it was able to reach the Atlantic from the Berlin Wall in a matter of a few hours with hardly any defence obstacles. The USSR was a global military power (but not economic), whose presence was felt throughout the world. It lacked a continental link with the Euro-

¹ W. J. Foltz, *US Policy toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92. No. 1/1977, and M. Bezboruah, *US Strategy' in the Indian Ocean*, New York -Preager 1977, p. 27

² Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, New York, Crane Russak & Co, 1977. p. 29

Asian coastline to take the upper hand in the global balance of power. By evacuating Eastern Europe and then shifting Russia's frontiers beyond Ukraine, Moldavia and Byelorussia, she lost her offensive advantage to Western Europe, but continued to maintain sufficient defensive power which could result in a disaster if it ever decided to behave as a great conqueror. Islamic and other countries in the South which had been annexed to the empire in the 19th century were lost. With them, Russia was separated from the most attractive points of the coastline, namely Iran and Afghanistan. Its chaotic economic transition was not providing sufficient opportunity to proceed with the strengthening of its naval power, and so the West's naval force prevailed in the Euro-Asian coastline. Russia is now threatened even more, as the threat from the Indian Ocean increased. In other words, Russia was no longer a global superpower and its interests were not reduced only to the region surrounding it which, however, is not small – from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean on the Eastern Asian coastline! Russia is, in addition, the second largest nuclear power in the world and that fact must not be overlooked by strategists abroad.

Has Russia become a loser after the disintegration of the Soviet Union? Russia has lost the imperialist power it had since the 18th century. The conquering ambitions of the religious orthodox and communist emperors had, as conceded in many current evaluations in Russia itself, brought its people only misfortune and backwardness. (See: Solzhenytzin's letter to Yeltzin, March 1994). It is only the inertia of imperialist feelings among some politicians or groups (e.g., Zhyri- novsky and the communists) that could take Russia back into the maelstrom of political powers, wars and impoverishment. On the contrary, the empire's destruction should eliminate all the characteristics of conquest as a feature of the new Russian state. This is not just a rational appraisal, but present-day reality is steering Russia towards development of cooperation, thus bringing to life De Gaulle's vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

What is the geopolitical reality of Russia's transformation from imperialist power to a country with powerful potentialities for international cooperation?

With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the East-West confrontation in Europe ended. Can it be revived? It would be unrealistic to believe that Russia would enter into such confrontations when we know that the Soviet Union had never done it while it still held the Berlin Wall. Could any strategist imagine that Russia would try to conquer Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic only to reach Germany's present borders, i.e. the European Union and NATO? Such a scenario is not far-fetched but is incongruous even if it were just a matter of Russia's being able to revitalize its military power to the degree necessary to engage in a similar effort. On the

other hand, what would its objectives be other than its own security in the present situation? It has been written in some parts of the world that Russia had imperialist aspirations because it wanted to secure access to warm seas. At one time, that had been a matter of Russian security, best illustrated by the Crimean War, in which the British and French fleets had defeated Russia at Sebastopol and endangered Russian security. It would be truly difficult to imagine any large fleet entering the Black Sea to threaten Russia's security. Such a fleet could only be a sitting duck for target practice rather than a real danger to Russia. If there is any warm sea that could have some significance for Russian security, this could then be the Indian Ocean. But why? It is only the United States that could endanger Russian security from that angle, but there does not seem to be any reason for the US to undertake a military action from such a distance against a nuclear power such as Russia. It is most likely that Russia's aspirations for an exit to warm seas may presently be considered just a myth from the past and no longer a real political goal with concrete political reaction. The economic significance of passages to the sea remains a possible reason, but there could be no obstacles for this in the relations of good cooperation. As for oil and gas exports from Russia, the pipelines are a much more effective form of transport, especially those avoiding isthmuses.

On the other hand, today's leading superpower – the United States – could not have the same interests for domination in the Pacific and its seas as during the Soviet Union. In the long run, this is too high a price, and the benefits are minute. The US will probably choose a strategy which will be closer to Britain's strategy of "balance" between the European powers in the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, China is an undeniable factor in Asia. It is difficult to predict how power relations will develop in Euro-Asia with the strengthening of the Chinese factor. It is certain that China is still not in the circle of countries which have joined processes for better cooperation through economic ties. If confrontations between China and Russia were to grow and the negative trend of earlier relations between the USSR and China were thus to continue, then the balancing role of the United States would be significant for the preservation of peace in Euro-Asia, and the world.³

Today, Russia and the West – in particular Western Europe – have become inter-dependent. Russia is Europe's most favorable energy supplier (oil and gas). It is a good thing, however, that Western Europe is not totally dependent on Russia for its energy supplies, but it is in its interest to be supplied from Russia. The linkage of energy sources in Russia with those in the Northern and Norwegian Seas

³ Ibid.

could contribute to the development of cooperation in Europe, which would again contribute to broadening integration processes from Western Europe to Eastern Europe and Russia. Such progressive processes could face obstacles in retrograde processes which could appear both in the East and the West of the continent. The existing process of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe stands in contrast to the practice of sovereignty of Western Europe aimed at satisfying as much as possible the needs of the people living in that area. Feelings of danger cannot be eliminated completely and it is up to the more affluent countries to prevent the creation of abysses that would put at risk Europe's progress and that of the entire Euro-Asia.

Current Geopolitical Features of the Balkans

If we assume that the East-West line of conflict has been cut and has no prospect of being restored, then the line connecting the Baltic and the Mediterranean is open, and the Balkan Peninsula acquires a new geopolitical position for the first time in Europe's long history. A significant number of countries exist along this line: Norway, Germany, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece. It branches out in various directions in the Balkans. If the route to Trieste is not counted because it is primarily a link with Central Europe, then the route to Salonika via Bulgaria towards Istanbul opens completely new areas for a much more intensive cooperation than has ever existed in the past. During the bipolar balance, this route was almost completely cut off by the East-West line of conflict, specifically in the Polish lowlands. As Hungary was also in the Eastern Bloc, the Balkans was practically isolated from cooperation with Northern Europe. This isolation had contributed to the Balkans finding itself exactly on the West-South East and East-South West line. These were lines of conflict and the Balkans was left aside from the progressive processes of the West and Northern Europe. That is why the Balkans became the "Balkans" and not part of Europe. It may be recalled that the name Balkans had appeared only at the beginning of the 19th century and that this area had been known as Southeastern Europe and, after the Turkish invasion, European Turkey. Its meaning is not just symbolic. The Balkans was indeed isolated from European processes and was a zone of sharp conflicts of interests between the superpowers. Without having any authentic interests of their own, the Balkan nations were always dragged into those conflicts. Hence, the number of conflicts in the Balkans exceeded by far the number of conflicts in other parts of Europe from the 19th century onwards. The name "powder keg" is not so much a Balkan specialty as it was imported from the outside. However, a past full of bloody conflicts, reli-

gious intolerance (or exclusiveness), mistrust or (unjustified) feelings of greatness with hegemonistic or even imperialistic ambition, continues to haunt it. These remnants of the past should be removed by the Balkan people themselves, but with the help of the international community. Such assistance should not follow the old model of imperialist ambitions towards the Balkans, but rather it should focus on helping the Balkan nations to get integrated into the European processes without the residues of bitter feelings and memories of bloodshed.

The question is the whether the Balkan states, in current circumstances, stand a chance to stay away from the imperialist rivalry of the great powers and avoid getting involved in their wars? Today, roads leading through the Balkans are those of cooperation rather than conflict. A revival of the German concept "Drang nach Osten" is now unthinkable. The rich countries nowadays do not need to take over capital markets by force. The poor countries, on the other hand, are craving for foreign investments and are at the same time prepared to offer cheap raw materials in exchange for know-how. Indeed, why would Germany want to conquer the East if it can realize its interests by economic means? In an intense economic exchange, the Balkans is more needed as a market and road to the South East than a zone of political domination, which is costly, volatile and conflict-prone. Russia, on the other hand, as was mentioned earlier, is no longer harboring the ambition to access the warm seas at the cost of war, but does need economic cooperation with the Mediterranean, i.e. the Balkan states as well. The constellation of power being such, the maritime powers (US, Britain, France) do not need to eliminate their rivals as they have made economic alliances in order to take care of their needs in the most acceptable way. The view that the Islamic factor is a threat to European processes of cooperation ultimately has no real foundation. The "Green Transversal" and the Islamic-Orthodox conflict do not have justification in reality because the Islamic factor is still a long way from the time when it will be able to join the power game. Changes that could cause conflicts with this background are possible in the future, but by that time the European processes will be in full sway rather than jeopardized.

The North-South line from the Baltic to the Mediterranean crosses the Danube at Budapest and Belgrade, providing new opportunities for cooperation. Namely, Europe's longest river, the Danube is a unique natural waterway linking the Black Sea and the North Sea. From Belgrade to the Black Sea the Danube is navigable for vessels big enough to sail in the Indian Ocean. Thus the whole of the Black Sea region becomes directly incorporated in this natural traffic artery which has until now neglected in the economic sense, especially compared with other waterways like the Rhine and the Rhone.

The Danube is of special importance to all the roads of European cooperation. Serbia, which controls 500 km of the Danube riverbank, would become the transport backbone of the Balkans, with the opening of the North-South line. This, however, could only be achieved within the framework of European cooperation. In conflict situations, the backbone becomes a vulnerable spot, as the enemy is looking to break it. In the processes of cooperation, Serbia will not be by-passed thanks to the South-North and South East-West routes leading to Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania. Apart from this continental route through Serbia, Turkey has an interest, together with Russia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania and Bulgaria to use the Danube waterway. If Serbia were to gradually develop cooperation with all of these countries, expanding cooperation and integration efforts, its central place in the Balkans would be beneficial to all the countries in the region. Therefore, the ways of cooperation in the Balkans need to be maintained and improved. First of all, there is a need to eliminate all residues of old hatreds, intolerance, exclusiveness or imperial ambitions from politics. Nothing needs to be forgotten, but everything that had happened must be placed in the context of the period in which conflicts were a normal form of relationship, and where cooperation was reserved for short periods between wars. In other words, the bad traditions must be given up and the policy of cooperation embraced.

With peace being restored in the former Yugoslav territories, Serbia should include all other former Yugoslav republics into the cooperation processes. The interdependence they had created during the 70 years of a life together cannot be suspended without great damage to all of them. In the future, the broken economic ties should be restored in order to encourage healthy economic cooperation and reparation of some of the damages.

All considerations about international relations must include the effect of the nuclear weapons on classical political roads of relationship development between nations. Nuclear weapons have changed the significance of geopolitical position.⁴ Naturally, with the existence of nuclear missiles, the geographic location of the rocket base becomes irrelevant. But the existence of a larger number of such bases enhances the nuclear striking or deterrence power, because it is harder to wipe out scores of bases than just a small number of them. After the breakdown of the bipolar order, it can be expected that in the development of international relations the United States will keep their bases in significant geographic points: in the Indian Ocean, in South-East Asia, Indonesia, Australia, Japan and, particularly, Taiwan, be-

⁴ R. Stojanovic, *Conceptions of International Security*, Belgrade, *Jugoslovenska revija za medunarodno pravo* (Yugoslav International Law Review) No. 23/1972

cause the United States must in some way play the role of a balancer of power in the future development of the political constellation of power on the Euro-Asian continental massif. Thanks to the existence of the nuclear weapons, the role of the balancer has changed significantly since the 19th century, when Britain played it. It was then possible for the balancer to go to war against the state that showed ambition to rule Europe. This happened twice against Russia in the 19th century, against France during Napoleon's rule, and against Germany in World War 1 and World War 2. The existence of nuclear weapons excludes such a role for the balancer, as a nuclear war would be a catastrophe for human kind. For this reason, the United States as a modern super-power and the only global power, would find it more in its interest to develop a system of collective security than to depend on its own forces. However, the balancer could grab a hegemonistic role or isolate himself from the rest of the world. Hegemony is also possible in a system of collective security if it is conceived only as a repressive mechanism against threats to international peace. Any arbitrariness in evaluating such threats could produce hegemony on the part of the biggest power, which would turn the system of collective security into its hegemonistic instrument when broader conflicts become unavoidable.

The modern balancer should focus on developing preventive rather than penal measures in building the system of international security. Punishment will not stop the pathological phenomenon within the legal system of any individual states, let alone between several states. Preventive measures, from diplomatic, economic, financial, technological and cultural, would generally be considerably more effective. Punishment should not be excluded, but it can exist only as a last resort.⁵ The OSCE has recently initiated this process with a special emphasis on preventive diplomacy. This trend should continue in order for the system of preventive diplomacy and other measures to develop in the best way possible within the existing systems of collective security for the sake of preventing inter-state conflicts.

International Security and the Balkans

“The Balkans to the People of the Balkans” is a good slogan, but it does not reflect a real political mood. It simply wants to say that a new Yalta (or Malta) should be avoided, i.e. the possibility of a new division of the Balkans into the spheres of interest among the big powers in the area removed. Such a division would mean confronta-

⁵ M. Burquin, *Le problèmes de la sécurité internationale*, Recueil de Cours, 1934, Vol. 49, pp. 473-539

tion among the powers. However, today it makes more sense to talk of "agreements" between the powers than a balance of forces among them. This is the favorable result of the disintegration of the bipolar order, which has prospects of lasting longer than was the case, for instance, after the Vienna Congress (1815) and the Congress of Paris (1856). The dangers of the big powers' agreements can mainly be deduced to the aspirations of one or some of them attaining hegemony. From past geopolitical analyses it follows that it is hard to determine what interests lay in hegemony since cooperation and integration are more favorable to the achievement of their interests than conflicts which would inevitably come with the inception of hegemony. The process of developing a European system of international security has shown that there is overwhelming awareness of the advantages of collective security compared with the balancing of forces and the inevitability of confrontations emanating from it.

In such an international atmosphere, aspirations towards the realization of the slogan "The Balkans to the People of the Balkans" would lead to isolation from these positive processes. No country can afford the luxury of isolation today, least of all the Balkan nations. Poor and underdeveloped, burdened by ethnic nationalism and religious intolerance, if isolated they would be caught in a whirlpool of violence (as the ex-Yugoslavia) sooner than manage to organize their own system of collective security. It would be very dangerous for international cooperation if the European Union were to develop a separate system of security, as such a system could spontaneously turn into an alliance of states which would be a step in the direction of a renewal of a balance of power relationship, of confrontations and conflicts.

Conceptions of Collective Security

In its broadest sense, collective security may be defined as a state in which members of an organization are safeguarded from internal and external dangers with a mechanism which they themselves have set up. In international relations, collective security constitutes a system whereby the international community ensures the safe development of each of its members, protecting them simultaneously from threats that may come from the outside, through a legal and political founded order. The scope of the political and legal organization of such a collective body, that is the extent of responsibilities its members have invested in it, will depend on their ability to agree on their common interests and values that this mechanism of collective security is designed to protect.

Every system of collective security must have rules prohibiting the use of force, as well as provisions for sanctions in the form of re-

pressive measures to be employed against those who violate the rules. Furthermore, there must be rules for the solution of disputes through peaceful means in order to prevent the use of force to such an end, and finally, rules of preventive measures of the many aspects of the life of the international community.

Both in practice and in theory, the system of collective security is often reduced to a system of sanctions against violators of rules prohibiting armed conflict. Ever since the first international organization of collective security – the League of Nations – came into being, “...collective security was almost totally confused... with the suppression of war”.⁶

Suppression of war was solely viewed through repressive sanctions against those who should use force to attain their interests. Without minimizing the significance of such rules, it must be said that alone they were hardly enough. Just as repressive measures cannot eliminate crime within a country – individual states are much more effective in this field than an international system of collective security – it is necessary to resort to preventive measures which are definitely more effective. An international system must also have a much more developed system of measures for the prevention of armed conflict than repressive measures can be. Collective security means safeguarding the security of every individual member, demanding considerably broader intervention by the collective body than the mere squelching of a conflict by direct action. The security of every individual member depends on many conditions relevant to international relations or relations within the borders of a member country in which public, economic or political organizations are ready to suffer the consequences of their favorable or unfavorable status in international relations. It is only through mutual interaction of internal and international factors that conditions may be created in which a system of collective security can intervene to safeguard the security of each of its mem-

⁶ Op. cit., p. 525. H. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, New York 1960, p. 193. It is considered that “...collective security, is different from the balance of power by the principle under which the alliance was created. An alliance of balanced power was created by certain nations against other nations or alliances of nations on the basis of which they consider those nations as being subjects of their special interests. The organizational principle of collective security is respect for moral and legal commitments that any attack from whatever country and against whichever member of the alliance will be considered an attack against all the members of the alliance. It is thereby understood that collective security means automatic action. On the other hand, alliances within balance of power systems are often indeterminate and rely on the political standpoint of individual countries as to what action to take.” See also R. Aaron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, Paris 1962, pp. 70-72, and Haas-Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations*, New York 1956, p. 460

bers. Collective security must take action before a dispute arises, as disputes are indicators of possible conflicts. Mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation must be developed as part of collective security. A debate on the shortcomings of the League of Nations in this sense was conducted between the two world wars.⁷ One could say that Hitler would not have come to power in Germany had the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund existed then to help Germany out of its economic chaos during the great economic crisis, and save the Weimar Republic and democracy. Nowadays, the importance of human rights is being increasingly pointed out, having been identified as an element of the United Nations security system immediately after their foundation following World War 2. It was considered, among other things, that respect for human rights could prevent totalitarian regimes, which are a danger for peace, from coming to power.

Experience between the two world wars and the global economic crisis in 1929/1933 which was barely overcome just before World War 2, led the founders of the United Nations to set firm commitments for its member states in respect of international economic cooperation, laid out in the rules of the Organization. The Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 55 and 56 reading as follows:

”With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems...” (Art.55)

“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” (Art. 56).

The fact that the crisis of 1929 did not repeat itself during the 50 years of the United Nations’ existence leads to the conclusion that the United Nations have contributed to this. International assistance to developing countries in the economic, technical and cultural fields are a confirmation of this. World Bank loans and IMF monetary intercessions were a blessing for all the members of the Organization. The overall system of international organizations covering international trade, the transfer of know-how, cooperation and, all the way up to the top of the pyramid, European economic and political integration, has

⁷ MA. Heilperin, *La cooperation economique internationale et la securite collective*, Recueil de Cours, 1939, Vol. 68, p. 377.

undoubtedly contributed to the smoother development of international cooperation than had ever been achieved in the past.

On the other hand, repressive actions taken by the United Nations from Korea to Yugoslavia, do not deserve praise. It is not merely a question of ideological-political differences in approach, but the fact that the success of those actions had been halfway attempts and often counterproductive. The use of direct force in Korea achieved only a *status quo ante belum*; in Congo, not even that, and in the Gulf, Saddam Hussein still holds his position. The economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro has caused damage to innocent neighboring countries and to the people of the whole region, but did not halt the war in Yugoslavia.

The Organization of Security and the Balkans

Apart from the universal system of collective security within the framework of the United Nations, regional systems have been developed in the post-World War 2 period. Firstly, these are the Organization of American States, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of European Security and Cooperation. The Arab League had not achieved much, neither in the peaceful solution of disputes among its members, let alone maintaining the peace in its region. The Organization of African Unity has had notable success in the peaceful solution of disputes in its area. Only the Organization of American States had success in the development of cooperation and in certain actions it took, thanks to the power of the United States. The European Conference on Security and Cooperation played a significant role in the seventies when it was created, in maintaining the policy of detente in Europe, and only after the collapse of communism did it take the opportunity of becoming an organization of international security. Created with the purpose of promoting international cooperation among its members and achieving a great deal with its Charter of Paris with regard to human and minority rights, its growing into an authentic organization of international security is a logical step. At its Budapest meeting in the spring of 1995, emphasis was placed on preventive measures, namely on preventive diplomacy, as necessary for the maintenance of peace in Europe. Further development of similar ideas could produce results that will satisfy Europe, the United States and Canada.

When talking now about the Balkan security, one could imagine a sort of sub-regional system attached to the United Nations and the OSCE. In view of the specific characteristics of Balkan relations and the danger of regional conflicts on a broader scale, the idea is not without foundation. What are these characteristics? In the first place

the historical inertia of territorial pretensions which is most evident in the programmes of nationalist parties of the Balkan states and of various movements of secessionist aspiration (for instance, Kosovo). There is also religious intolerance among the three religious groups – Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic. Finally, the question of national minorities threatens to cause broader confrontations which tend to overflow, spreading from the Balkans northwards and in the north-east direction. Economic backwardness and stark impoverishment make all these problems more serious than if they were to appear in more favorable economic circumstances. The low level of economic and technical development brings economic cooperation down to ordinary commercial exchange in view of the fact that industrial cooperation, the division of labor and capital transactions are beyond the existing level of economic development. It would, therefore, be difficult to imagine the pooling of funds through a common banking mechanism, because there are no adequate funds which the individual Balkan countries have in surplus for such a purpose.

Could all of these problems be resolved successfully in any separate Balkan system of cooperation and security? Even a superficial observer would see that such a system could only function successfully if firmly linked to the existing systems, the OSCE in particular, which, as it is, has gathered almost all the most advanced countries of the world in its membership. In addition, the system is fundamentally linked with the United Nations, having produced in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975 a specified list of areas of cooperation, from economic through scientific and technical, to human rights and freedom of communication among all citizens of the signatory states. Were they to gain the support of the OSCE, the Balkan states would have a solution for just about all their problems. The OSCE Charter of Paris of 1991 is of particular significance, as it stipulates the commitments member states have in regard to their internal order as well. Were the Balkan states to apply these rules they would avoid the danger of totalitarian regimes taking rule and would be able to maintain an economic system essential to cooperation with other states in the system. Namely, the Charter of Paris commits its signatories to conduct an open market-type economy which is nowadays the most suitable for successful international economic cooperation and for internal economic development as well. By applying its provisions for human rights, all the negative repercussions of religious intolerance would be removed. Its elaborate system for the protection of national minorities and ethnic groups could provide the Balkan countries with a basis for overcoming their minority disputes. Protection of the territorial integrity of member states is something which the OSCE still has to work out to suit present day circumstances in Europe, different from the time when the Final Act was adopted in Helsinki. The

Balkan countries could rightfully expect assistance from the OSCE for the realization of its rules in the Balkan region.

No analysis of this kind can overlook the existence of the European Union and of NATO which, with OSCE, constitute an overall organization of international security in Europe. With its great economic potential, the European Union should not self-complacently shut itself off from Eastern and South-East Europe as this would create a gap which would be difficult to overcome with political or diplomatic means. The European Union's expansion must be a gradual and carefully conducted process, because haste could damage the level of integration already attained in Western Europe as well as achievements in bringing the Eastern and South-East countries in compliance with the EU standards.

The basis on which NATO was build is now lost, since the rival bloc broke up. However, it does not have to disappear. The idea of "Partnership for Peace" would have a positive effect if NATO were to be transformed into a military sub-system of the OSCE. It would be an essential supplement to the system of collective security which has still not been achieved by the United Nations, although provisions for it exist in the Charter. It needs to be underlined at this point that the repressive measures of the system of collective security are essential, but preventive measures are more significant and effective for the maintenance of peace and cooperation. If NATO and OSCE came together, the European Union would not need to create its own military alliance which could create grounds for a new balance of power and lead to fresh confrontations. If we can geopolitically assume that there is little chance of a renaissance of Russia's expansionism, then NATO's evolution into a military segment of European security could be accepted as a process that would be consciously supported by all the European states. Such a process would not be able to unfurl without obstacles, and deviations which could threaten European security are possible. The most dangerous situation would be if the USA were to establish its hegemony within this system. It is the only country which is able to establish such hegemony and that is the reason for emphasizing this aspect of danger at this point. In view of the fact that in evaluating what possible interests may exist for this, no real political interests for such hegemony on the part of the USA are apparent, conditions exist to avoid such deviations. The development of European cooperation would best contribute to this.

Having in mind the processes described above, the Balkan states would do best to contribute to their own security within the overall development of European security if they were to try to apply the preventive measures foreseen under the OSCE. The consistent fulfillment of the documents of this organization would be a first step in that direction. Taking such a step, the Balkan states would offer proof of

their maturity for the development of cooperation in all other fields as well. They will have the need to be helped in the case of economic cooperation by both the European institutions and those of the United Nations system. The big powers, which are the principal decision makers, could contribute to the maintenance of peace and cooperation in the Balkans if they were better acquainted with the requirements of the region to improve the economic, technical, scientific and cultural conditions existing in it. Repressive measures cannot help, so diplomatic and other preventive measures and action towards developing a need among the Balkan states for mutual cooperation would certainly produce better results, especially because the people of the Balkans would welcome such support from the international community from a feeling that they belonged in a world in which traditional hatreds and anachronistic interests were a thing of the past. This would also contribute to the consolidation of the Balkan states internally, which is not a matter to be overlooked when the maintenance of international peace is in question.

PART THREE

Vladimir Goati*

Determinants of Transitional Strategy of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)

The Origins of DOS

Ever since their origin, the relationship between Serbia's opposition parties was marked with deep divisions. It is no exaggeration to say that between 1990 and the September 2000 elections they spent more time and energy on internal bickering than on efforts to topple the Milosevic regime. In this period, alliances between the major parties, featuring the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), were generally short-lived and unsuccessful, enabling Milosevic to stay in power. The most striking example of the discord between the opposition were the federal and local elections of November 3, 1996, when SPO, DS, and GSS ran jointly as the "Together" coalition. At the federal elections, "Together" had very poor showings, but won the local elections held the same day getting the majority in the country's 40 major cities. Attempting to thwart the opposition's election victory, Milosevic resorted to altering the election will of the citizens ("the great election fraud"). In reply to this, the coalition "Together" organized massive protests. As a result, the regime was forced to recognize the election results, in early 1997, and hand over power in these cities. However, "Together" failed to capitalize on the victory and a broad public support. Their long-suppressed differences came into the open, leading to the split of the coalition in the spring of 1997. The downfall of this coalition allowed Milosevic's shaken regime to consolidate.

In mid 1998, the Serbian opposition parties – threatened by an increasingly repressive regime – established a more solid form of cooperation. The "Alliance for Changes" (SzP) included DS, GSS, Christian Democrats (DHS) and New Serbia (NS). The new alliance's

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goal was to dismantle the ruling authoritarian order by means of free and fair elections, and to include Serbia and FRY in Europe and the rest of the world. The process of bringing the chronically divided Serbian parties closer together was temporarily suspended during the military conflict between NATO Alliance and FRY (March 24 – June 9, 1999), only to be sped up after the conflict was over.

In September 1999, the SzP firmly demanded all-level free and fair elections. To support this request, they organized continual civil protests. The regime's refusal to hold early elections urged the Serbian opposition to adopt the "Platform of the democratic opposition of Serbia". Apart from the demand for free and fair elections and market reforms as initial steps toward a democratic Serbia, this document supported the normalization of relations with all states, "...including former Yugoslav states".

Promises of Serbia's return to Europe and to the rest of the world (or Serbia's return to "its geography"), which the democratic opposition incorporated into its political platform and strategy against the regime, were not just a more realistic political option, but also a choice based on the pro-European orientation of the Serbian citizens which remained unshaken despite years of the regime's systematic anti-European propaganda. Results of many pre-election 2000 empirical research showed that ruling parties (SPS, Yugoslav Left, Serbian Radical Party) and the citizens diverged the most regarding Serbia and FRY's relations with Europe and the world. While the ruling regime – via the state media – constantly blamed the US, Germany, Great Britain, France and other Western countries for the hard situation in the country, leaning to the "East" (mainly Russia) for support, the Serbian citizens supported integration with Europe and the rest of the world. This is corroborated by opinion polls conducted by the Institute for Social Sciences in summer 1998 (IDN, CPIJM, 1998, JJM-132), showing that 79% of the respondents believed that FRY should become a member of the European Union. Results of the Institute's polls conducted nation-wide – in Serbia without Kosovo – in December 1999 showed an unchanged pro-European stance among the citizens even after the NATO bombing. The poll – conducted on a sample of 2,039 respondents – showed that a relative majority (43%) was in favor of cooperation with the West, 19% wished for stronger ties with Russia and Byelorussia, 18% supported cooperation with all countries, 3% answered something else, and 17% did not know (IDN, CPIJM, 1999, JJM-136). More than a mere predilection for a strategy of cooperation with Western countries, these views also reveal the support for the key values, notably democracy and free market, upon which those countries' systems are built.

In any event, the Democratic opposition of Serbia (DOS) – formed in January 2000 – is a heterogeneous coalition both in terms of

size and political platforms of its members. Before the ousting of the previous regime on October 5, 2000, DOS was dominated by the Democratic Party (DS), the most numerous and influential of all. Parties united in DOS belonged to various “political families”: liberals, nationalists and socialists (more precisely: social democrats).

The October Revolution

Milosevic’s government scheduled elections for September 24, 2000, believing that was the most propitious moment. In those elections, Serbian and Montenegrin citizens chose the federal president, members of both chambers of the federal legislature, and – only in Serbia – members of the provincial and local legislatures – all in one day. The critical vote was the one for federal president, which was to weigh the strength of Slobodan Milosevic, by far the regime’s most influential person, against the opposition leaders, including Vojislav Kostunica, the unique candidate of DOS. SPO, the strongest opposition party for many years, contested the elections independently.

Kostunica won by a landslide in the first round of elections, receiving 50.2% of votes; Milosevic came second with 37.1%, while the remaining three candidates put together won less than 10%. DOS also triumphed at the elections for federal parliament and at the local level. SPO was brutally defeated; its presidential candidate (Vojislav Mihajilovic) won only 3 % of the votes. This party won just one out of 20 seats in the Chamber of Republics, and not a single one in the Chamber of citizens.

Milosevic’s electoral defeat and the failure of the ruling parties – SPS, JUL and SRS – sent a wave of shock through the regime’s establishment. And then, as was to be expected, they began covering Milosevic’s loss, a desperate try that lasted from September 25 to October 5, 2000. As was to be expected, since the political leadership of Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s authoritarian regime were neck-deep into illegal doings and violence and losing power for them meant facing criminal and civil charges. In addition, the international tribunal in The Hague had on May 24, 1999, indicted Milosevic and his closest aids. Losing power made their extradition to the tribunal look very realistic.

Acting as the *longa manus* of the regime, the Federal Election Commission was instrumental in its attempt to forge the electoral will of the citizens of Serbia. By breaching electoral and other legislation, the Commission’s permanent members announced the forged results on September 28, saying that Kostunica had not fulfilled the legal condition to become president of FRY (50% plus one vote). This meant that a second round of elections had to be held on October 8,

2000, giving Milosevic the opportunity to prepare a new election fraud. In order to prevent this, the leaders of DOS led a campaign of civil disobedience (on September 29) and mass protests, until the results of the presidential elections were recognized. Apart from hundreds of thousands of citizens demonstrating every day on the streets of Belgrade and other cities, about 13,000 miners from the country's major coal mine Kolubara halted production and joined the protesters. Milosevic's regime tried to force them back to work threatening to use police and army against them, but thousands of citizens joined their strike, which is the most probable explanation why the regime did not use force.

Many days of demonstrations reached a climax on Thursday, October 5, 2000, when more than seven hundred thousand citizens from all over Serbia poured to the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian cities demanding that the election will of the citizens be recognized. The demonstrators seized the federal parliament and national TV buildings, despite the interventions of the police, who used clubs and tear gas. Bloodshed was avoided as the elite police units (Special Units, Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, and Special Operations Unit, better known as the Red Berets) refused to open fire on the crowd and joined the citizens instead. A "soft democratic revolution" took place in the streets of Belgrade on October 5. Because of its massiveness, it was likened to the events in Prague, in 1989. Apart from the similarities, however, there were differences too. There was violence in Belgrade (police used clubs and tear gas, and the demonstrators used rocks, sticks and bulldozers) as well as casualties (two people died and dozens were wounded), which was more reminiscent of the "Romanian scenario".

It should also be emphasized that on October 5 in Belgrade, the potential force of the demonstrators exceeded that the force (violence) used, which can be explained by the fact that many protesters were armed and the takeover of the federal parliament and National Television buildings showed their firm resolve to, if need be, use other means than peaceful to defend their electoral will. Bearing in mind the authoritarian nature of the ruling regime in Serbia, the importance of force – which, to repeat, mainly remained latent – should not be underestimated. Under the pressure of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, the ruling regime was forced to recognize Kostunica as the new federal president-elect, as well as the victory of DOS at the federal and local elections. The latent force in the October events was not an accidental, unimportant and side phenomenon, but played an essential role, since without it the citizens' plight would fall on deaf years and the regime would continue to rule as before.

The DOS in Power

Immediately after the “October Revolution”, the federal government, together with President Kostunica, undertook a number of activities in the area of foreign policy that re-introduced the country to the UN and other important international organizations. Moreover, FRY re-established formal relations with NATO on January 10. After the ousting of the previous regime, the Serbian citizens’ wish to re-enter Europe and the international community got even stronger, show the results of a Medium Index poll. Conducted in April 2000, they suggest that around 80% of the citizens of Serbia supported joining the European Union and around 60% (in June 2001) were in favor of joining the Partnership for Peace.

The internal changes (economy, police, judicial system, etc.), which were the responsibility of the Republic of Serbia, were considerably slower than the changes in international policies. This may be explained by the fact that, apart from DOS, until January 25, 2001, the government comprised some parties from the old regime, with the power of veto over all decisions. Elections for Serbian legislature were held on December 23, 2000. Prior to these elections, the leaders of DOS signed a document called “Contract With Serbia” listing measures to be taken after the election victory. This document contained promises of rapid democratic reform and integration of FRY into all the major international organizations. In fact, this text contains all the key points of the “Platform of the Democratic Opposition” (democratic transformation, thorough market reforms, rapid integration into the international community), which got the support of the majority of citizens at the September federal elections.

From Triumph to Disintegration

At the December elections, the victory of DOS was even more vibrant than in September – 64.4% of the votes, which translated into 70.4% of seats in parliament (176 MP’s out of 250). By contrast, the former ruling parties SPS and SRS won only 60 seats (37+23). SPO again suffered a fiasco, winning no seats at all and failing to even reach the 5% census.

As noted before, the 18 parties comprising DOS were different in both size and political agenda. Until October 5, the joint anti-Milosevic effort kept them in one piece. But with the old regime now gone, DOS was left without the main ingredient that kept it together. This became painstakingly obvious as soon as the new Serbian

government set to work and two main parties – DS and DSS – started to disagree bitterly over relations with the international community. Even before the October changes, DSS was falling behind DS in size and influence. After the election of its leader Kostunica as federal president, it experienced sudden growth, outshining DS in political influence, as polls suggested.

The reason for the June 2001 dispute between DS and DSS is two-fold: firstly, there was an acute asymmetry between DSS' huge popularity and its minute political influence, and secondly, the two parties had very different political programs. DS came across as pro-European and ready to meet all the conditions for the country's readmission to international institutions. DSS had a rather reserved stance towards the West (especially the US) and its readiness to comply with its conditions was not unconditional. The crystallizing point of this long-lasting dispute was the conflict between DS and DSS over FRY's obligations regarding the extradition of The Hague's war-crimes indictees. This issue was raised in a tense atmosphere before the republican government in June 2001, when the leading Western powers linked the holding of the donor conference for Yugoslavia to the extradition of the individuals indicted by the tribunal, Milosevic above all. After the decision to extradite Milosevic was refused at the federal level, that is when the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the federal government's decree on his extradition – the Serbian government passed and carried it out on June 28, 2001. *This prompted a strong reaction from DSS, which culminated in this party's decision to leave the government, on August 17, 2001, thus marking the beginning of the demise of DOS.*

With DSS leaving, the government's support in the parliament came down from 70.4% (176 seats) to 52% (130 seats). Although it still had an absolute majority, the government's position became unstable, since a possible departure of any other of the remaining 17 coalition members could jeopardize it.

The actual split of DOS has far-reaching consequences, not only because DS and DSS found themselves on the opposite sides, but also because their leaders hold two strategically important positions in the new political order, that of the prime minister of Serbia and president of Yugoslavia, respectively.

DSS' moving to the opposition enabled the parties of the previous regime – SPS, SRS, and SSJ – which together had only one fourth of the house seats – make a comeback from the political margins where they were pushed after the December elections, to the mainstream politics. In the months to follow, DSS will be faced with a difficult dilemma: to refuse to cooperate with these parties and confine itself to powerlessness, or to accept cooperation and form a strong anti-European bloc with them. This bloc could, in the future, pass a vote of

no confidence to the government thus extorting early elections. This controversial teaming up could damage DSS' voter support, especially among its followers from October 5, thus diminishing its chances of electoral success. However, it is not impossible that at the next republican elections, DSS, together with those three parties, could win the majority in the parliament. Still, this would not be enough for it to form a stable government due to the unbridgeable differences between them. Such an outcome would definitely slow down democratic and market transformation already under way in Serbia.

Miroslav Hadžić*

A Plea for a "Cost–Benefit" Approach

Fruitful talks on the integration of FR Yugoslavia/Serbia into the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community became possible only after the fall of the Milosevic regime. Subsequently, two additional conditions and motives needed to be simultaneously achieved. The first move was to be made by the new Yugoslav and Serbian authorities. They were now expected to translate their pre-election rhetoric into a sensible strategy of a comprehensive approximation to the Euro-Atlantic Community in order to join it in the future. Clearly, this had to be preceded by planning and carrying out an all-embracing strategy of social reform directed towards making the country's values and interests compliant with those of the Euro-Atlantic Community. The response of the new authorities dictated the pace at which the initial international benefits resulting from Milosevic's demise were translated into strategic advantages, now attainable with FRY/Serbia's new position in the Euro-Atlantic environment.

Of course, the new authorities' success depended directly on the will and needs of the central powers of the Euro-Atlantic Community: the US, EU and NATO. There is no doubt that they wanted to crown a decade of handling the Yugoslav crisis and wars by removing or at least diluting the security risks that until then were coming from Serbia/FRY. They finished the first part of their job by admitting FRY into key international organizations through summary procedures. As for the second part, – the gradual and permanent inclusion of FRY – the Euro-Atlantic decision makers needed to have a comprehensive support program for Serbia and Montenegro's democratic reform. Moreover, they needed to be prepared to, in advance and with precision, define the conditions that FRY/Serbia was to fulfill, i.e. determine the rules of the game that must be followed in coming closer to the Community.

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Despite this, it was entirely up to the new authorities whether and to what extent they would succeed in preparing Serbia/FRY for this historical and strategic step. First of all, this required of them to finally identify national (state) interests, and allow for their realization. And all this against the background of the new Euro-Atlantic and global configuration of power, given and imposed upon them. It is not surprising that the first internal obstacles of this desired integration came from different political and ideological perceptions of the scope and sense of the Euro-Atlantic Community. Their emergence as well as their end result from the illusion that FRY/Serbia is able to choose the way and measure of their integration into the Community. Again, it comes as no surprise that the prevailing perception at home was that FRY/Serbia could get integrated into the Community selectively – on the economic and political levels, but not on the level of security. One mistake led to another: when, as KLA poured into Southern Serbia, they were forced to recognize the security effectiveness of the Community and NATO, it appeared to them that a mere expression of political will of FRY/Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace would be enough.

The cause of this oversight should be sought in the reluctance by part of the new authorities of FRY/Serbia to foresee and accept all the implications of their decision to enter the Euro-Atlantic Community. The by-product of this is an erroneous belief that FRY/Serbia could become part of the security system of the Community without a radical reform of its old security sector and armed forces. In the core of this illusion lies a hidden intention to avoid facing responsibility for Serbia's role in the bloody break-up of the previous Yugoslavia. The same is true for the attempts of the new authorities to get (and keep) democratic legitimacy despite its avoiding or rather delaying to dismantle the Milosevic regime.

The discussion about the security of FRY/Serbia should therefore move away from ideology, manipulations and petty politics and be taken to a level of strategic thinking. This could be an introduction into a long-term security planning, which would allow the creation of substantial socio-economic conditions and, by the same token, introduction of constitutional and systemic instruments for a gradual establishment of a democratic and secure society. Only in this way is it possible to avoid reducing the present security controversy to a false dilemma: to join or not to join NATO. It is equally important to publicly demystify the illusion that partial integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community is possible, and that it can be done so as to suit our economic and political needs only.

Providing that the new authorities knew where and how to place FRY into the security system, they, but some other factors as well, still do not have valid answers to basic security challenges and di-

lemmas of the Euro-Atlantic Community. The terrorist attacks on the USA only strengthened these dilemmas. Therefore, just as the bombing of FRY/Serbia crystallized the contradiction of the so-called humanitarian interventionism, the terrorist attacks revealed the futility of isolated security in a poorly organized and unsafe world. Hence, the present position that military force should be used in retaliation against terrorism is, in principle, indisputable. However, the dilemma remains of whether dealing with the consequences will eliminate the sources and causes of terrorism, which since September 11, 2001, is the major threat to the individual, common and collective security of citizens and states around the world.

In the last 10 years, the citizens of this country experienced – and contributed themselves to – the serious effects of a chronic lack of personal, social, and state (national) security. At the same time, thanks to the external players in the Yugoslav crisis – namely the EU, NATO and US – they suffered severe consequences of a lack of global security. Serbia and FRY can partially alleviate and/or eliminate part of these consequences by becoming integrated into the security system of the Euro-Atlantic Community, if they manage to snap out of the paranoia of being constantly conspired against, i.e. abandon the illusion that they were given the task to tailor the world to their own measure. To that purpose, it would be a good idea to reexamine the reasons for a chronic lack of security of their citizens and states alike.

Not long after the October 5, 2000, the new authorities proudly took credit for bringing Serbia and FRY back into the international, i.e. Euro-Atlantic, community. They mistook it for evidence of their diplomatic skill. Moreover, they interpreted the fact that everything went so quickly as a confirmation of Serbia's geopolitical importance. They assumed and broadcast that Serbia was once again a crucial factor of peace and development in the region. The more creative individuals went so far as to argue that a uniting Europe could not achieve its goals without Serbia. This resulted in a belief that the Euro-Atlantic Community had to unconditionally help the new Serbian authorities for its own good. They also played on moral arguments saying that the Community could thus redeem itself for its incorrect policies toward Yugoslavia, which climaxed with the NATO bombing.

At the same time, the new authorities avoided pointing out two important facts to the public at home. Firstly, that the US and EU had to tug at Serbia's sleeve to, among other things, get DOS (including DSS) to behave in the right way. Secondly, Serbia's prompt admission to international institutions brought about new installments of international obligations, whose settlement it could perhaps delay for a while, but not avoid. In fact, the new authorities were left to choose between meeting those obligations willingly or under duress. However, it is out of their jurisdiction to make the list of obligations. Even though this

list depends on the good (bad) will of the Euro-Atlantic power holders and/or their strategic calculations, its content is, in the long run, still determined by local factors.

Thus the Community requires that the new authorities first resolve tasks left over from the Milosevic era. In other words, it intends to make the Serbian citizens and their new leaders partly settle the costs of Milosevic's war policies. The first installment has arrived from The Hague Tribunal. The next ones are due soon, and they may involve asking Serbia to apologize to its yesterday's brothers for the wars they jointly produced, thus in fact admitting that Milosevic and the Army were aggressors. As a result, it would have to pay war damages. The new set of obligations derives from the expectations of the Community, but also most of Serbia's citizens, that the new authorities have finally and irrevocably broke with the former regime. To this purpose, the Community had already devised a mechanism known as the harmonization, which requires the future members, in our case Serbia, to normatively and in practice adopt the highest democratic standards.

It appears that international credit that Serbia and its new authorities earned for toppling Milosevic is now slowly thinning. With the initial enthusiasm of the West now wearing off, Serbia began receiving ultimatums. The new government reacted according to the usual pattern. The Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, in the name of patriotism, started putting the obligations off, thus only making their price go up. In the name of pragmatism, the rest of DOS, led by DS, chose to bargain and make quick promises. Both of them, of course, capitalized on this in their struggle for power, which began as early as on October 6, 2000.

There are two inherent obstacles to the barely passable foreign policy of the new authorities. The first consists of the illusion that the Euro-Atlantic Community could be entered using a shortcut, or partially. The other is the intention to gain economic and political benefits resulting from joining it, but at the same time avoiding the security obligations that come with it. The Serbian and FRY authorities seem to be forgetting that it is a community of states with soft sovereignty, resting upon a high degree of congruence and interdependence of its members' economic, political and security interests and goals. To make things worse, the authorities are still dodging telling this loud and clear to the public at home. No surprise that the citizens are still not ready to fully accept all the consequences resulting from the much desired return to Europe.

This is corroborated by the hesitation of federal authorities and the inaction of their Serbian counterparts regarding joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. This explains why the Army chief Gen. Pavkovic and the General Staff have so far only paid lip service to the idea of joining PfP, and Kostunica, as the head of the Supreme

Defense Council, has mainly kept silent on the issue. Similarly, the Serbian government, which proclaimed its desire to reenter Europe, has been avoiding initiating a house debate on the security integration of Serbia and FRY. The federal government has indeed set the PfP admission procedure in motion, but has not so far deemed it necessary to consult the MPs on the matter. This explains the calm of the local officials when the representative of the Council of Europe recently read to them the article of the future Constitutional Charter placing the Army (armed forces) under democratic civilian control. For truth's sake, DOS remembered this too, but only when the military counter intelligence service were already in their backyard, despite an uninformed Pavkovic and a partially informed Kostunica.

As expected, chameleons invaded the void resulting from inaction and are now in a hurry and aiming directly for the NATO. They hope for political benefits from it, whatever the outcome. Entering the hall of NATO through PfP would be a proof of their early courage and progressiveness. They would profit no less from rattling the saber of NATO, which could further slow down Serbia's and FRY'S admission into PfP. This option would allow them to relapse into their true – xenophobic and chauvinistic – state.

This said, it would be useful to quickly look at the purpose and scope of the PfP program, launched in January 1994. Today, it includes all European states, with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina FRY. This program has been the Community's and NATO's direct response to the post-Socialism security risks and the wobbliness of the pro-democratic regimes in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. The Community's paramount interest was to remodel the security of its own strategic environment. That is why security and military integration came first. A next step in the political and perhaps even economic integration into NATO and the EU depended, in principle, on the candidates' reform capacities. Of course, the Community's interests prevailed. By bringing the ex-socialist armies under its control, the US and NATO increased their strategic crisis management ability. At the same time, the states were asked to reform their armies and security according to NATO standards. This also implied supplying them with Western equipment and arsenal, to the pleasure of the US military industry.

An (emotional) assessment of the many ways that Community benefited from PfP could probably improve patriotic digestion, but cannot annul reality. All the more as NATO and the PfP have become the unavoidable substitute for a marginalized UN and a disoriented OSCE. Or rather, because they made them their satellites, following the logic of a changed global configuration of power. Despite all, NATO and PfP are the only efficient instruments for establishing and maintaining common security in today's Euro-Atlantic space. All the

more so as the European Union has still not decided how to define its common security and foreign policy lying on the “NATO pillow”.

The key differences between NATO and the PfP originate from their respective means for achieving (extorting) common security. NATO and the US have retained the appropriated right to use military force whenever and wherever they assess that their interest are jeopardized. The declaration of war on terrorism shows that the US no longer needs NATO. By contrast, the Partnership is a two-way street of security cooperation, first between NATO and the member states, and then between themselves. While NATO is obliged to protect the security of its members, the Partnership does not offer or guarantee such services. This is why the recent expectations of Macedonia, and of some ill-informed local analysts, were unfounded.

The membership in the central organization (NATO), as well as in its branch (PfP), is voluntary, but the conditions and procedures for admission are different. Their basic common denominator is devotion to peace and democracy, readiness for security cooperation and interoperability with NATO. The element linking all this is the application of the principles of democratic control of the armed forces, which, among other things, requires effective subordination of a depoliticized and de-ideologized army to democratically elected civilian authorities, transparency in defense matters, plans, and budget, the controlling role of the parliament and defense ministry – all subject to public scrutiny.

And yet, an old rule that admission criteria are only applied to those that you are not willing to admit, and never to those that you are willing to let in, applies to both cases. Turkey is a good example of that. A member since 1952, it would have trouble meeting the strict and precise conditions for entry into NATO even today. The same is true for Greece as well. Moreover, there is no evidence that Albania ever met the required conditions for entering the Partnership.

Still, the membership in PfP can be understood as a prerequisite for those who want to join NATO. Accession to NATO, however, does not necessarily ensue from the membership in the Partnership. Hence, the Partnership states can choose and propose programs in which they will cooperate with other PfP and NATO members. They carry their own participation costs. And most of all, the principle of voluntary entry into the Partnership implies the right to leave it, exercised so far by Malta.

The consequences of Serbia’s and FRY’s possible accession to the Partnership can be partially identified by making a list of foreseeable pros and cons. We must have in mind that what to us may appear as an advantage, the ruling elites and their leaders might perceive as a threat. Let us begin with the least controversial points.

As a PfP member, Serbia and FRY will:

- Get the opportunity to speed up, together with its neighbors, the security stabilization of the West Balkans to everyone's advantage, as well as to build and strengthen measures of mutual confidence;
- Contribute to the security, economic, and political integration of the region;
- Make use of the exchange of security information, knowledge and experience;
- Establish permanent channels of security cooperation with NATO and other members of the PfP;
- Directly acquire knowledge of contemporary practice of the security of citizens, society and state;
- Give its army (armed forces) the opportunity to share contemporary scientific, technical and technological innovations in the field of defense (war), as well as peacekeeping;
- Enable professional soldiers of the Yugoslav Army to study abroad and learn foreign languages;
- Acquire knowledge about rational defense planning, budget transparency and control;
- Receive additional stimulus for the modernization, professionalization and reduction of its army;
- Facilitate the training of the army for peacekeeping operations and handling new security risks (international terrorism, trafficking in arms, drugs, people, and human body parts);
- Avoid internal political disagreements about the false dilemma: to join or not to join the NATO.

Obviously, a more serious analysis loses sight of the potential benefits for the sovereignty and integrity of Serbian and FRY. Some are still harboring a hope that the membership in the PfP would help to keep Kosovo within FRY, i.e. preserve the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. However, it is safe to presume that no partnership, including the one with NATO (USA and EU) could keep this union together if its members do not see any reason (interest) for it. Even if it is possible to prove that this union is sustainable, except in the case of Kosovo and Albanians, these reasons are eclipsed by the security and other interests of the Euro-Atlantic Community, something Mr. Solana has been trying to explain to the political leaders here. One thing is certain: the entry into the PfP cannot lessen the odds on Serbia and Montenegro staying together.

The membership in PfP would result in the following additional and immeasurable benefits for the citizens of Serbia:

- By meeting the political conditions for admission – with the co-operation with the Tribunal being the central one – Serbia would start getting rid of the legacy of war.
- The application of the principles of democratic control of the military (police, secret services, para-police forces) would narrow the possibilities for their internal and political (ab)use;
- The army and generals would be expelled from politics, and politics would be expelled from the army;
- Comprehensive and thorough reform of the security sector in Serbia would finally cut down the mechanisms of state coercion to the right measure and do away with the militaristic and police legacy and culture;
- A contemporary security concept would place His Majesty The Citizen into its center, promoting him into the basic determinant and final purpose of the security efforts of the state and society;
- Short-term cost of the reform and reduction of the army, as well as the police, would soon result in visible medium-term economic, social and political benefits;
- The reform would entail staff changes within the army (police, secret services, para-police forces), which would finally remove Milosevic's generals from power.

However, what is best for the citizens may not be in the interest of the new leaders. If it were not so, they would already have launched an autonomous reform of the security sector and armed forces. Instead of hiding behind the requests of the international community, they would bring in urgent reforms in order to meet the needs of the citizens who had voted them into power. The list of potential damages to the FRY (Serbian) authorities could then be reduced to the fact that accession to the Partnership would narrow their space for manipulation with the obligations that they had undertaken. This is where the reasons for their unnecessary hesitation to expose themselves to the risks of taking Serbia and FRY into the Partnership should be sought.

Mile Stojković*

FR Yugoslavia's Integrative Capacities for the PfP Program¹

Within the framework of the current military-political constellation in Europe, particularly in the Balkans, the resolution of the security issues requests of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) a more active cooperation with the international community. This explains the special interest of our country toward the international security integrations, in particular to the Partnership for Peace.

Late last fall, the federal government launched an initiative to analyze all the relevant conditions of FRY's capacities for accession to PfP. An expert team of the Ministry of Defense was set up to draft all the necessary material and submit it to the federal government.

Let me mention here that the Institute for the Military Science of the Yugoslav Army organized a conference entitled "PfP and FR Yugoslavia", in late January 2001. That was an attempt to consider the military aspect of accession from many different angles. The objective of the gathering was not to respond to the question of whether Yugoslavia should or should not join PfP, since this is to be decided by the relevant state organs. The conference, however, enabled us to better prepare a comprehensive proposal for the country's accession.

Before the conference, Belgrade-based Institute for Geo-Political Studies in Belgrade organized a panel debate on the same issue. Apart from the representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and military and diplomatic representatives from some European countries, a delegation of the Ministry of Defense and the Army also attended. At issue was our country's capacity for admission to PfP. Thanks to its previous work on this issue, the Ministry of Defense was an active and knowledgeable participant in the debate.

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¹ This article was written in September 2001

The NATO PfP initiative was launched at the NATO Summit in Brussels, in January 1994. PfP's objectives include:

- achieving transparency in the area of national defense planning;
- providing democratic control of the armed forces;
- capacities and readiness maintenance in order to support peace-keeping operations under the UN and OSCE authority; and
- developing a relationship of cooperation with NATO in order to participate in joint planning, training and exercises.

We are familiar with the fact that the procedure of the Partnership accession is based upon three documents: 1) Partnership Framework Document; 2) Presentation Document, and 3) Individual Partnership Program.

As we understand it, the *Framework Document* is, in fact, the *Statute* of the Program, and its acceptance and signing denotes the first phase of the accession procedure. With the *Presentation Document*, each partner offers a transparent proposal of the preferred level, dynamics and extent of its joining the process of cooperation with NATO. *The Individual Partnership Program* relies upon the previous document and is considered as a *sui generis* agreement between NATO and each individual state, defining the obligations and level of partnership.

We consider the Partnership to be of enormous significance for NATO and for our country as well, for many reasons:

- first, through PfP, NATO non-members can participate in the resolution of security problems, applying NATO-compliant means and methods;
- second, this reduces the risk of partnerships with an opposite orientation;
- third, this provides conditions for joint participation in peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, which are getting increasingly costly;
- fourth, the PfP membership ensures a high level of military cooperation, which, in turn, encourages the country aspiring to NATO membership to meet the necessary conditions and standards.

The Army's expert team working on the draft proposal for FRY's admission to PfP, to be submitted to the federal government, has considered all these reasons.

The advantages and disadvantages of the PfP membership have been analyzed, but also the possible consequences of FRY's staying out of PfP.

The team found that the advantages would include:

- eliminating or at least reducing many negative security effects in our immediate or broader environment;

- strengthening our defense and reducing outside threats to national security;
- a faster reintegration of our country into the international community;
- a more significant integration of our country into the decision-making process within a collective European security system;
- improvement of our relations with neighboring countries;
- prevention of certain destructive processes in the country, especially secession, and
- better access to scientific, technical and technological Western achievements.

The disadvantages of the membership would include:

- a danger of marginalization of our own armed forces, and neglect of the military industry;
- a bigger defense budget;
- disagreements between some political groups (still under the impression of the bombing of Yugoslavia) regarding the perception of national sovereignty;
- disability to carry out the obligations from the *Individual Program* and bilateral agreements due to the difficult financial situation.

FRY's prolonged *restraint* from joining PfP could:

- slow down and even prevent our country's inclusion into international and regional integration and damage its international reputation;
- allow some countries to continue to follow the policy of force toward FRY, as well as various forms of sanctions and threats;
- exclude our country from decision making about the security architecture of Europe and the Balkans;
- prevent and limit economic and military cooperation of our country with other countries;
- intensify psychological propaganda against our country;
- interfere with our internal affairs under the pretence of protecting human rights and democratic freedom;
- provoke and generate conflicts and crises in the country as well as with the neighbors, etc.

Still, in the context of the advantages of FRY's accession to PfP, from the aspect of the country's defense, certain positive factors can be discerned that could strengthen our defense and security capacity. According to the Ministry of Defense, they are:

- a drop in the number of security threats in the Balkans, since all the NATO and Partnership nations from these territories would become partners;

- reduced possibility of a non-military threat to our security, due to the normalization of relations with the neighbors and a changed policy of the international community toward our country;
- first partial and then total reorganization of the Yugoslav Army to include the entire defense system with an accent on the adjustment, dimensioning, re-armament and training according to NATO standards.
- making our command system compliant with present-day needs and standards of the Western type, which would ensure a more efficient functioning of the entire system;
- supplying the YA with contemporary weapons and equipment in accordance with our economic and technical possibilities, which would facilitate further technical and technological compliance;
- making the current military equipment compliant with NATO standards, which would step up the exploitation of the country's technical resources – scientific, research, educational and producing capacities
- creating conditions for the military industry to quickly decide what to modernize, and what to transform, thus ensuring a more equal position on the international markets;
- training and education in the Yugoslav Army would not undergo any substantial changes, except in the area of foreign language training, command training, and training in utilizing new equipment.

However, FR Yugoslavia accession to PfP could have negative effects on the country's defense system:

- partnership is not always a reliable security guarantor, because the country's defense cannot not be delegated to the partners alone, but rather a compatible, i.e. combined and yet autonomous system of defense is also to be built;
- becoming part of the NATO intelligence and security system could gradually marginalize our intelligence and security capacities and narrow the possibility of independent control of the key leverages of the country's internal stability;
- the introduction of NATO-compliant weapons and equipment would require thorough organizational and systemic changes, putting additional financial and manpower burden on the Yugoslav Army;
- Yugoslav Army reorganization, modernization and re-armament would involve huge material means that are beyond the country's current capabilities.

Accession to the Program would request carrying out appropriate legal and doctrinal changes, as stipulated by the OSCE's "Code of Conduct in the Military-Security Sphere" which defines the role and place of

the armed forces. The organizational and functional changes within the Yugoslav Army and the entire defense system would result in additional requests which, in turn, could impact the system of management and command, or the entire defense system. Some of these requests are quite general:

1. A clearer and more precise allocation of competences in the field of defense among the state's top organs (legislature, government, president, ministry of defense).

2. Parliamentary and democratic control of the armed forces via the introduction of a transparent budgeting process and a clearly defined role of the parliament and government in deciding about the strategic use of the armed forces and restricted spending (the control entails drafting the military budget, having access to intelligence services, participating in the strategic planning and changing the Army's organizational structure, equipment procurement, etc.)

Therefore, the obvious reasons in favor of FRY's accession to PfP are as follows:

- it is one of our country's strategic goals, which presupposes the necessary changes in the political, economic, legal, military and other areas; in the process of transition, these changes could only bring additional benefits;
- although it would be quite costly, the Program reduces the dangers to FRY's security, and modernizes and strengthens our defense;
- looking from a military perspective, the accession to the Program is necessary for an efficient national defense system, despite the changes – in the system of command, organization, equipment, training, doctrine, and budgeting – it requires;
- by joining PfP, FRY would gain greater support from the international community and get the possibility to, under certain circumstances, approach some strategically important internal problems in a more independent and efficient way (namely, Kosovo and Southern Serbia);
- the accession to PfP would significantly contribute and give a boost to our foreign policy. That would be a step toward the strengthening of a much-needed confidence between FRY and the international community and, of course, a road to enhanced cooperation, peace building and generating a safer environment in the region and beyond, etc.

After FRY's possible decision to join PfP, it is necessary to present to the other side – in the form of a *Presentation Document and Individual Partnership Program* – the real potentials and interests of our country, together with accepting the responsibility to fulfill our obligations in the long run.

However, the current developments in the Republic of Macedonia show that PfP is not a fully reliable guarantor of security and sovereignty of the member state. It seems that the Partnership should be considered from a different angle, if not with suspicion, then at least with a measure of restraint. PfP might be the right orientation for our country on its road to becoming a part of the collective security of Europe (a final decision about this is with the top state organs) but we need to be aware of the other side of the problem. Namely, the international community, i.e. NATO representatives will probably set conditions for us to meet in order for the accession to be successful.

Based on the information we have, as well as the experience of other former Yugoslav and neighboring states with PfP, it can be expected that the international community presents us with the following three conditions:

- to establish a more viable relationship between FRY government and The Hague tribunal;
- to ensure compatibility between FRY's and the international community's strategic goals in the Republic of Srpska;
- to continue the reorganization of the Yugoslav Army in order to bring it in the OSCE framework, and ensure transparency and democratic control of the military.

Zlatan Jeremić*

The Preparation of the Yugoslav Army for Accession to the Partnership for Peace Program

Problem Definition

Past decade is characterized by the process of globalisation as well as disintegration. The consequences of both processes were felt in the former Yugoslavia as well. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) went through difficult periods of isolation, sanctions, international political and military pressure, and NATO aggression. Parallel to the changes on the political scene, the process of political, economic, financial and security integration of FRY into the Euro-Atlantic area has been unfolding. FRY security integration into the North-Atlantic Community is a necessity for the Yugoslav society. At issue here is not whether FRY wants to get integrated or not, but what it is supposed to do in order to get integrated. The forms, contents, volume, intensity and pace of that accession should be projected. The Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) is a step in that direction.

Basic Terms Definition

(A) PfP has been promoted upon the NATO initiative at the NATO Council Summit in January 1994. The former North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the OSCE members were invited on that occasion to accede to PfP, which was essentially imagined as a suitable semi-institutionalized security cooperation vehicle, within the framework of the armed forces and military doctrines of the member countries, harmonized with the NATO standards. It is envisaged as the instrument of accession to the Alliance. At the same time, PfP could

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be understood as a phase (entrance hall) of the NATO's expansion eastwards. This idea could be seen clearly within the Framework Document, where the objectives are clearly defined.¹

Apart from the fact that candidates for membership have different motives for accession to PfP, they all share the following aspirations:

- revitalize political, economic and social life;
- use the privileges in the treatment and instrumentalization of national-minority problems in the neighboring countries;
- improve geo-strategic position;
- fulfill geo-political and territorial ambitions;
- achieve international recognition;
- link national security to US and NATO;
- fulfill national aspirations and strengthen the negotiating positions with the neighbors;

The character of PfP best shows the national defense implications on the Partner nations:

- legal reform and adoption of doctrine documents in the area of defence;
- reorganization and modernization of defense ministries;
- military reorganization in accordance with NATO strategic concept;
- introduction of certain country's participating obligation in crisis-management operations and multinational military support and peace-keeping operations;
- introduction of the civil-military control of the armed forces, military doctrine transparency, budget planning and armament and military equipment;

The character and activities of PfP, as well as the experiences of its members, promise a quicker and all-inclusive organizational changes in the army in case FRY joins in. Organizational changes include changes in the organizational structure structure, sub-systems, influence and culture, strategy and resourced of the military.

(B) Organizational Changes of the Yugoslav Army Towards the Accession to PfP

¹ (1) Provide more transparency, openness and publicity of work in the planning process and national defense budgeting; (2) provide democratic control of the armed forces; (3) develop and maintain capacity and readiness for the participatio of national contingents, in full compliance with the constitutional provisions and principles of each country, in UN and OSCE missions; (4) establish military cooperation with NATO in terms of planning and joint exercises, in order to prepare the signatories for the participation in peace-keeping and search-and-rescue humanitarian operations, as well as for the participation in other operations to be undertaken in the future; (5) in the long run, create the kind of armed forces that are to be more able to operate jointly with the forces of NATO countries.

In order to identify and project the substance of the organizational changes in the YA, the causes, limitations and starting points of these changes should be defined.

The reasons for the organizational changes in YA are both external and internal. The external ones derive from international processes, as well as those unfolding inside FRY. The process of globalization and opposition to this process mark the present-day international scene. Political, economic, financial and security integration, primarily in Europe, determines FRY's orientation, whereas security and military-political integration is one of the elements of FRY's becoming part of the international community. Struggle against terrorism, intensified after the attacks on the US, will have positive effects on FRY's reintegration into the international community and could have a positive impact on solving the situation in Kosovo. Twenty-seven European states acceded to PfP with different content and intensity of participation. All FRY's neighbours acceded, except Bosnia-Herzegovina and the armed forces of certain states are incorporated into KFOR in Kosovo.

The changes on FRY's political scene triggered the reorganization of all state segments, including the security sector. Unsuitable constitutional provisions on the Yugoslav Army and a lack of democratic civil control of the Army damage its reputation. Financial dire straits impeding the modernization of the armed forces reduces YA's level of effectiveness. At the same time, the Army itself has been stalling on internal reforms.

The internal causes of the YA's slow organizational changes could be classified as follows: 1) YA organizational culture is not in full compliance with the processes in the state and in the international community; 2) there is a tendency towards the bureaucratization of the army, due to an overburdened organizational structure with a complicated subordination system and functions that go beyond the limits of military profession; 3) legislative and doctrinal papers are awaiting changes; 4) introduction of technological changes resulting from the accession to PfP; 5) deformation of structural power in controlling the resources which are not for military use.

The obstacles on YA's path to changes are multi-dimensional. Some result from the requests of the international community, others are a consequence of the general state of affairs in the country. In fact, they boil down to: 1) the obligation of urgent reduction of military personnel; 2) numerous regional security interstate cooperation program obligations to be fulfilled; 3) the material framework of the dimensioning of the army which has to be compatible to the country's level of economic development; (4) unresolved relations between Serbia and Montenegro; 5) the impact of terrorism, etc.

FRY's encumbend government has not yet offered the initial elements of the army organizational changes process which should

define its future role within the national security system. A system of presumptions should include: 1) radical change and harmonization of the constitutional, legal, doctrinal and other regulations in the area of defence and armed forces with the European judicial standards and agreements on military-security cooperation; 2) changes of the current civil-military relations that could bring about the creation of the procedures of a permanent and reliable democratic, civil and parliamentary control of YA; 3) implementation of all legal restrictions regimes and , control mechanisms as determined by OSCE, NATO and PfP institutional frameworks; (4) appropriate budgeting to ensure funds for the reorganization.

Military Doctrine As a Foundation of the Organizational Changes

The organizational system of YA has to be a result of vision, mission and objectives of the Army. The vision (what it could be) and mission (what we want it to be) are defined by the legislative and executive branches and are to be explicated in the Constitution, laws and doctrinal documents. Military doctrine represents a realistic platform, which includes all the fundamental issues of the military activities of the state and its integral defense. This doctrine defines the points which the military reorganization should be based upon. It should rest on postulates serving as the principles for the projection of YA's organization.

SCIENTIFIC OUTCOMES

Change of YA's Organizational Structure


YA's organizational structure is conditioned by its functions. The basic YA functions are: 1) commanding; 2) activity and counter-activity and 3) providing activity. The Yugoslav Army consists of three basic sub-systems: (1) commanding; (2) combat, and (3) logistic.

1) The commanding sub-system structure consists of: a) regional and processing functions carried out by the commanding system; b) organizational structure, and c) the level of technical equipment of the commanding system. Gray areas within these three elements are management and command of the Yugoslav Army and commanding within the Yugoslav Army.

In case of FRY's accession to PfP, the (sub)systems of YA of management and command will have to be adjusted. In order for it to be feasible, the following has to be done:

MILITARY DOCTRINE OUTCOMES

Slika 3



- clear division of the authority of state president and government, i.e. prime minister and minister of defence, i.e. the chief of staff, as specified in the Constitution and the Law on the Armed Forces;
- harmonization of the federal and republican constitutions;
- institutionalization of the democratic civil control of the army to correspond to the national interests of security and defense.

2) The system of command in the YA is burdened with competences that impede its functioning. At issue here is the functioning of the departments of housing, educations, science and some sections of the logistics.

- The command authority within the housing department is one of the leverages of the internal system of subordination of the General Staff. In spite of this, YA members attach a positive connotation to it, since it gives them the impression that their superiors can respond positively to their existential needs. Keeping of this competence within the General Staff, however, makes difficult the parliamentary control of the YA, i.e. its budget. The YA system of command should be freed from this duty, which should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense.

- The functioning of the military educational system should be the responsibility of the state and therefore placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence.

- Scientific activities in the field of military science should be centralized and dislocated from the YA into the Ministry of Defence.

- The rear-lines security should be organized on the basis of logistics, and taken care of by the YA.

- The evident overlap of certain issues and activities in regional and combat branches functions in the system of command leads to the increase of the number of jobs, and therefore to a more complex system of command.

- The technical ability of the command system is very low (dramatically neglected). In order to meet the Partnership criteria, there is an urgent need to modernize.

Functional and organizational changes are also needed in other YA segments. Without them, a proper participation in PfP is not possible:

- Intelligence and security function should be harmonized in terms of organization, functions and manpower. Organization-wise, this could be a specialized sub-system of national intelligence and security under the competence of the president of the state. Function-wise, the methodology of work needs to modernize and adequate control mechanisms ought to be introduced.

- Training and education of the members of YA for the participation in PfP activities should be geared toward acceptance, adoption

and application of NATO standards in the following fields: command and communications, airspace management, realization of tasks within the multinational forces, logistics organization in the military, and other.

- One of the YA priorities should be to take part in conferences organized by PFP, and focus on the construction, definition and implementation of the strategy of military science and research.

In spite of all, I believe that the Yugoslav Army is equipped and skilled enough to realize all the activities requested from a modern army, except those in outer space, and therefore complementary with PFP.

The most difficult part of this integration will be to meet the PFP (NATO) conditions in the area of logistics. The organizational changes in YA in the field of rear-lines security entail the reengineering of the logistics functions and processes, as well as a further improvement of the projected level of the YA's logistic organization.

The organizational culture is to be nurtured in the YA, based on the culture of tasks and culture of roles. The YA members should not be evaluated according to their rank (rank syndrome = knowledge and capability), but rather according to their capability to contribute to the task at hand. His or her values should include independence, flexibility, adjustment, initiative, orientation toward success and result. Organizational culture aimed at the task corresponds to team and project organization, on which most of the subsystems are based.

There is a certain power structure within the YA that supports the linking of formal authorities with the carriers of informal power within the military organization. The object of the organizational changes must be a realistic structure of power based upon the distribution of formal authority. The structure of power change is an important pre-condition for the organizational changes in the YA. At the very beginning of this process a misbalance of interests could take place, and those with power might try to control and impede the changes that could jeopardize their interest. Therefore, the pillar of the changes must stand outside the military organization, free from the burden of power structure, with a full participation of the YA's experts.

Conclusion

The process of organizational changes has been intensified within the YA. Its members' attitude to these changes is very positive. The Yugoslav Army expressed maturity in understanding the need to carry out organizational changes, by way of a series of conferences in which politicians too took part. The organizational changes must have a scientific basis and a broad foundation, because an isolated transforma-

tion of the army, without the same process taking place in other subsystems of security and defense, could have negative effects. The initiative and responsibility for carrying out the organizational changes in YA is not only in the hands of YA, but the FRȲ authorities as well.

PART FOUR

Jovan Teokarević*

FR Yugoslavia and Partnership for Peace

The core of the problem of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme is best described with the following statement of the former US President Bill Clinton: "The question is not whether, but when and how". When he said this in 1994, Clinton, of course, did not have our country's accession to PfP in mind. He was referring to the North Atlantic Alliance Initiative of NATO enlargement through the accession of former Warsaw Pact members, launched in those days.

Just as the decision on NATO's eastward enlargement announced a historic change in the structure and orientation of the Alliance, as well as in the general security situation in Europe, so did Yugoslav government's decision in April 2002 to apply for PfP membership. It was a defining moment in the country's foreign policy and security strategy. The official demand for integration in the wider structure of the NATO showed a clear desire of the new Yugoslav authorities to break up with the legacy of the Milosevic regime, which in 1999 resulted in war with NATO. This conflict will always mark the relations between FRY and NATO, something both sides will have to accept.

Particularities of FRY-NATO Relationship

An important indication of the nature of this relationship is the fact that it took the federal government one year to formally apply for PfP membership after having hinted that possibility for the first time. This decision was based, among other things, on a clear recommendation for application, resulting from internal analysis of the Defense Ministry and the Army of Yugoslavia. A lot of precious time was lost, not only due to the bickering in the ruling coalition, but also because this particular issue could not be agreed upon. The way in which the

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citizens first learned about the intention of the post-Milosevic government to apply for PFP was a consequence of the ruling coalition's estimate that the membership was neither opportune nor a priority. Moreover, most key actors probably feared negative public reactions. Two months after the October changes, this news was released not in the context of the implementation of DOS program, but was leaked to the press, which gave it an unnecessary air of mystery. Some even thought it was a hoax played by the "unpatriotic" faction in DOS.

Those in the ruling coalition against a fast approximation to NATO clearly misinterpreted the public mood which was – according to polls conducted in spring 2001 – very much in favor of the PFP membership. Even if three quarters in favor of the membership might seem slightly exaggerated, it can be explained with a general sense of satisfaction in Serbia in Spring 200, inspired by the Yugoslav Army's reclaiming of the Security Zone toward Kosovo, and its joined efforts with NATO to defuse tensions in Southern Serbia. Only two years after the bombing, the Alliance decided to cooperate directly, "on the ground", with our soldiers, despite initial hesitance. This new and unexpected partnership helped to build mutual trust, to the satisfaction of both sides. The public, government and the Army were pleased to see NATO applauding high professional readiness of the Yugoslav Army. For the first time, and after many years of bitter experiences, NATO was transformed in the eyes of the Serbian public from an enemy to an ally, in the politically sensitive area of the struggle against Albanian terrorism.

This, however, did not last long. The popularity of PFP and NATO dwindled quickly, as soon as clashes broke out between the Albanians and government forces in Macedonia. Our public drew new lessons from the behavior of NATO and EU in the early stages of the Macedonian crisis, which looked familiar. The disillusionment probably resulted from the belief that the membership in PFP (and above all the presence of NATO forces) was a guarantee of security. After the Albanian rebellion was tolerated for too long, which eventually put at risk Macedonia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, our public was compelled to conclude that the guarantees from Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO, were a dead letter. To be sure, those guarantees were never promised to PFP members. Even the new full-time NATO members felt uneasy about this issue, in relation to reservation expressed by President Clinton a little before Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became members in 1997.

Macedonian events sent messages of a more general nature as well, including that it does not pay to be cooperative, in the sense required way the West and its new postcommunist allies. If it did pay, the public reasoned, Macedonia, as a model of cooperativeness, would not have to pay such a high price. Because of the similarity of its

problems with the Albanian minority, Macedonia became the most telling example for the Serbian public. Not only were NATO troops stationed in the territory of Macedonia, but a full-scale war broke out just days after this country, as the first among the states of the Western Balkans, signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, in April 2001. Serbian public feared that Macedonia's recent past could easily become Yugoslavia's and Serbia's near future.

Although the mayhem in Macedonia had an effect on the public opinion on our country's accession to PfP, it could be assumed – even if only on the basis of insufficiently reliable data from subsequent opinion polls – that there was a tight pro-PfP majority. The public's support for NATO membership – regardless of how unrealistic this option may be at present – is considerably weaker than the support for PfP membership. Such a big difference in the level of support for these two essentially complementary steps is not seen in any other country in Central, East and Southeastern Europe.

However, it should be noted that this discrepancy, apart from understandable caution, reveals a high degree of realism, too. The kind of realism that could be recommended to a member of the federal parliament who a year and a half ago suggested that FRY should join NATO directly, without entering PfP first. This example also proves that the public, and the political elite, are poorly informed about PfP, including the conditions that our country has to meet in order to join it.

An important aspect of Serbia's position on PfP is a widespread opinion that the current support for PfP membership does not alter the following two deep-seated and equally widespread beliefs. First, that the 1999 NATO bombing was a huge mistake, not only the Alliance's, to be sure, but it did a terrible injustice to Serbs and should not be forgotten, not only for the Serbs' sake. Second, the ousting of Milosevic was not the result of the bombing, as is generally held in the West and in our neighborhood. The bombing had only postponed his demise, to say the least, and Serbs alone should be given all the credit for getting rid of him.

With NATO bearing similar psychological and political grudges against Serbs, the real question is whether so much emotional luggage in our relationship will permit normal cooperation. Although this problem should not be underestimated, it is much less to blame for our belated accession to PfP than a paralytic DOS or its reluctance to launch the reform of the military. Let us remember that today, in mid-2002, we are approximately a year and a half behind our original foreign-policy schedule, including membership in the Council of Europe, PfP and the signing of an agreement on stabilization and association with EU. This delay should be a warning to all, especially those who describe our transition as the quickest so far.

Expectations

The extensive public and expert debate on this issue revealed four main expectations from our membership in PfP.

First, the membership will have a huge symbolic value and will come as a natural next step in our policy of opening up to Europe and the world after a decade of isolation and wars. Joining PfP will reaffirm our strong strategic commitment to integration – economic, political and security – and our determination to be an inseparable part of the Euro-Atlantic community of states ruled by democracy and market economy.

The second expectation is that PfP membership will provide a good framework for reconciliation and radical improvement of relations with our neighbors. The same applies to the leading Western countries and NATO members, until recently our traditional political and war allies.

Thirdly, PfP membership is expected to provide the best possible solution to the status of Kosovo, which would in turn stabilize the entire Balkan region, as well as improve security.

And lastly, PfP will be the best and the unique framework for a military reform, i.e. modernization and professionalization of the Army of Yugoslavia. Closely related to this is the Army's adequate positioning in the context of a democratic regime, i.e. its coming under civilian control.

Due to specific reasons, some expectations, shared by other countries prior to their accession to PfP, simply do not exist here. Firstly, no one expects that the integration within NATO structures, even on the level of PfP – will guarantee defense in case Russia attacks. This, in fact, was the most common and main reason for the former Soviet satellites to join the PfP and NATO. Just as our citizens do not expect NATO to defend them from a Russian attack, which they do not deem possible, they also do not expect that PfP membership will bring or improve democracy and human rights in our country – as is usually claimed by NATO supporters across the post-communist world. Rather than the appealing slogans, it is the direct experience with the Alliance that counts: it is difficult to expect democracy from someone who was recently dropping bombs here.

Finally, let us mention another expectation that has been particularly salient among today's candidates for membership in NATO, but was almost totally missing from the debates in our country. It is the hope, frequently stressed above all by Bulgarians and Romanians, that accession to NATO will work as the ultimate incentive for foreign investment. All candidates for the second round of the enlargement, to be invited at the Prague NATO summit in

November 2002, claim that the fact that they were not full members of NATO, despite many years in PfP, was responsible for poor foreign investment. Apart from legal infrastructure and the imminent EU membership, the countries of the so-called second transition circle believe that they still need to become members of NATO, whose symbols will give the necessary guarantee to foreign investors. Similar debates and explanations are to be expected here once foreign aid is gone.

Context

In order for our planned integration into NATO structures to be as satisfactory as possible, one should bear in mind the context of the current NATO enlargement, and of our seeking PfP membership.

1) The first important feature of that context has to do with the nature and functioning of PfP. In several areas PfP failed to meet the expectations prevailing in Eastern and Central Europe in mid-nineties. At issue here is the idea of PfP's general role: instead of becoming the entrance hall leading directly to full NATO membership, for many PfP became a permanent waiting room. In the meantime, additional obstacles emerged. Candidates for NATO membership now have to enter the Membership Action Plan (MAP) before being admitted to NATO, a condition met by Croatia, for instance.

Secondly, instead of dealing with the "hard" security issues (and be the guarantor of security for individual countries already during this stage of integration) as was expected, this programme became absorbed by "soft" security issues, exhausting itself in non-specific drills (natural disaster management, for instance), or the English language courses for officers.

Thirdly, the expected financial gain from PfP is also lacking. In no way has PfP become a "second Marshal Plan" for Eastern Europe, but it did not cost much the participating countries either. In the framework of its own individual plan worked out together with NATO, each state chooses the activities it wants to participate in and finance, or which are financed by the Alliance. The good news is that the enlargement of NATO has not been too costly for its members (as originally feared) and was even less costly for the PfP members. The Western military industry has not yet cashed in on the membership in the "security club", as was also expected. Despite all this, the price of joining NATO is going up, and NATO is making this clear to all the candidate nations. All current MAP members are requested to increase their present defense budgets – 1.5% of the countries' GDP in most cases – to the planned 2% to 2.5% in the next years.

2) The second important element of this new context in which we want to join PfP, while seven countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria) are expecting to be invited to join NATO in November 2002, is the very nature of the Alliance. In fact, NATO is no longer what it used to be during or immediately after the Cold War. The terrorist attacks on the USA marked the beginning of a new era in the life of the Alliance, introducing two important novelties in NATO's identity and the trans-Atlantic relations.

Identity has been the Alliance's major problem ever since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the bipolar division of the world. From then onwards, NATO's identity has been multifaceted. It is at once a defense military bloc of a number of countries and the collective security system of Eurasia (or at least its backbone), but could also be seen as a substitute for the United Nations, i.e. an interventionist force for crisis resolution in and outside the territories of its members, and so on... The multiple identities are not a problem *per se*. The problem is that the Alliance can choose which identity to present and impose as the main one. In principle, this should be a matter of concern for the prospective members, since after years of waiting they will be joining an organization that in the meantime underwent internal transformation. In the absence of the "Russian threat", NATO membership has lost its security feature and gained political significance, a substitute for a failed quick accession to EU. This is why the internal changes did not have the candidates worried.

After the September 2001 events in the US, the Alliance reached a turning point and assumed a new image, that of a global fighter against terrorism. This, however, is only a fragment of a bigger picture unfolding today before the eyes of the world. One element of this picture, with far-reaching effects, is a new relationship with Russia, the twentieth member of the Alliance, without the power of veto. Once NATO's main rival and enemy, and then a reluctant partner in recent years, Russia joined NATO, thus getting there before many countries which sought refuge in NATO against Russia. This rendered senseless the entire ruling model of NATO enlargement. A radical improvement of relations with Russia (partly reflected in a spectacular reduction of the nuclear arsenals on both sides) has shaped some important elements of the perception of NATO in our country, which is looking to come closer to NATO structures.

The change consists in a simple formula devised by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that mission should determine the allies, and not vice versa. In other words, the NATO membership card is not enough to solve a problem in alliance with Washington, i.e. NATO as a whole. Yugoslavia's experience in Southern Serbia in 2001 has already proved this to be correct. This should not be understood as a call to give up the already initiated Euro-Atlantic integration of our

country, but rather as a reminder that possibilities for security cooperation with NATO arise with every step down that road.

This change has resulted in the US pushing its European allies to the margins, because of Russia today, and tomorrow because of some other state. This is a new situation for the European allies as well, which makes it difficult to prescribe any recipes. Still, it is safe to say that choosing just one side for the main or unique partner would be a big strategic mistake on our part.

Conditions

The conditions for our country's entry into the Partnership for Peace are widely discussed and known today, which was not the case until recently. The only good aspect of our tardy reaction to the invitation to join several international organizations is that all of them (CoE, PfP, EU), but also some individual countries (the US, for instance), have identified a set of conditions to be fulfilled. Conditions for the admission to PfP are similar to those set by the Council of Europe. The main prerequisite is the ability to prove a country's regime to be democratic. Although in our case this is no longer difficult, neither the CoE nor PfP will even start to consider our application before the new state of Serbia and Montenegro is constituted. The two republics must first pass a constitutional charter, as required by the Belgrade Agreement, signed in March 2002. Since FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the only two European states that remained outside the CoE and PfP, it is unlikely that their applications will be considered with unreasonable sternness, but the accession will certainly be more than just a formality. The accession to the Council of Europe will be a confirmation of the democratic character of the political system.

The second condition for the accession to PfP is civilian control of the armed forces, as a kind of operationalization of democratic principles in this sensitive domain, which the Alliance sees as particularly important. Our situation is extremely unfavorable here, since the ruling coalition has only just initiated the reform of armed forces. If it had not been for the so-called Perisic Affair (in which Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Perisic was accused of spying), the public would never have learned that neither the parliament, nor the government had the Army and its intelligence under control and the legislation on the control of security services would never have been passed.

In order to provide enough evidence that the government has at least initiated the process of civilian control of the army, three steps must be taken. First, an important aspect of the civilian control is

financial control of the army, i.e. the control of the military budget, which has to be transparent. Before we apply this on the 2003 budget, another two steps must be taken. One is to establish the National Security Council, and the other to make the parliament defense and security committees truly operational, as well as to adopt a new security doctrine.

The remaining two conditions are easier to fulfill, since a part of the road has already been passed, and their fulfillment depends on political and military factors from Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. their application for admission to PfP. Cooperation with The Hague tribunal has finally started, and the Dayton peace accord has been respected and the relations between the Yugoslav Army and the Army of Republika Srpska, denied until recently, have been suspended. The staff changes in the Yugoslav Army are not listed among the formal conditions for admission to PfP. However, their absence – from the Headquarters in particular – will mean that the new government in Belgrade is still backing the individuals who symbolize the old regime and a different conception of the role and place of the armed forces in the country's political system.

If FRY wants to be a successful member of PfP, it must have realistic expectations. One should not expect miracles from it, since it is not a universal cure for the country's problems. Its importance is symbolic and political: PfP membership is a confirmation that a country is on the right course. And while not many innovations should be expected from PfP in the area of security – at least not independently from other NATO and EU programs – it will certainly not jeopardize the main national interests of Serbia and Montenegro. Partnership for Peace is offering at least a convenient framework for many initiatives that we might come up with. In that sense, security cooperation with our neighbors is our big chance as well as a challenge.

Ivan Ivanov*

The Bulgarian Experience in the Partnership for Peace

The Republic of Bulgaria was one of the first countries that joined the PfP Programme by signing on 14th February 1994 the Framework Document. This new stage of enhancing the relations with NATO was an expression of the will of Bulgaria to safeguard and promote the common democratic values of the Alliance. The decision to join PfP was an important element of the Bulgarian policy in achieving its strategic goal – the full integration of the country in the European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political and military structures.

In the same year 1994, Bulgaria submitted its Presentation Document to NATO. The Bulgarian Presentation Document outlined the steps to be taken to achieve the political goals of the Partnership, the military and other assets intended to be made available for Partnership purposes, and the specific areas of cooperation with NATO.

Based on the statement made in the Presentation Document, Bulgaria presented its first Individual Partnership Program (IPP) on November 28, 1994.

The period from 1994 until 1997 was characterised by a regular participation of Bulgarian military officers and civilians in different PfP activities – political consultations, courses, seminars, meetings, and exercises.

February 17, 1997 marked the beginning of the stage of intensive preparation for future NATO membership. A National Programme for Preparation and Accession to NATO was developed as a result of the decision of the Council of Ministers. This programme was adopted on March 17, 1997.

A decree of the Council of Ministers was issued establishing a governmental mechanism to coordinate the efforts for preparation and accession to NATO – the Interdepartmental Committee on NATO In-

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tegration. The Committee is headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence and includes the Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army and deputy ministers of all the relevant ministries.

An important element of our participation in PfP and of deepening the cooperation with NATO was the establishment of a Permanent Bulgarian Mission to NATO, including diplomats and military people who participate in the work of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Political-Military Steering Committee – the working forum for PfP. The Republic of Bulgaria participated in plenary sessions, consultations, seminars and working groups in order to enhance the military and political cooperation between our country, NATO and the Partner countries at a qualitatively new level, and to reiterate the common commitment to strengthening peace in the Euro-Atlantic zone. Bulgaria is represented at meetings of the Military Committee Working Group on Cooperation and the NATO Military Committee in EAPC/PfP format by its own military envoys.

Permanent liaison officers to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe – SHAPE, in Mons, Belgium, were assigned by Bulgaria.

After the decisions taken in Madrid in 1997 to enhance PfP and the establishment of PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) in various NATO military headquarters at the strategic and regional levels, Bulgaria appointed a number of officers in them since the beginning of 1998. These officers work together with their NATO colleagues on planning for exercises and conducting other activities, thus acquiring the necessary experience for working in international teams. This contributes to the enhancement of interoperability capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria with those of NATO, and the application of this experience in the units of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.

Participation in PfP has an important direct contribution to the ongoing defence reform. The national PfP policy is developed and implemented in compliance with the main provisions of the national documents regulating defence policy and strategy, and the restructuring of the armed forces – the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, the Plan for Structural Organization and Development of the Ministry of Defence – 2004, and the Plan for Structural Organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria – 2004.

1.1.1. Bulgaria takes full advantage of the opportunities offered by the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations – PMF, the Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations – OCC, the Training and Education Enhancement Program – TEEP, including PfP Training Centers Network, PfP Exercise Simulation

Network and the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes).

Bulgaria actively promotes regional cooperation within the PfP and the use of existing PfP tools and programmes in support of NATO's South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). Bulgaria's approach to regional cooperation aims to support the implementation of the PfP objectives and further broadening and deepening the Partnership, to increase the confidence and the joint conduct of peacekeeping tasks. The country participates and is currently hosting the HQ of the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe (MPFSEE). The national PfP policy includes efforts to focus and coordinate bilateral cooperation and assistance in support of PfP.

The Individual Partnership Program (IPP) is an annual document that covers a two-year period. The IPP contains statements of the political aims of Bulgaria in PfP, the military and other assets to be made available for PfP purposes, the broad objectives of cooperation between Bulgaria and NATO in the different areas of cooperation, specific activities to be implemented in each one of the areas of cooperation and in the spirit of PfP activities.

The selection of activities in our first IPP and later on was made on the basis of Bulgaria's individual requirements and priorities, from a list of activities contained in a Partnership Work Programme (PWP).

After the Washington Summit decisions, Bulgaria tailored its IPP in support of the implementation of the MAP Annual National Programme goals and tasks.

The priority areas of cooperation in our IPP are:

- Air Defence;
- Airspace Management;
- Consultation, Command and Control, including Communications and Information Systems;
- Logistic Support;
- Military Education and Training, including Language Training;

The main efforts in implementing the planned IPP activities for 2001 were directed toward achieving the necessary level of interoperability and supporting the process of preparation of the country for its full membership in NATO. Participation in about 350 activities was planned for the year 2001.

The Bulgarian IPP for 2002 includes about 300 activities. This decrease in the number of activities in comparison with the year 2001 is due to our result-oriented and "quality versus quantity" approach.

At the NATO Summit in Washington, the Alliance came up with a number of initiatives. The most significant one for those countries aspiring for NATO membership is the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Bulgaria perceives MAP as a demonstration of the Alliance's

will to continue its “open-door policy” and to enlarge the Euro-Atlantic security area. A set of Enhanced and More Operational Partnership activities as well as national, bi- and multi-lateral activities are in support of MAP.

On the basis of the Washington Summit initiatives, Bulgaria specified its priorities concerning participation in the PfP and commitments relevant to future NATO membership. They are set out in the MAP Annual National Programme of Bulgaria.

The Republic of Bulgaria participates in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in the PfP from December 1994. PARP is developed with the objective to accelerate the interoperability with NATO and it provides feedback to the Partner countries for better preparation of their armed forces for participation in joint training and operations. Bulgaria provides information on a wide range of subjects including its defence policy, developments with regard to the democratic control of the armed forces, national PfP policy and relevant financial and economic plans. The basic task of our participation in the broadened and adapted PARP is the adaptation of the Bulgarian planning processes to these of NATO.

During its membership in PfP, Bulgaria participated actively in the political dialogue and consultations with the aim of strengthening European security, achieving maximum transparency and predictability in the defence sphere, and in support of the process of taking important decisions in the field of national foreign and security policy.

Cooperation in democratic control of armed forces, defence policy and strategy, and defence planning and budgeting areas has played a positive role in boosting the defence reform, in particular the restructuring of the MOD and the General Staff and the introduction of a planning, programming and budgeting system.

The democratic control of the armed forces and CIMIC relations were promoted through exchange of information and consultations with the Alliance and its members on the matters of national legislation and practices; participation in national and international courses for civilian experts, parliamentarians and scientists; coordination and facilitation of the exchange of civilian specialists in the defence area.

The cooperation in the fields of crisis management, air defence and airspace management, modernisation of the national Communications and Information Systems (CIS), Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) was of great value in achieving one of the most important national PfP objectives – formation and preparation of units able to operate with those of the NATO members in peacekeeping and other operations.

1.1.2. Our participation in PfP exercises contributed to a high degree to the entire process of reforming the Bulgarian Army. The improved skills of the command staff for work in a multinational

environment created capabilities for active participation of Bulgaria in future CJTFs. During the period 1994-2000, Bulgaria participated in 128 PfP exercises and in two NATO exercises with more than 4,800 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

The exchange of military delegations for coordination of the military cooperation in the framework of PfP and the increased contacts between the military on different levels was an important contribution to the achievement of the PfP objectives.

After the National Programme for Bulgaria's Preparation and Accession to NATO was approved in 1997, the financial resources available for activities under the Programme and Annual National Programme for the implementation of the Membership Action Plan are included in the state budget. The overall management of these resources is exercised by the Interdepartmental Committee On NATO Integration.

These resources are allocated to cover the implementation of EAPC activities, carrying out political dialogue, consultations and other military diplomatic activities, for the Annual National Programme of the Membership Action Plan and the Planning and Review Process, for the Individual Partnership Programme, for participation of Bulgarian units in international missions, SEEBRIG, SFOR, and KFOR.

Zsolt Rabai*

Hungary As a Member of NATO

In 1999, Hungary became a full Member of the North Atlantic Alliance with all the rights, commitments and obligations of the membership. Hungary has now achieved full political integration. However, full-scale military integration is an ongoing process. Many people say it is too slow. Perhaps. But we should not forget that it took the Federal Republic of Germany almost ten years to achieve full military integration in the Alliance. Today, the task is even more complicated because Hungary has to aim at a moving target. NATO is rapidly evolving and this necessitates changes in all the member states.

What Was Hungary's Motivation to Join the Alliance?

There was consensus among Hungarian policy-makers to reintegrate the country into the community of free and democratic states. For Hungarian politicians, as well as for the public at large, the Euro-Atlantic integration had two pillars: NATO – the defence pillar, and EU – the economic pillar. Therefore, by entering the Alliance, Hungary was to ensure its smooth integration into the community of developed democratic states. Did Hungary's membership fulfil these expectations? I think the answer is definitely affirmative.

The second major motive for Hungary was well defined in Prime Minister Orbán's speech: “By NATO membership we would like to ensure a stable, peaceful and secure environment in the long run.” This goal was a clear challenge in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe ravaged by collapsed regimes, collapsed economies, vacuum of power, crisis of values along with the rebirth of extreme nationalism, an increase in human-rights violations, etc. Did the NATO membership provide Hungary with a safe environment in the long run? Up

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to this moment and to the best of our best knowledge, the answer again is affirmative.

It was clear from the very beginning that Hungary's main motivation for membership was neither a supposed direct external danger nor a concrete military threat. However, a fear of the return of the old communist regime in Russia, especially after Foreign Minister Kozirev's unforgettable speech at the 1992 OSCE Summit in Stockholm, directly influenced the Hungarian government's decision to seek NATO membership. Additionally, fears of a territorial spill-over, as well as economic implications of the Yugoslav crisis, pushed responsible politicians to urge the country to join the Alliance.

I have mentioned economy. At that time, the Hungarian economy needed a considerable inflow of foreign direct investment in order to re-establish a healthy economic growth. All economic reforms, the introduction of a free market economy, conditions for a free and fair competition, were not enough to attract foreign investments – especially serious long-term investors – in light of the Balkan wars. According to the leaders of international companies, the prospect of the country's eventual NATO membership guaranteed them security of investment.

There was another important motive for Hungarian government's decision. This was the opportunity to be part of the international decision-making process about Europe's main area of conflict – the Balkans – which is in the immediate neighbourhood of Hungary. Hungary's participation in NATO's political discussions and decision-making was put on test just days after its admission. NATO started its air strikes in Kosovo and Serbia. Because of the closeness and the presence of a large Hungarian minority in Voivodina, this operation had an impact on Hungarian interests. If the question were whether Hungary's membership of NATO was a good decision and whether it ensured representation of Hungarian interests in the context of NATO air strikes, my answer would again be affirmative.

Neutrality Vs. Membership

Since 1956, neutrality has been a dream of the Hungarians. Following political changes, the first freely elected government did not want to provoke Russia by requesting NATO membership. However, the Yugoslav crisis and Kozirev's speech in 1992, convinced Hungarian politicians that the country's security needed to be strengthened. This challenge came as the Hungarian Armed Forces were halved in size, while maintaining the same structure. The defence budget had also been reduced considerably. In April 1989, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary had Soviet troops on its soil. The number of

peacetime troops was 160,000 and the military expenditure came to 3.5% of GDP. In 1996 the number of peacetime troops was 81,266 and the military expenditure dropped to 1.26% of GDP, which was also decreasing.

It was obvious that the country's hard security would be at a higher level, more effective and less costly with NATO membership. The inevitable reform of the Hungarian Armed Forces also seemed to be more efficient in the NATO context.

Is NATO Membership Really Cheap?

Cheap security does not mean that a country can avoid military reforms and further decrease defence expenditures. It means that all the preconditions are there to ensure high-level security by sharing the tasks and burdens with other Allies. It also means, however, that the Armed Forces have to be modernised and transformed to be able to participate in the Alliance's common tasks and commitments. To obtain NATO membership, Hungary had to increase its defence budget to 1.81% of the GDP.

NATO membership also meant active participation in its planning process, which resulted in efficient support to the reform of the Armed Forces, especially in identifying, developing and introducing the required capabilities. The first developed Target Force Goals defined the main direction of the Hungarian Armed Forces in the medium-term. The focus was on: language training, high-level command, control and communication, host nation support, inclusion in NATO's integrated air defence system, preparation of Reaction Forces and participation in NATO's Strategic Intelligence Information Exchange.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Partnership for Peace was an important element in Hungary's preparation for membership, especially in the field of defence planning and interoperability. Additionally, PfP membership added value to the internal stabilisation of the country by focusing on transparency in defence planning and budgetary processes and ensuring democratic control of the Armed Forces.

Foreign Policy

Preparations for NATO membership had also challenged Hungarian Foreign Policy. A prerequisite of any future NATO membership was clear reconciliation with all the neighbouring states, a diplomatic solution to the problem of national minorities. Of course, Hungary had

to make it clear that it had no territorial claims on any other country. Not only did Hungary fulfil these preconditions, but it became a staunch supporter of its neighbours' admission into NATO.

National Consensus

A consensus from almost all the parliamentary parties carved a solid background for all governments in developing relations with NATO. Only two small political parties opposed NATO membership – the Workers' Party with 2-3% public support, and the Party of Hungarian Truth and Life, with 5%.

The referendum on NATO membership clearly demonstrated that national support was not limited only to political parties: the turnout was 49.24%. Out of the total figure, 85.33% votes in favour of the membership. The latest opinion polls put public support for NATO membership at more than 70%.

Legal Issues

NATO membership also meant a psychological and legal challenge. After the political changes, one of the primary constitutional changes consisted in banning foreign troops from Hungarian territory and sending Hungarian troops abroad without the agreement of the Hungarian legislature. This constitutional change, however, limits Hungary's ability to contribute to new NATO missions or even react quickly in case of the activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Public Procurement Law, National Defence Law, etc., also had to be brought into compliance with NATO standards.

Hungary's Contribution As a Member Country to the Work of NATO

By commencing the enlargement process, NATO wanted to extend its zone of security to destabilised Central and Eastern Europe. We can already say today that this expectation has been fulfilled.

On the one hand, Hungary's vicinity to Europe's major crisis area was of great importance for the work of the Alliance from the military and political points of view. On the other hand, Hungarian knowledge and experience in the region helped to make realistic assessments of the situation and find more viable solutions. The experience of Hungarian experts with Ukraine and Russia is also much appreciated.

Last but not least, Hungary, together with Poland and the Czech Republic, now has a valuable experience in what it is like to join NATO and to make its own defence system compliant with it. By sharing this information with new candidates for membership, they can together make the NATO enlargement process a much easier one.

Ljube Dukoski*

Republic of Macedonia in the Partnership for Peace

The republic of Macedonia took the road to NATO membership almost a decade ago, but has been a PfP member since 1995 in 1993, the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia passed the decision to include the country into Euro-Atlantic integration. For us, the last eight years have been a period of intensive cooperation with nato and PfP countries, constant progress of that cooperation and a period of serious changes in the country, particularly in the national defence system. As a complex process, the Partnership for Peace has enhanced our liaisons and influences through cooperation in EAPC, as well as regional and bilateral cooperation. However, on this occasion I would like to focus only on the cooperation mechanisms in PfP in which the Republic of Macedonia is involved and has specific experiences.

For this purpose, let me mention the individual programme, planning and review process (PARP), the support of NATO member countries in equipping the army of the Republic of Macedonia, the annual national programme for membership, the host nation support for NATO forces and the cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.

Individual Partnership Programme between the Republic of Macedonia and NATO (IPP)

We are pleased to say that this is a very successful partnership tool. Each year, the Republic of Macedonia and nato develop IPP. The degree of its implementation has largely depended on whether it has been well focused on the priorities, whether the personnel management has been functioning well, and whether there is enough staff with proficiency in english, which is a prerequisite. IPP progress and its implementation have been increasing constantly, both in terms of

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quality and quantity of the related activities. Furthermore, I would like to emphasise the following facts: annual participation in some 10 nato/pfp and “in the spirit of Pfp” exercises, 200 activities (seminars, courses, educational activities, conferences...). I can say with pleasure that they were a remarkably useful source of knowledge and a possibility for an exchange of experience that was valuable for the building and enhancing process of our national security system.

IPP implementation, of course, requires significant funds. For instance, the costs for IPP 2000 amounted to around \$1.5 m, one third of which was covered from the national budget, and about two thirds by NATO.

Planning and Review Process (PARP)

The Republic of Macedonia joined the second PARP cycle. More precisely, this involved the implementation of 31 interoperability goals during the first three-year cycle, from 1997 till 1999 their implementation within the units of the army of the Republic of Macedonia meant introducing more than 500 basic nato standards. The progress achieved was within the limits of our capacities.

In 2000, the Republic of Macedonia joined the third PARP cycle. In consultation with NATO, we accepted to implement 47 partnership goals. Of them, 22 are general, 16 are related to ground forces and nine to air forces. Macedonia also defined its national contribution in collective defence. Namely, one infantry company, one engineer platoon, national support element and two helicopters.

In the case of Macedonia, PARP has proven to be a good mechanism providing constant consultations and knowledge concerning the structure of the armed forces, their equipping and training. In the absence of PPBS, we make use of PARP methodology for defence budget planning purposes.

Seen from the aspect of its contribution to peace in SEE, SEBRIG represents a truly significant progress, particularly with regards to the history of the region. SEBRIG is an expansion of increased trust of the see countries, and offers a possibility for immediate training of personnel according to NATO standards by the personnel from Italy, Turkey and Greece. Another aspect that must be taken into consideration is the fact that the national participation in multinational units is not cheap. Macedonia's share in the SEBRIG budget is 5.56%.

NATO Support for Equipping the Army of the Republic of Macedonia

NATO support process for equipping the army of the Republic of Macedonia has been intensified since 1998. The “clearing house”

process is well coordinated with the bilateral cooperation of the NATO member countries. I would like to emphasise the support in equipment by the us, Germany, France, UK, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, and other NATO and PfP countries, notably in communications, armour personnel carriers, field vehicles, and NVG's.

Host-Nation Support

In 1999, the PfP cooperation entered a new, more complex and intensive stage. In the course of that year, Macedonia found itself on the very *boundary* of the conflict in Yugoslavia. As the Kosovo crisis threatened to spill over into Macedonia, NATO emerged as a guarantor of our security. During the same year, Macedonia provided the possibility for NATO to deploy some 27,000 troops in its territory, thus allowing access to the airport in Skopje as the host-nation support was in the focus of the cooperation. That role engaged a lot of personnel from the army and a number of ministries of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as infrastructure for accommodation and transport of the troops and logistic support. With regards to the stay of NATO forces, a solid legal framework was developed based on the national laws and SOFA agreement. development of the legal framework was a long process, constantly evolving and enhancing. Real-life situations (traffic accidents, indemnification of private property, damages of infrastructure, etc.) required the legal framework to be urgently defined.

Annual National Programme (ANP)

An aspirant country since 1999, the Republic of Macedonia has the responsibility to develop an annual national programme for NATO membership. Currently, the development of anp 2002 and relevant consultations with NATO are in progress. At least 10 to 20 experts from the army, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Interior are constantly working on it.

Partnership Cooperation As a Possibility for Counter-terrorism

You are all well familiar with the fact that the Republic of Macedonia was a target of terrorist attacks, organised and conducted from the territory of Kosovo. Again in 2001, the coordinated approach of the international community, primarily NATO, with the government of the Republic of Macedonia gave positive results. Bearing in mind our experiences, the deputy defence minister recommended the following at the december session of the MoD:

- joint operation plans to be developed with the host nation and to establish more efficient mechanisms for their speedy adoption and updating;
- police forces are the key factor in the fight against terrorism;
- exchange of classified information; and
- to introduce procedures and mechanisms for early warning and management of risks and threats.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise once again the achievements of the Republic of Macedonia from the PfP cooperation:

- support in building and enhancement of our defence system;
- preparation (training) for giving contribution to peace in the SEE region and Europe as a whole;
- it promotes and enhances the bilateral cooperation among NATO and PfP member countries;
- it reinforces the fight against terrorism in the region; and Macedonia is convinced that active cooperation is the strongest mechanism for accomplishing a full-fledged membership in NATO.

Stefan Merisanu*

Partnership for Peace: Scope, Objectives and Structures

PfP – SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

1. Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a major initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of PfP is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe.

The Partnership for Peace Invitation (PfP Invitation) was addressed to all states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) able and willing to contribute to the Programme. In July 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in early 1995. Now Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) has 46 member countries (19 NATO countries and 27 partner countries, and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has 55 member-states, comprising all European states, together with the United States and Canada.

The PfP programme focuses on defence-related cooperation, a real dialogue and cooperation between NATO and each partner country. It has become an important and permanent feature of the European security architecture. The programme is helping to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build good security relationship based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles.

In accordance with the *PfP Framework Document*, which was issued by Heads of State and Government at the same time as the PfP Invitation Document, NATO undertakes to consult with any active

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Partner if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

The Framework Document includes specific undertakings to be made by each participant to cooperate with NATO in fulfilling the objectives of the programme as a whole. They are as follows:

- • To facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- To ensure democratic control of defence forces;
- To maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and for the responsibility of the OSCE;
- To develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations;
- To develop, over a longer period, forces with more ability to operate with the forces of NATO members.

2. Procedures for Obtaining PfP Statute

Any country wishing to join Partnership for Peace is first invited to sign the *Framework Document*.

In addition to describing the objectives of the Partnership, this describes the basic principles on which PfP is founded.

By virtue of their signature, countries reiterate their political commitment to the preservation of democratic societies and to the maintenance of the principles of international law.

They reaffirm their commitment to fulfilling in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights:

- To refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;
- To respect existing borders;
- To settle disputes by peaceful means;
- To fulfill OSCE obligations and commitments.

After signing the Framework Document, the next step in the procedure is for Partner to submit a *Presentation Document to NATO*. This document indicates the steps to be taken towards achieving the political goals of the Partnership, the military and other assets that the Partner intends to make available for Partnership purposes, and the specific areas of cooperation that the Partner wishes to pursue jointly with NATO.

Based on statements made in the Presentation Document, and on additional proposals made by NATO and the Partner country, an *Individual Partnership Programme (IPP)*, covering a two-year period, is jointly developed and agreed on. The IPP contains statements of the Partner's political aims in PfP, the military and other assets to be made available for PfP purposes, the broad objectives of cooperation between the Partner and the Alliance in various areas of cooperation, and specific activities to be implemented in each of the cooperation areas in PfP.

The selection of activities is made by each Partner separately, on the basis of its individual requirements and priorities, from a list of activities contained in the *Partnership Work Programme (PWP)*. This principle of "self-differentiation" is an important aspect of PfP, which recognises that the needs and situations of each Partner country vary and that each should identify the most convenient forms of activity and cooperation. The PWP contains a broad description of the various areas of cooperation and a list of available activities for each area.

The PWP, like each IPP, also covers a two-year period and is reviewed annually.

For example: the 2001-2002 PWP offers cooperation in 23 areas (slide number 1, please). They are as follows:

1. Air Defence Related Matters – ADF;
2. Airspace Management/Control – ASM;
3. Consultation, Command and Control, including communications and information systems, navigation and identification systems, interoperability aspects, procedures and terminology – C3;
4. Civil Emergency Planning – CEP;
5. Crisis Management – CRM;
6. Democratic Control of Forces and Defence Structures – DCF;
7. Defence Planning, Budgeting and Resource Management – DPB;
8. Planning, Organization and Management of National Defence Procurement Programmes and International Cooperation in the Armaments Field – DPM;
9. Defence Policy and Strategy – DPS;
10. Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence Research and Technology – DRT;
11. Military Geography – GEO;
12. Global Humanitarian Mine Action – HMA;
13. Language Training – LNG;
14. Consumer Logistics – LOG;
15. Medical Services – MED;
16. Meteorological Support for NATO/Partner Forces – MET;
17. Military Infrastructure – MIF;

- 18. NBC Defence and Protection – NBC;
- 19. Conceptual, Planning and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping – PKG;
- 20. Small Arms and Light Weapons – SMW;
- 21. Operational Material and Administrative Aspects of Standardisation – STD;
- 22. Military Exercises and Related Training Activities – TEX;
- 23. Military Education, Training and Doctrine – TRD.

3. PfP Structures

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC, which replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in July 1997, is the body that oversees the development of dialogue, cooperation and consultation between NATO and its Cooperation Partners and provides practical basis for cooperation and consultation between individual member countries and the Alliance. The EAPC has 46 members (19 NATO and 27 Partner nations).

The EAPC sits twice a year at both foreign and defence ministerial levels and, as a rule, at ambassadorial level in Brussels, on a monthly basis.

The EAPC activities complete the PfP Programme

The EAPC Action Plan is made for two years and includes specific areas, such as:

- Political and security-related matters;
- Crisis management;
- Regional matters;
- Arms control issues;
- Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues;
- International terrorism;
- Defence planning and budgeting and defence policy and strategy;
- Security impact of economic developments;
- Civil emergency and disaster preparedness;
- Armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD);
- Nuclear safety;
- Defence-related environmental issues;
- Civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control;
- Scientific cooperation;
- Issues related to peace-support operations.

All members of PfP are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). New member countries may join EAPC, participate in PfP, sign PfP Framework Program and embrace the EAPC concept.

However, PfP retains its own separate identity within the flexible framework provided by EAPC and keeps its own basic elements and procedures. It is founded on the basis of a bilateral relationship between NATO and each PfP country.

Political-Military Steering Committee of Partnership for Peace

(PMSC/PfP) – is the basic working body responsible for PfP matters. It sits in various make-ups, with Allies only or with Allies and Partners.

The main responsibilities of the PMSC include:

- advising the Council on PfP questions;
- being responsible for the overall coordination of PWP;
- developing political-military guidelines to be used by the NATO Military Authorities for the preparation of their input to PWP with respect to military exercises and activities;
- providing guidance for the preparation of the Individual Partnership Programmes (IPP); and
- developing and coordinating work in relation to the Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP).

The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) is a unique PfP structure, based at Mons (Belgium), where the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is also located. It operates under the authority of the North Atlantic Council. The task of the PCC is to coordinate joint military activities within PfP and to carry out the military planning necessary to implement the military aspects of the Partnership Work Programme, notably in the field of military exercises, especially in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and search-and-rescue activities. The PCC also participates in the estimation of these activities.

The Cell is headed by a director. Its international staff consists of NATO personnel and, as of 1998, the personnel from Partner countries. Staff officers from Partner Missions are also attached to the PCC for liaison purposes.

In the NATO Headquarters, Partners are represented by liaison elements consisting of diplomatic and military personnel. Many Partner countries have established full diplomatic missions formally accredited to NATO, as well as senior military representation to the Military Committee.

4. Other Pfp Initiatives

The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)

The Pfp Framework Document commits NATO to developing with the Partner countries a planning and review process, designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations, in conjunction with the Alliance forces. Initially, Pfp operations were limited to peacekeeping, search-and-rescue and humanitarian operations. Later, with the new concept – Enhanced and More Operational Pfp/EMOP – the missions included peace-support operations (PSO), as well.

The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) is a two-year process with both bilateral and multilateral elements. For each planning cycle, Partners wishing to participate in the process undertake to provide information on a wide range of subjects, including their defence policies, development of the democratic control of the armed forces, national policy on the cooperation within Pfp, relevant financial and economic plans, and an extensive overview of their armed forces and detailed information on the forces which they are prepared to make available for Pfp cooperation. All these information are provided in NATO's biennial "Survey of Overall Pfp Interoperability".

Two PARP cycles have been completed since 1995 (1995-1997 and 1997-1999, which was extended till 2000). The main goal during the third PARP cycle, which began in 2001, is the implementation of the Partnership goals, involving each Partner country.

Enhanced and More Operational Partnership/EMOP

This concept was first promoted after the Washington Summit in 1999. Its main purpose is the increase the Partners' role in the decision-making and planning process within Pfp.

Political-Military Framework for NATO-led Pfp Operations/PMF

This concept provides the Partner nations with the possibility to generate the forces and capabilities that might be made available for peace-support operations. To this purpose, a database was created

containing more information about these forces and capabilities, as well as an estimate mechanism and feedback process.

*Training and Educational Enhancement
Programme/TEEP*

This programme is a national responsibility, but its main purpose is to promote the dialogue and cooperation between NATO and PfP training and education institutions.

It contains six main elements:

- cooperation between training and education institutions;
- estimate mechanism and feedback process for the PfP activities;
- instruments for interoperability – process for Partner countries;
- instruments and planning methods for exercises;
- NATO lesson learned for national strategy area for training and education; and
- simulating and training at distance.

There are a number of TEEP training centers, including one in Romania. The PfP and the academic community have designed special programmes of cooperation in the area of defence within the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institute.

ROMANIA'S PARTICIPATION IN PfP

Romania was the first Partner country to sign the PfP Framework Document, on January 26, 1994. It participates in PfP convinced that this is a means to fulfill the interoperability and partnership goals.

The Romanian Army is getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic exigencies. This participation is an indispensable stage in the process of preparation for integration into NATO. Romania's participation in PfP brought about the reform of the military, thus being an important tool for training the forces for multinational operations (type PSO). This increased Romania's credibility as security provider and a factor of stability in Southeastern Europe. Furthermore, the PfP offered the possibility to participate in the new initiatives launched at the Washington Summit, namely the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) and Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP).

Romania's participation in PfP activities increased in terms of complexity, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The table below shows the evolution of this development.

Slide 2

Year	No. of activities	No. of exercises	Exercises hosted by Romania
1994	60	4	-
1995	145	8	2
1996	385	12	2
1997	580	18	3
1998	546	36	2
1999	426	30	3
2000	340	28	6
2001	336	26*	-

* 19 NATO/ PfP exercises and 7 ISO exercises

Between 1995 and 2001, Romania hosted several NATO/PfP exercises:

Slide 3

- 1995 – exercise "RESCUE 95"
exercise "COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION 95"
- 1996 – exercise "COOPERATIVE PARTNER 96"
exercise "COOPERATIVE KEY 96"
- 1997 – exercise "COOPERATIVE SUPPORT 97"
exercise "COOPERATIVE RESCUE 97"
exercise "COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION 97"
- 1998 – exercise "COOPERATIVE PARTNER 98"
exercise "RESCUE EAGLE"
- 1999 – exercise "COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION 99"
exercise "RESCUER"
exercise "OLTENIA 99"
exercise "COOPERATIVE BEST-EFFORT 2000"
exercise "OPENING WINDOWS RO 2000"
exercise "BLUE DANUBE 2000"
exercise "RESCUE EAGLE 00/MEDCEUR 00-2"
exercise "COOPERATIVE KEY 2000"
exercise "CARPATHIANS EXPRESS 2000"

The aim of Romania's participation in PfP is to fulfill the Partnership goals. The main elements of these goals are the following:

- to provide the necessary conditions, from the military point of view, for Romania's integration into NATO;
- to fulfill the stipulations of Membership Action Plan;
- to prepare the forces for participation in crisis management operations;

- to use the air space of the European community and manage air space in crisis situations;
- to adopt the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

The Elaboration of Individual Partnership Programme between Romania and NATO (IPP)

The Individual Partnership Programme underlines the political commitment of the Romanian Government to further strengthening the country's role as a security provider, and pursuing national security interests in close relation with the general process of consolidation of security and stability in Europe.

Romania's commitment to Partnership for Peace also reflects a firm adherence of the entire Romanian society to democracy, respect for human rights and free-market economy.

In elaborating the IPP, the Romanian Ministry of Defence (MoD) consults the structures with attributions in this field, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking into account the qualitatively new opportunities entailed by the conveniences of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the implementation of the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership for Peace.

The NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office (my former office) drafted the Individual Partnership Plan between Romania and NATO for 1998-2000. The main activities were as follows:

- When it was first received (1998-2000), PwP was compared with the precedent document (1997-1999PWP) and with the 1997-1999 IPP.

- Between May and September 1997, the national defence institutions as well as other civilian institutions involved in NATO/PfP activities were consulted about Romanian participation in PWP activities. The NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office organised a meeting with all representatives of civilian and military structures with responsibilities in this field in order to decide on the forces, means and costs of Romanian participation in PWP activities 1998-2000, including the activities hosted in Romania. Following this consultation meeting, the Individual Partnership Program (IPP 1998-2000) was drafted as follows:

- *Part I – Introduction. Political-Statement of IPP*; this part was drafted by NATO and Strategic Problems Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- *Part II – Forces Available for PfP Operations*;
- *Part III – IPP Objectives* were drafted by Military Cooperation Section within the General Staff;

- *Part IV – PfP Activities* (other than NATO/PfP exercises, seminars, courses), and
- *Part V – ISO Activities* (regional activities that contribute to the accomplishment of PfP objectives) are planned by NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office.

– After receiving the answers and inputs from those structures, the NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office drafted the Individual Partnership Programme between NATO and Romania. It was then submitted for approval to the Supreme Council for Country's Defence (in September 1997).

– Therefore, the NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office made the necessary changes and drafted the Individual Partnership Programme between Romania and NATO for 1998-2000 (in Romanian and English). The document was submitted for approval to the NATO specialised offices and structures through the Romanian NATO mission (October 1997).

Upon NATO's approval, the NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office informed the military and civilian structures about the activities they had to organise at home and abroad for the period 1998-2000. The NATO/PfP Activities Planning Office and the Military Cooperation Section within the General Staff coordinated all activities of the National Defence Ministry.

Since 2001, the IPP drafting process rules have been the same, but the contact with NATO structures is now made via the Internet. Approval is obtained by the same means.

Since 1998, the civil organizations have been involved in IPP activities, thus facilitating the exchange of ideas on issues of mutual interest. In this sense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, as well as other ministries, through their representatives, attended various meetings and took part in a number of exercises organized within the IPP.

The achievements realized within IPP involve proper budgeting by both Romania and NATO. The IPP activities prove Romania's political will to continuously invest efforts in this sense, in compliance with the financing principles stipulated by the PfP framework. Romania supports the financial expenditures for the exercises organized within the PfP framework.

The Importance of IPP Assessments

The IPP Assessments are prepared every second year to cover the activities of the two previous years of implementation, and submitted to the PMSC through the NATO Team notation. Partners also have the option to submit this assessment on an annual basis.

The IPP Assessments are a ceaseless dialogue between the Partner country and NATO (as the PARP study also represents) which helps to evaluate the efforts made in various stages. They are useful in identifying the shortcomings encountered in different fields and identifying the improvement measures.

In case of aspirants, the Assessment of PfP activities could provide a useful input on defence/military issues. To maximize the benefit of this assessment in reviewing the progress of the aspirants, it should be coordinated by means of MAP procedures. The Assessment of PfP activities should be discussed in the PMSC in 19.1 format for each Partner.

Romania has prepared these assessments on an annual basis, because it considers them to be instrumental in the context of IPP correlation with the Membership Action Plan.

Correlation Between IPP 2000-2001 and the Membership Action Plan

The Membership Action Plan clearly defines the priority areas of cooperation in the PfP framework. They are:

- Military Doctrine and Training (LNG+TEX+TRD);
- Air-Space Management and Air Defence (ADF+ASM);
- Command and Control, including Communications and Information Systems (C3);
- Logistics (LOG); and
- Military Infrastructure (MIF).

As regards the priority areas of cooperation in the PfP framework, the objectives are the following:

- *Military Training and Doctrine*
 - Reshape and democratize the structure, manning and legal status of the armed forces in accordance with the new concept, Multiannual Planning Cycle 2000-2007;
 - Downsize the Armed Forces and numbers of civilians working in the military;
 - Create a competitive career structure for the professional cadre.
 - Ensure the understanding and application of the allied doctrines and procedures used within the combined joint peacekeeping, search-and-rescue, humanitarian aid NATO-led operations:
 - Implement specific training programmes for the personnel in the PARP dedicated units.
 - Increase the number of Romanian military personnel and civilians participating in the courses organized by NATO;
 - Run the courses at the Regional PfP Training Centre;

- Establish the Regional Training Centre of Defence Resources Management by the end of 2000.

– *Air Defence and Air Space Management*

- Reorganise the air defence system to make it compatible with NATO systems;

- Connect the Air Surveillance System main command post to the NATO integrated system;

- Complete the procurement programme for the FPS 117 radar systems and the related equipment for data transmission;

- Start the programmes to equip C-130 aircraft with NATO radio navigation system and MIG-21 LANCER with NATO air-reconnaissance system.

– *Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C3I) – objectives*

- Continue to develop the Strategic Communication System for the Romanian Armed Forces (STAR);

- Develop compatible C3 systems for Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) ground units and air forces;

- Implement the NATO C3I procedures and standards to Romanian Armed Forces;

- Integrate all C3I components into NATO interoperable strategic communications system.

– *Logistics – objectives*

- Adapt the Romanian Armed Forces logistic doctrine to meet the NATO standards and requirements;

- Finalise the NATO-compatible structures of the logistics departments at all levels of the Army structures;

- Adopt the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS) using standard NATO movement equipment.

- Develop cooperation with NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) in the area of codification, stocks storing and management and sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NAMSA.

– *Military Infrastructure*

- Upgrade the facilities made available for PfP within Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Lessons learnt from Romania's participation in PfP are the following:

- Romania's participation in PfP was realised at both individual and team levels. Romanian staff officers contributed decisively to the improvement of scenarios and the understanding of official documents. Inside every team, they proved to be able to make the right decisions. Furthermore, *Romania was the only Partner country to par-*

ticipate in the whole spectrum of NATO/PfP exercises (ground, naval, air, logistic, civil protection, and combined).

- The participation in the NATO/PfP activities, from the planning stages, was essential for theoretical and practical training of Romanian staff officers.

- The participation in PfP activities improved the preparation of forces designed to participate in peace-support operations (PSO); the experience gained in those missions constitutes the basis for the training of the forces which will take part in NATO-led operations. It gives a good insight for the improvement of rules and regulations.

- After an active participation in more than 1,100 activities between 1997 and 1998, Romania applied quality-efficiency instead of quantity criteria. Therefore, the activities scheduled for 1999-2000 were numerically reduced and priority problems selected.

For 2001, in the process of the selection of activities, the following requirements were observed:

- Most of the activities were within the seven priority areas: air defence (ADF), air space management (ASM), C3, logistics (LOG), infrastructure (MIF), English language instruction (LNG), training and doctrine (TRD);

- Every activity should contribute to the fulfillment of a Partnership Goal (PG) and a MAP II goal.

The selection of participants was realised through the Peace Support Operations (PSO) subunits and those with representations in the NATO command structures.

Romania selected 336 activities (28 hosted locally), covering all the 23 areas of cooperation for 2001, 191 activities being planned for priority areas (57%). Until the end of 2001, 90% of the priority areas activities were completed. The activities in the other domains were 85% completed.

In 2001, Romania planned to take part in 19 exercises. Sixteen were executed, two postponed as a result of the security measures imposed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 events, and we were not invited to one. Furthermore, Romania took part in other 7 ISO exercises.

The Participation to the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)

The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process, launched together with PfP concept at 1994 Brussels Summit, is the main evaluation tool of PfP.

In the first PARP cycle (1995-1997), Romania partially accomplished 18 interoperability objectives assumed in 1995 (out of an overall 19 proposed by NATO).

During the second PARP cycle (1997-1999, subsequently extended to 2000), the main goal was to implement the 44 objectives of interoperability. The Peace Support Operations (PSO) units and those from the Rapid Reaction Force have priority in this period.

In the spring of 1999 Romania decided to implement 10 of the Initial Partnership Objectives (IPG). Those were intended to supplement the preparation to accomplish the partnership goals and not to replace them. The aim was to declare the forces of partner countries and their capabilities that are ready to take part in NATO-led peace support operations.

In February 2000, starting with the third Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) cycle, Romania started implementing 84 out of 88 Partnership Goals:

- 26 general partnership objectives;
- 19 partnership objectives for Land Forces;
- 16 partnership objectives for Naval Forces;
- 23 partnership objectives for Air Forces.

Among these, five were accomplished in 2000 and 19 in 2001. Another 17 Partnership goals are to be implemented between 2003 and 2006, and an extra 14 in 2007.

Even though the number of Partnership Goals is so impressive, their accomplishment contributes to the increase of interoperability implementation.

At the level of the Ministry of National Defence the "Plan for Implementation of Partnership Goals for 2001-2007" was adopted. For every partnership objective is nominated the responsible structure for its implementation, cost evaluation, planning the resources.

Romania considers that national security interest can be accomplished only through integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, the integration into NATO being a strategic objective.

Through active participation in PfP and EAPC, Romania has proved to be able to face the NATO requirements, making a valuable contribution to the security environment in the 21st century.

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